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On_ July 20, 1954 1 after.alm<>st eight years of bitter fighting 
between France and the peoples of Viet~Nam 0 Laos, and Cambodia, 
certain Agreement~ were signed at the Far Eastern Conf®rence at 
--=, 
Geneva 9 foll~wing ihe fall-of Die~ Bie~ Phuo Tb®y r_epEesented both 
the end-of ths ~Indo~Chi~a War 09 and th® beginning of-a process 
:'! 
which led to the termination of the French Colonial Empireo The 
War,·, popularly called "the_ Indoc:c,Chin.a War" and thought of as mainly 
i Franc@=Vietna~~se ~ffair, b~g~ri as no more than an attempt.at 
colonial· reco.nquest by Fr~n~e, and ended as a phase of the inter- · 
national "Cold War"o 
With the Geneva Agreements, a precarious peace came to Indo~ 
China, a pe~ce which meant no more than a respite from conditions 
of actual warfarso Th® ~peace which came to Indo~China was not a 
.,. -•,, • - •'.t -,,.,-,-••.• ,:,-\•--~.-,,•a•.,--.-.• •·.·,,-.._r.-.-, •• -- , .-, -. 
.. "conqueror 9 s peace 00 but a ~forced peace~o It was born out of neither 
victory nor ordinary diplomatic compromise, but omt of a combination 
. -
! 
o ~ ~ -~ a_c km~ i ~h~_ ea~~ it. _ a,n,d ~~ ta~! _d_~ f ea~ s.~~~~e-e._ d __ J~-.: W''2~~~~-~~-C?~eE..,_J_ b=~.a::;,:=~~=:11 
L_-~~ .. :::: ..= ......... = . . ~;_;_-.:,, __ .. ;;.;s1 _:-.~:-~-~~.,,_ •. ~ .... ,.~.,i·.\,l~--"' ... ~., • .17:'.,-~ ..  ... ,~~:.-·--~'J'.-· ..  'P.'~~f~. ~-=--=· . ". ~--'. · · · · ·· · · ,,. · · · · - · . · 
f.or which-·many people were grateful, but whether or not it ·was a 
"peace with honor", as French leaders had promised, few people would· 
agreeo 
The peace which came to Indo-China with the settlement at Geneva 
., 
was indeed the results of a series of fortuitous cireum~tanceso It 
came because Western leaders were unable to find a comm@IDl solution 
~ . 
regarding Indo=China ~ because the F~ench leaders finally realized 
that the colonial era was ovell" end "la presence francais~ 1111 could no 
longer be preserved in Indo~China by means of force; because the 
·- . . ' ' . . ' 
· -- ~-- · le~ders of. the-United States were not prepared to assume the re~ 
., .. 
sponsibility fur the war without the moral and material support of their 
' 
la Although the actual signing of the agreements took place during 
the early hours of July 21, 1954, the Agreements were officially 
ttated "in Geneva at 2400 h~urs o~ the 20th of July 195%0" (See "Text 
of the, G®neva Agreements 9 ' 0 Nev, York Times[hereaft<er !)[T 7 July 2q» 
195%)0 Premier Mendes~Franc~ was thus abl~ t@ win the wageT he had 
made a month s~tlisr upon assuming office~ to reach an &greement 
concerning the ,var in Indo~'Cbina vii thin 30 days or to resigno 
(Ale:xand.~r ·\Ver th~ Lost .. Sta.-teman; . The .... Strang.e _____ Hi.Bt_or.y:_J>..f : .. ~i.erre_M'en._des-
France (LoJldoJl: Bar~ie 13oo~ks, 1~?8), p._87. ~~ ~~ ~ _ ~~~----------
.. ' .......... '·······~····· ·····~ ,., .. ~··~·-·-···· .... , .... -.. ,~ .. ··-·-·-·,·· - -· ..... ---·· - -- .. ., .. .... .. . . . . .. .. . . ... ... . .... . .... , .. , .. ,., ···,·~··-·..-· 
\. 
... 
-:--·· .... :···-·--··-..-·--._, ......... ~,-,.-· ... ~ .. · -··-·-·-·~·-1-· -. -- .. . 
-···· ' ................ . 
"' 
. ~---·~~---,.._._'-'".'--=----=-.... - .. _--a..,s.,,- - • --··--,·---
- - -
-·. ··--·~·-·•.l'.t 
,.,-
-2-
-- _.,.__ .. .•_ i ; .. ;" . 
., .~ 
----·------·--·----~----:--·--.. -------·-.. ------
• i); • .• 
'"allies and, finally, becau.s~ Great Britain was anxious t.o "avoid a 
·•o;.• • •·.. • ..... ,. ·-··· ,. .• - ,• .-. ~-······ ··-····- •,··- -·-·· ·----····· •. -- •• _:-- - .. - ~- - \=.If" -... • o"" - .. ... ....... . • ~ ·- •• 
.:,, . 
·universal catastroph~ and to seek a peaceful understandi~g with 
. " 
the newly emerging power of Commu.nfst China, 
The Geneva settl~ment was achieved, however, not merely.owing 
to disharmony amoqg Western leaders, but can also b~ attributed to. 
international Communist strategy at the time. One of the reasons 
.. peace came tQ Jndo=Cpina was because the Soviet Union was anxious 
to demonstrate it© sincerity in a~hieving "peaceful co-existence"; 
. ~ 
because China.~ arixi@us 'to gain international recogni tion1) had urged 
.. (t 
;-., 
_i.'-
~' --: 
·- -- ·-·.. -·. --· .- .... - 7--, 
lts .. ally ·in theS·outh to make·concessionsr and be-cause.Jthre·Vieta:o -~-- ~ ~ ~ .•. ~,.·. , ... .--,, .--~ .. - -.:,-.c.·--~·-..... - ••. ~ -··· ~ •< • 
' . Minh Regime·f) apprehending possible atomic warfare and appreciating_ 
the desire JorLpeace of the Vietnamese people, accepted much less 
than they could bJve asked fore 
Peace-making is unfortunately not always an easy task, however. 
·The Far Eastern Conference begun in Geneva on April 26, 1954 was 
,marked with special uncertaintyo Of its two stated objectives~ to 
establish a "united and· independent Korea" and to restore ~peace 
while its attempts to reach its primary goal ended in failure. Its 
endeavour to restore peace in Indo-China, however, brought about 
the historic Agreements which resulted in an unstable and evanescent 
truce. 
The Agreements practically terminated the French colonial 
. i 
' ! 
, ... , ,, , .- ' - "- . -· •-~ ·-· .. 
regime which was established in Indo-China about one century earlier. 
Cambodia, and Laos won almost complete independence~ Viet~Nam was 
partitioned by the Agreements into two zones 9 each administered by 
:- I 
___ .......... -......... ·-----.. ---~~--:-.. ·-"--------a--separate government o The parti ci pant is to the Geneva C onf e renc e 
., 
undertook to ~respect the sovereignty 0 the independence 9 the unity 
and the territorial.~ntegri~y of the abov~~menti~n~d States (viz. 
Cambodia, Laos, and Vi et=Nam) and to refrain from a'iiy interrf ere nee 
in their internal affairso" 2 The Agreements include the Agreements 
of the Cessation of·Hostilities, the Final Declaration of the 
'· '*" 
Geneva Conference, and the Declarations of the Gover~ents concernedQ 
~· 
... ,..... . -
_ .. _ .. ___ ,_ _____ ,__, _______ ,_~ 
---------·--·········· --- ------ --·-~-----·--··4·--·"·--~----,~ •-- ···-- -'------------------------.. ~-----····-~ ...... -------··-···-- ·--··--' .. . . -
See Text, op. cit o, NYT, _Ju_l~_ 2\_, __ 19.5_~~ !----~-----------2 0 ' -- .... _-~-- .... ____ ,,_ 
.... --~ • • - .... • • .. Jo • - ... - • • .. - •• ••• .• - .. - .~ - ... • .. •• -- •• - ' .... - ,, ... -· ••• • ... -- - .... '~ -. --- - _ .. - -· ... -- -- •• ,- -- ....... ..... 
I 
.... . ' 
·-·----···-·---·--------~---:---,-· - ·---·--- ··--·-·---- . ---··-··-·. --- ·-·---··-·-----. --.. . : ·~----·--. -- . · ___ ·-·-------·-
! 
....., 
• I 
.J 
·'· 
-3-
C , 
·". 
-···· -·· --~--- -·-- ~------
_ V.i'et..,.Nam,. according to the Agreemen~s~, was to be' divided .at·~~-~ . ... -····-···-···-- .. ,- .. 
. . ... . ·•. . s.ev;nt;;;th· p~;~ii~l°:3 iii. of North ;i.~t:;~~~~~d p~;t ~f Ce~tra1 .. j 
\ t{ 
·l·~Jl"~. V1 et-Nam ~ from "the Chi~e se frontier, in the North dOl'{ll to almost the.. -i __ J 
......•. ,._ ······ ···- .. ·······:·······-··· - . -·--·· 
·, 
~-
for~er imperial capital of Bui~ were placed under ~he ~ontrol -~f the 
:... .. . ' . 
Democra!ic Re~ublic of Viet~Nam 0 no longer ~viet-Minh rebels"o Th~ 
part of Viet-Nam south of the 17th Parallel was ·left under the super-
vision of the then '0State of Viet=Namt" headed by Emperor ])ao Da~,one 
_, 
of the "Associate States" set up by the French during the conflict. 
,.,.-.;.~-~\ ( 
· · ........ ., ..... .,----,-~., ... , . .,~.-~--· ... ~ ... ,. """""' ---.-....... !J.!9 .. · f a-&i l i-tatep -the ··-e nf o-r~ emen·t--o-f~he ·· A·g· r:eemelfi-~·-~- ---re·g~t1~ -.... ---·- ····· _ ..... ---···>"'··"·--,···---·"·" ..... --.-~· 
',. ~-... ' r-
~-
f 
ing of the hostile forces was called foro French Union forces 
% 
noith·of the demarcation line (ioeo mainly in the Hanoi~Haiphong 
areas), and the DRVN forces south of that line, were to be concen-
trated in specified grouping zones, which were t' be evacuated 
within three hundred days in different stages~ I~ order to re-
store peace and \o forestall the resumption of c~nflict~»the ~ 
Agreements clearly stip~lated 9 besides the provisions aimed at en-
'!JJ 
.. ... --r,·-o;.-c·"·~;~"=~=~·-7'·:- ·,-:·:-· c~,-s,ar-ing,: th·e ; .. C'0'·S;S1l'tio,n"··:o·f::·.·:h:ocs·ti 1 i tie-s,,--~_t·ha:t·.•· 11 tb·e' ·i1itrodl1e-ti:on i·D:1if):'.Y"::O.":r···'.,-,cc,c·s-:;-,c-;:c~~=-'.C":""-'-7 "r-· 
... ~ . 
Viet~Nam of any troop reinforcements and additional military 
personnel, as well as any reinforcements in the forms of all types 
of arms, munitions, and other war materials is prohibitedo" 
Also prohibited were "the establishme.nt of new military bases,," 
the establishment of "military bases under the control of a foreign 
Stateegoin the regrouping zone of either party," the adherence of 
either side 09 to any military alliance," and ··t·he use of either side 
"for the resumption of hostilities or to further ·an aggressive 
Jo Mendes~France in his first report to the National Assembly after 
the Geneva Conference said that the Viet-Minh had at first asked for 
the 13th. Parallel (Ji»urnal Offic'ieli,, 23 July 195~)v but according 
to a report of Colone1 d@ Br~bi@Q@~p .who negotiated th~ military 
questiG) __ Illls v1,i th ~he ~e_pr~~~nt~tives ·of. ~Ttle Bo (;hi Minh. Government, 
the Vietnamese took the initi~tive to propose that the dividing. 
line between the two mones sb~uld be established ~somewhere near 
Buen J;ituated between 16th and 17th Paralle.!70 (J,0J11._,x:,.aa1·0fficiel, 
17~,cembrel954)o Realising the weakening position of France at · 
the Conference 9 the Viet=-Minh representatives later insisted- upon· 
the 13th Parallel, and obtained the 17th Parallel as they originally 
proposedo . . . 
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·-p-·o·· ·11·· c·y .. " .·Both .par·t·fe·· s· w·e· r· ·e fu·r· ther· ·. o·· r··d· e· ·r---·e--d ·t·o obse·rve·· th·e ·bu·f·fer···· . '· ..•....... , .... ;, .. , .,.,.. ,·,~---~·-···"'.'"·•···-··.····-·-
c~aracter of the demilitaris~d toneQ 
With a view to insuring the ~eunification of Viet-Namf the 
Agreements specified that elections would be held simultaneously in 
both parts of Viet~Nam by July 20, 19560 The authorities of Noith. 
I 
and South ~iet~Nam were to prepare for this..national election 
beginning July: 20 9 19550 The e1ections would then be organised and 
carried out 9 after con~~l°ul tations bet-;;veen the two Governments of 
· Vie .. t--NaIJ!, under the supervision of an ··'lnternatiorial Supervisory 
...... _ .... 
. '·-- .. , ... .~~ ........ ;:,.; r.;:..~. ~-·, ~··~·.;.~ -.,,r".•'•¥<--. :!'""_....,. ..... d 
.,_ 
Commission consistjng of representatives ·"o··r India, Poland and 
Canadao 4 -- ' 
Responsibility for the enforcement of the Agreements was, in 
the first instance, recognised as that of the French High Command 
and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam(DRVN), 
which together formed a Central Joint CommissionQ They were in 
turn subject to the supervision of the International Supervisory 
, • Commission,/ under the chairmanship of the Indian representativee 
The Commission was to vote generally by majority with dissension 
• .,~ •. C -'· ... r L_.~ _/ _'t • ! .. '•-......... ..:?·-" :""•s_~.- ';•_;•~' .,f • .. ~---.:---~~--.... --.,_-• ~·<••••-,-•:~-,,.--:u .'.C;.~ :·-•::•·~,-.,.-::-._ .. -•·- Cf." ,-·-,'>""',:;-_• • ,•• ·; .. .,.., ·1~ .... •;·•-••·-1h:·--, -:--;.!-•;:,-: •"•,-;•·•r--:---::-;•:-• '-"':-"'~.,••::--:··-:~-·,: '":",...• •~·- ;-·:•:·,-• .. :,~-"'\""'.;"~' ···--·-··;·-~- ••'i- •• •••-·..-•~- •'"'::~ ·-s:•---.,:•-•-:--•--•-:-~-;-•-;---,·,'.:---::::---••-•;~y-:-:---:-.-•-,_:-;-•,:·~~·.-::-~--•-.•-., '• ;-s;-;-;-•-:--:-r.:----i.-i-~\".'~"-.. ~;7•:;--;.'":,.~~,,.--;;;·-•:~1 If .. ,Ji..~ ,, > 11 - > ,-•},-.,._,{ .. j I ,;; ') < •• ~ .. 
r~corded as sucho · 
,,,T 
. -- ' -·~- -·-
The terms of the Geneva Agreements relating to Laos and Cambodia 
differ somewhat from those concerning Viet-Namo In the Agreements 
regardi;g Laos 9 the' independence and political integrity of Laos 
.a::.., 
was tobe ~ecognised by the Democratic Repnblic of Viet~Namo Alien 
military forces were to be evacuated "within four months," although 
the Royal Laotian Government was permitted, at their own initiatjve, 
to request the continuation of the existing French bases at 
Savannakhet and Xieng Houang and of the French military inst~uctors$ 
I' . 
4o The provision f~r nation~wide elections in Viet~Nam was 1 
. - ·#-\. . 
stipulated in the.rFinal Declaration of the Geneva Conference,of · 
which the United States and the State of Viet-Nam are not signatoriesQ 
Thanks to this _legal aspect of the Agreements 9 the Government of 
C)!South V.iet.,...Nam v1as later able to refuse to hold negotiations with 
the authorities of North Viet~Nam for the preparation of the elec~ 
tionso There have been, .consequently, no natio~...,.wide 1elections -as ., 
stipulated in tQe settlemento 
........... 
- - -· ·- -·• - - -- --'•---------- - -- ------ - -~--· 
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, I 
· · ..... : ......... ~ .............. .;., .. .; ... :,~ ......................... The Laotian Royal Government. was to grant·· a general amnesty to 
I ' 
Laotian, ndissidents" (ioeo the supporters of the ·pro 7 Vie~---Minh 
Pathet Lao movement)e Tho~e who ~hose not to integrati into the ' 
.. 
Laotian community under the control of the Royal Govermment would, ~. 
_for the time bei~g 9 be concentrated in the northeastern provinces 
of Phong Saly and Sam Neua~ They would remain under their control, 
though under the supervision of a Laotian Government delegationo 
r ~ \!· 
" These areas wouJd subsequentl~be r~integrated ~ith the Kingdom v 
·ir" 
' 
. J . . 
of Lao's after' national ele~tio'~s to be.><held in
1
~~~_';5.- · - ----------- --
,,. 
·In the Agreements concerning Cambodia, t~ere was no provision 
· for the· establishment of regrouping areas for 'iei ther the French 
Union forces or the DRVN forceso All" alien military forces, French 
~":f 
Union forces included, were to have evacuated Cambodia territory 
within three mont.hso The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam was to 
! 
recognise the independence and political integrity of Cambodia~ 
.·. 
Cambodia, f·urthermore, .won its rights··to request foreign aid in 
m~n and mat~riel, if they deemed it nec·essary for self-defense, 
. _ · · ·. to allow foreign military bases on its territ ... Q.17Y .i.f theii;·{s,ecurity · ·>~· ,_ 
. . .. _ · i!L:;~ •" . ·· '' · ' ·" -l' • ,.< ·'. " .r-:-r.,,-; , .. ?"e·'C."-'.""'T.7-, .. , • .·. ,;-- , - .. ,.·,··fr, ·, •. ,~ re;- +:;, . , ,. ,. ,t ·r., .. ,. , . ~. '"':'· . ,, ,c7 •. , --~-- . ,, , . , , ,;, .-:-,.r.-. ~- .,.· '.'/;'f',\.' 1, ,, , ;' .... • ;~."!f., .. '.. ".' i,.:, .. , .. 7"""'c,, .~, • •. , ,. ,· .. r.;-,c:.,,,,i~,~~-' =~*-··,·'c;_,,.,.,,, 1 .. "~>i., o.,c-.o>,,S,J -•~:;·.:'~·>""";.~:ref.';·, . 
.......... !, .... 
.... ·. 
was menaced, and to enter into military alliances which were not 
contrary to the United Nations Charter. 6 · 
A;f ter three months of protracted negotiations a,in the early hours 
of July 21, 1954, a final settlement was achieved at Genevao The ·-" 
Geneva Agreements.were composed of two principal parts~ the first 
- ' 
part consisted of the three separate Agreements on the Cessation 
of Hostilities in Viet~Nam~ Laos 9 and Cambodiao Each was signed 
by Ta Q_1.1ang Buu, fqr the Comm,ander--in--Chief of the P-eople 0 ·s ·Army 
of Viet-Nam, anl by Brigadier-·General Del teil, for the Commander-
in-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo~Chinao 
"The Final Declaration ·of the Geneva Conference" formed the 
5o Agreement on the ·Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, See 
NYT, July 24:, 19540 
.60 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia, 
· Ibido July 24, 19540 
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second part of the s~ttlemerito The Dele~ation of the Stat~ of Viet-·· 
Nam,hopel~ssly·p~ot~ited agai~et tbe settlement whieh.was negbiiated 
I 
. 
-, 
.,. 
. : .~ ·: 
' 
.and agreed pr-_actically without i·ts consent and sometimes v1i thout its 
knowledge, 7 refused to affix ,fts name to the Final Deciarationo 
...___ 
/ . 
.... 
Maintaining r:eservations with r~gard to the I accor~1 and sensing that 
" c ... 
the- accord might be interpreted at home as a concession to the Com-
munist side, the UoSo Delegation also refused to sign the Final 
_ 
Settlemento 
- •. ,, ,--t-~ ... ....,.-.......... .i....,...,..,~,~--n---:,d,-.--.-- ... ___ ~--- . .z 
.. --· - --· -. -- . 
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;">r 
. ---- :tr .... ,. -- ... -- , . - ··- ..... ~ ('· - - . q-, • .Ai .. 
,lor the American ·Delegation;- General Bedell Smith, however,. 
'issued a separate De~laration 0 whic~ volunt~ered that the United~ 
,. ·· ··········States the threat or t..h.e nRA of ·force to· dis-
~- ' • .i' ---
tur~' the Agreements and that the Government of the United States 
•ooo would view any renewal of the aggression in -violation of the 
afore said agreement's with grave concern and as seriously_.,,, threatenCD 
in~'international pTace and security."
8 
' 
In connection with the statem~nt in the "Final Declaration" 
concerning free elections in Viet~Nam, the UQ So Declaration main-
. I 
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~.-;-;,r•·i·rc--="='=~•-;~/~'",,,,, .. .,i,.,c~·.-,=•T,-;~talii~ed'c;•inatC••it 'tf's'ball "''seek to· achieve unity .through free elections !; 
, • 
I 
... 
... - ..... \; - . 
'lo.,... ........... -.: ..... _ .... -· 
. 
supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted : 
fairlyo" 9 Meanwhile the Delegation of the State of Viet=Nam also 
published its own.Declaration voicing its protest "against the fact 
that the French High Command has arrogated to itself the right, 
·without prior a.greeme)lt from the Delegation of the State of 
Viet-Nam 9 to fix the date of the future elections despite the clearly 
political nature of such a provisiono"lO 
·-s; T • 
When the delegates of the seven other nations had affixed their 
signatures, peace, however flimsy its nature 9 controversial its form~ 
and dubious its content 9 had come to Indo~China~ 
7o The Head of the Vietnamese Delegation complained at various 
~~~asions that the Delegation of the State of Viet-Nam was not 
being informed of the negotiations by j. ts French Allyo · (NYT, July- - ·-
19, 1954; The Times (London) 9 July 19 0 195~0 · 
80 Declaration of the United States Dele ation, UoSu Depto of 
State Bulletin, Volo XXXI,. Noo 788 AugQ 2, .195q), ppo 16~-630 
,!t'., .• : ··.(t·'i\.£.' ·.,_('••' 
Ibido 
' ,· 
.,. 10g ..,.De~-laration of the Delegation of the State ·of Viet-Mam, 
_IbidoJuly 2~, 195~0 
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CHAPTER ONE : BACKGROUND OF THE GENEVA ·coNFERENCE 
. ' . "' 
• I . 
.. Many· aspects o"'f the Geneva Far Eastern Conference rema--iri obscure e 
·Three questions in particular require answerso There is first of all 
/ 
the question as to why the ConfeT~nce was convened at all? Secondly, 
J an explanation is required as to why the great powers were able to 'i ' . .I 
1 (/ agree on a settl<emento In the third place O one could ask which of 
~ . 
· .. :tJ.'le maj«rr powers was successful? Were the Agreements signed at Geneva 
. . - . T . ' . ,· ,.· - •. . . . . ; . ., -~ 
~ Communist victory_ as- many people in the ·'\Vest consider ... or did "they· 
; 
represent a settlement ,favorable to both sides? Answers to these 
........... , .. ~-···-··'·· ...... ···""as~q~estionEl form thf! su~ject _of this thesis e As a first step towards ·····-·······················-·-···· 
the solutions of these dilemmas, it is proposed t4at events immediate-
/'. 
ly preceding the Conference be examined and that this be followed by 
a description of the Conference itself 9 the de1~gates attending and 
"" 
the procedure adopt~d at the meetingse- rlt is hoped that this analysis 
'will suggest hypotheses which eiplain the reasons for the summonin~ 
of the Conference and the policies which the Great Powers followed 
' ,.· . ~ 
=···''" ~, - .. , .. , ... ,. , .... , <·.::.~,·,·--·-~'···---· __ ~µi:J~g ___ t~-~- .,.P~-~c ee dings o -
' 
. . .,,.~ .................... - •. , ... -· •'• ·-,--, .. .' __ - ........ , .... - ... · .. ,,··;,.~ ... ,-..-·"·.;.·,..;,· .. -.. •.• -Al·,,~..;...--.... ;-·.;.·. :"·-·-4-;...~, .•.. ,~--·· .. ~,,:.··, .• ,.:·· ..• --:. .. ·--~··.::,.- ,.:.~·:,;.;~-.--:.,...;··_':",l·:··,:-.·,-..-".:1·1 , 
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The Geneva Conference was convened o~ a background of war-monger-
ing, hatred, threats, political chaos, and military uncertaintyo The 
war which F:rance began ira Viet=l\Jam ~uring the last months 'of 1946 as ) 
a colonial enterprise~ an internal affair of the French Empire -
had become an 'international matter of concern. 
Indeed, during the early months of 195~, when the war was 
approaching its clima_x, it seemed that all the major problems which 
confrotlied our troubled and uncertain world came to, focus in Indo~ 
Chinao The war seemed to lose its immediate colori~g of a colonial 
l 
affair and ceased to remain a matter between France and the peoples 
,,. 
<Q:..... __ 7.,~-=F 
·..!:... 
of Indo=-Chinao It had acquired global and symboliv significanceo 
East and West 9 in the modern political nomenclature 0 as well as in 
the traditional cultural and geographic sense 0 had come to an open. 
and head~on conflicto The war which was fought between France and 
the peoples of Indo-China had its world-wide implications, obscured 
but not concealed by the unreadiness of the powers in the background 
1-
.. 
. , I• 
-- • > .... • ••• ·~ 
..... ·•: , .... -·· ;._ , .. • ... - .-- . - . - -·- ·- .............. , ... . 
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.. the United ~tates, · the s··oviet Union, and China - to assume respon-
sibility and to commit themselves fully to the sides they each claim~ 
. 
ed to champione In the international field 0 tbei® were charges and~ 
counter-=charges o~ interventtomfv~tlie1r®-we-re--tlireats and counter-
threats of "internationalizing~ the war~ 
In Indo-China - and particularly in Viet-Nam itself, - where 
the battle~ were wag~d 9 there was a miiture of political chaos, 
.... 
, 
' . . . ~ ~. . . 
,I • 
i 
::--··' I 
I 
.i,. nationalist unrest and military uncertaintyo On the one hand, the 
war which v,as fought in Indo"""'China had political as w~ll as ld.eo~ ... ·-·······--··"-'--·-'"· 
{, 
logical significanceo It was increasingly clear that the wair was 
• I 
.. .... ·-· .. ,, ·--·---- ·--.... ·-· ...... _.: __ I . . . .•. ··•-"· .. I. " .. , · -,• ••,-1)· -· . •-· "'..:_ .. . . fought on ·one side by force 
......... ,,,.D·- , ........ ·, ---····---·· .. ., .. ,,_ . .,_, .... _.,,. •.. 
of colonialism and the other by 
-
the on 
an unbending nationalist spirit using the support of the Communist 
organization and leadershipo Y~t 9 on the other hand,/it see~ed 
that the real issue at stake was not as much a question of com-
munism vso Western imperialism~~ the n&iionalist and racist . 
. -
tendencies which make up part of the great forc~s driving the 
··· revolutions which occuJcrsd immedi\~tely after "the Second We.rid Waro 
~ 
-... . . ... ·---<;.~.· .·· .. ,,., ,,,_y_ln _the eY.eL.Jl.f ___ Iit(tat :c:.Aaian-B--~-,.;-t . -~-- ' -~ ----- . - ---·· - .. ···-· ,-:, .. ' : .. : ~~- ~~--:..... .... ·.:. ..... -.<-' .' d" ..... ;:" .. .;,,.,.,, • .,~.,,,, .c,· ~ I - , • ... ·.- ~---~- ·.·.-:_•··_.,,,,,_,: . ..,;,,;..,.~ ''-'--·.,,.-.,, ..... ~·.,l-,·,._ -.. .. •, •. • .••. ,,_'.<..-....-...'!!; .1 •. :<1,-..-J •. ,~-~·---..·Jo••':'°."'·#--~- ,--: •f• l•<"·'",.-i:~))"i;._• · •••• _ ._. . .,., ..,. ,,,. 
\ 
\ 
i 
white VSo yellowp Europe&n VSo Asianso To the Vietnamese masses, 
\ 
who are larg~ly composed of pea~ants 9 who had never had eny ex-
perience with Comm~nist oppression but a good d~al of exp~rience 
with French supp~ession 0 the war was merely unjusi war waged by 
a former Western colonial power againBt the will of a suppressed 
. people, who happened ~o be Asian, •nd who desired independenceo 
', ..... ,,,, , .. Added to this confusion was the F~ench attempt, to install a 
puppet regime in order to gain international recognition of the 
legitimacy of "la pr~senc~ francaise" in Viet=Name The attempt 
was never successful 9 but did succeed in adding further chaos to 
an already confused situationo Th~ vicissitude in the military 
field 0 meanwhile 0 became a caus® for cofilcern·P and it was ~oon 
clear that from the Spring of 1950 on 9 after the Chinese re-
luctance to intervene openly, or perhaps Vietnamese reluctance to 
let the Chinese intervene openly, the war in Viet=Nam was an 
elastic affair bet~een France and the Government of ao Chi Minho 
., 
'! 
-9,-. .. 
. . 
- ----·--·---·-. ---· --- ---------· -- - ····--·· ,._ -
----.,- .... : .. _:·=·:-·-~·-_ .Y.et,.i,n .. th.e .. mil.i t~ry field 1 it seemed clear that t·he .·balance favoured· , · 
. - . - ·- . - -- -- - - -- . -•-- - . -·- .... ~ .. - - . . - - . --- - - - - - -- --- . ~-- ·- - -- . - . -- . - --- - - -, ----- .---,- ·-·- -- -.. :--- .. ::., 
the Ho Chi Minh Regime. 
·Meanwhile, by 1953, with military~ontrol in Indo-China slipping 
--~~~~~~~~-ftt~tni:H-rv-.-ff't~-th:e hanas of~the Viet~Minh9 in France theiewas"aPre-
· ···· .......... .,.,., ...... ,. ___ ·-o···-···v..ai.l.ing ,varc:=1tvearinesso For many Frenchmen t'it all looked as if the 
war in Indo~China was a frightful trap into which we had fallen, so 
~ - ) 
that we should exhaust all our strengt~ in it, so that we should 
' . 
lose .our men and equipment there, and be ·reducec;I to helplessness 
in Europeo'• 11 The war had lost its--meaning for the French p-eople~-
'ii 
-•• ·;.;.;···•••v• 
.1> 
---·--··· .............. ,.·" .. : ...... r·· "When ··France -began the war .. · it was an internal affai·r · a. struggle · :· .. _ ....... -~~-·-··--··--·· 
'~~ g 
-- ,__ -------- - ----- to reg8.in a lost ... CololiillI tl~ri.tol'y Vlfthin the French EmPire allcf to----------- -
rebuild a past glory. 
In 1953, the war was no longer of exclusive French concern, 
and there was little re~son f~ the French to feel enthusiastic 
about fighting someone else~war. To many Frenchmen thus it seem-
ed to be unreasonable that France should bear the major burden of 
tbe military costs of the waro If the war were to become "inter-
? 
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were willing to dos then the French 80 presence '9 in Indo=-China would 
not be guaranteedo Furthermore 9 if the war should become 99 inter-
national" by any means - either by being referred to the United 
Nations or by letting the Americans intervence openly - French 
prestige would be damaged and the survival of the French Union 
would be doubtfulo 
What would France get in return for a victor~ over the enemy, 
if there could ever be a victo·ry? Nothing! "Even· at its very 
best," as Mendesaa>France put it, "even if we win a resounding 
victory over the Viet~Minh in the Far East, all it will entitle 
12 
us to will be to go homeo~ Indeed, it was hard to expect the • I Li ''"' I ' , JI• 
French· people _to ··be· prone· to go ·on with a-,va·r,.in whi~h, in -any ca.s~e,-~ .. -----------·------ .. ··---
llG Pierre Mendes-France 'in Preface of Francais Mitterand, Aux 
frontieres de l' Union francaise 0 (par~s, 1953), ppQ 12-14 (trans-
lated in Alexander Werth, Lost Statesman; The Strange History of 
Pierre Mendes-France' .!!.1! e . Cit O ' p e 75) 0 
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..... t,hey _would have no.thing to. gaino By this t i me F.rance h a d 
made concessions to Bao Dai which, if ca~ried out, would greatly 
exceed allr, ·that Ho Chi Minh had as·ked for prior to t,,he conflict. 
1; .;-~ 
US Wl tne··~mili tary~si tuation continuing to deteriorate 9 there 
was no longer ~~question of regaining a l~st peace and a lost pres-
"--· .;-
t ig&, but the question seemed to ~e'whether and how France could 
go home in peac~nd wi th"'out losing honoro 
~ 
{ 
But as the war became a profitless enterprise from the point 0 
' . 1. 
. 
'! 
' i 
j 
. ' 
· ·of view of France ~\nd the French Union 9 it became important· in the" ..J 
' 1 . . ·•···· ' '.···· . . .. ' 
. - · - ' . . • . _ r I 
·eyes ·of bthjr Western leaders as pirt of their plan to 9ontain ' f 
I 
- ........ ·-· ....... ,. ...... -................ Communist ·expansi·on i1m.AsiS;o}' A. Communi~st··success ~in ··11i-do.;..China-- ...... ·-···-··-··-···-·····-··-..... ~--·1: 
--- ..... 
-
.. ' . 1! 
would mean a signif ica:nt change in the world balance of power!.!· .. 1: 
, 
. I 
~eanwhile I the Irradoc=Chinese drain on French military strength and ) , · i 
l 
the consequent intensification of French opposition to German 
rearmament did not at all promote Western unity~ It was mainly 
from these other Western Powers that France had sought and re-
ceived moral and diplomatic endorsement of her rSle in Indo-China. 
~=:::=c======~~~-~~L±iAik-= she .. .J,1ad-_ma..da.~i:t. . :nLA..~-~lwkii.. a}:..,a- · VIA-Ci! ;&,:'JP-~~ ... ~~-- ~ .~-.. ~-.. ,. ...... , , ..... , . a.·. ~-• , ,, ,,•., ·> ~ '_,_,,~ .J ;,·,\, .• '",•I "!.,·:r-.1,_. __ . •.,.·, >-,,...:.,· ... •· l~ ',·c•, ' ".'' '1 ·;·' ·. .·,_. ;.! . ' . •i,,,· '. •·· ., .. ··' • . ' .'. ' • .. ,' ~. • 1 ,• . • • -·, ' •• - •,, ;. _, •• ' , ,,..~,L._,.._.-~- ......... .-,._.., •• _.._i-·-- ~ . ._ - ·-···- . 
... "·. cei~'\and would welcome financial and material aid, but she had 
desired no direct military participation by others 9 in part 
because she wanted to retain sole command of the situation and 
in part ~ecause of fears that Peking might respond by direct· 
intervention with her troopse 
- The spring of 1954, saw a different picture of the war 
ushered into the situation, bowevere With the French military 
morale worsened to the breaking point as a result of successive 
defeats and with the increasing Chinese material aid to the Viet-
-.................. . . . . . Minh, France sought open military intervention by its most power-
ful ally 0 the United Stateso It is precis~ly the subsequent 
negotiation's· fo:rr Amarican int<e1rventiorl!D inrhich lent their impact. 
to the events·prior to and during the Geneva conventionQ In one 
way one could say that these negotiatio~s had been part of the 
reasons for the success at the Geneva Conference o~ Indo-Chinao 
Mean~hile, France was fortunate to find that it could be· 
saved from a po~sible and probable defeat by the decision reached 
"•><, 
... ,-. 
... . ... "·---- ,,_ . ·- -----·--·· ····· --·--··--· ..... _. -····-· ··--·-·--. - -----·, -· -- - ... -,--,.- -~---· 
/ . ,. 
·- _____ .,.,,_ ... ·--· .. 
I 
I 
r 
I 
I 
! 
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-- a-t ·the Ber·lin Con_f-erence· for ··the· conventn,g · of'- a Far Eastt!'rn Confer-
Jnce at which t~e question of peace in·Indo=China would be discuss-
\ ' . 
edo In May 9 1954 when the Geneva Conference began its dis~ussions 
------"-~------------------------------------------------:~-------------------------------------~------------------ ----'---- -- ~---------·--=--·-==--=------------I 
on Indo~Chjna it was preceded by a Viet-Minh victory at Dien Bien -
" I., .• .,._.-
. . . - ,. · .• ., -·.. t.··- .•. • •. •• 
~? 
<' 
.... , ... , .... ··-. -.-- .. ···-· .. , .. , ........ ········- -·-··:-···:···-·--::····· --~- . ,_ .... . 
. . ~ 
/!,_:..f,:: 
_!"~ 
Phu, the Fiercest and most dramatic event of the entire Indo~China 
episod® 9 .-®. battle at -~hi.ch France commi tied and lost many battalions 
,, 
of her biat tr@opso With the loss of Dien ~ien Phup there was no 
longer the question of France fighting a prolonged war in Indo=Chinae 
Dien Bien Phu meant the end of the French dream of regaining Indo-
China, · if· any such French·· dream still e:Xistedo 
The battle o~ Dien Bien Phu 9 however 9 had-left :its effect .. direct-----
ly upon the direction of th~ American policy of intervention, which 
vacillated with the military vicissitude of Dien Bien Phu itselfo 
For some time, it seemed that Dien Bien Phu might b~ the·_outbreak 
of a Third World War 0 ,vith the French proposing massive American 
intervention by air-=pov1er 9 and vii th some Ameri.can leaders suggest-
- ing the use of the atomic bombs to deter Communist victory at Dien 
. · , ·, · , · ~--- '"'~"' ,, ,., , .,, Bie-n Phu o 13 · Furthermore ; the b a: t t le ha. d · al so ha it , its 0 ·in di re ri· · --, ,::_ '" ~~·~--,··~_,,-, -,-. .-
, 
.. ~' 
effect upon the negotiation for peace at Geneva9 
' I,.- ' 
Together with the 
., . 
negotiations for intervention of the French Government of Laniel 
and Bidault 9 it resulted in the destruction of a French Government, 
and put into power.in France a man more inclined to peace in Indo~ 
China without the risks of a universal catastrophe by opening the 
way for American interventiono The man was Pierre Mendes~France, 
a statesman who had promised "peace with honor," and direct negotia~ 
14 tions with the Ho Chi Minh governmento 
130 Mo George Bidault, the then French Foreign.Minister, in an 
account to Drummond a~d Coblentz, s~id he had no doubt in bis mind 
that Secretary Dulles had offered him on two separ:a;t'e o_ccasions the 
use of the atomic bombs in connection with Dien Bien Phus -Roscoe 
Drnmm~nd- and dGasto~ C~blentz, -Duel at- the B~i~k 9 (Ne; Yo~-k: D~~bie~-
day9 1960) ppo 121 ..... 220 Also: Je·an Ro Tournoux, Secrets d' Etat,, 
Paris: PlonP 1960), po 48. · 
( 
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was convened. The Conference was con~ened under the shadow of milit~ 
V" ~ 
ary defeat, under the tnreats of intervention by a big power and a 
I. -
. ~- ...:· ... '"', ......... - . 
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Bully No. i.")!5and under the fears of nuclear bolocaust or a·gjneral 
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15. Alexander Werth, France 1940-1955, (New York: B9lt, 1956), 
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As the , Berlin Conf.erence of the Big Four Pow·ers' Fore-ign· ...... -····- .. ·-
Ministers (January 2·.5;· ~ February 18 0 1954) ca~e to .a de~dlock 
on the questi~n concerning the reunification of Germany and the 
question of arm Austrian State Treaty D a decision wa·s made to con-
vene a Conference -0n Far Eastern affairs at Genevao It was then 
·decided the the Conference should be held outsJde of the United 
Nations and that the Soviet Union invite Communist Chinao 
' . 
ln- the I communiqu, srgnecl at ~,he·" end :or· the Conference .. the 
,--
Four Foreign Ministers proposed that a "conference of 'representa-
• . . 
tives'" of the countries concerned to the Korean conflict shouh(i 
be held in order to establish a "unite~ ~nd independent Korea," 16 
Second in importance 0 and as an afterthoughtD the Foreign Ministers 
-. - ~ - - - ·-
.... 
l ...• , j 
... -·".... . •"·"·'. -'· ., ... ~.. . ... ... ··- ..... 
\~ 
agreed that nthe problem of restoriIDlg peace in Indo<=>Cb.ina will also ~ 
~~ discussed at the conference, to which 9 representatives~ of the 
United States, France 9 _the ··united Ki\}ngdom~ the Union of Soviet 
Socialist RepublicsD the Chinese People's Republic and 'other_ 
c"C"' - '. '" -""."''"'''·'"·,;r .. s=·,-·.,~··"····x·.s:,.;,' c•,int·e·r-es te d . states V w1·11 ' be' f nvi t, e·d O '' l 7;' . -- .·~ -.. . - . - . :.-.... ~ .. ;., -~"''·"" C,•C' '-'·''' -,,- .;. """J . .;.;,;,s •• ,.~':~-'·''• ·" _"""''.-''' ;·""·" 
.... 
Thus, although failing in its principal objectives of finding 
a solution to the German question and the Austrian State Treaty, 
the Berlin Conference achieved a significant result~ the decision 
to hold the Geneva Confer~nce to dis~uss international relations 
· in the Far Easto Aside from this :result,, t,he only other c_oncrete 
J, 
> • 
,, 
accomplishment achieved at the Berlin Conference was p~rhaps the 
,-ltgr~ement to "hold an exchange of views to prom,ote a successful 
oooaggreement on disarmament, or at least on a subatantial re-
...:, 
duction ·of armaments" in order to facilitate "the ·establishment 
· - · ... '' 18 
of a lasting peace." 
16 o Four-Power Communigu~ at tlie End of the Be·r-lin Conference, 
18 February 1954 9 Ue So Department of State Bµlletin, March 1, 1954e 
170 Ibid o ,. M_arch 1, '11954. 
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The wordi?g of the communique proved to be an advantage as·· 
well as a di,sadvp,ntage, later. On -~~e, _<>_ne hand, the ind·eterminate 
choice of words of the communique enable·d the Foreign Ministers 
to meet both the standards of the policies of their~ indi vidua_l 
nations and the spirit of conciliation of the Conference~ Thus 
the use of th~ term 99 :irepresentative-~svo in connection with th·e 
,. 
Geneva Conference left open the question of whether the Conference 
would ~e one of Foreign Ministers or o~her delegateso Considera-
tion· to 1;-~· S~ ··1f!)re:i.g~ policy was paid when the Foreign Ministers 
", 
agreed to limit the discussions at the Geneva Conference to the 
. ... 
'· 
............... ·- ·-.··~-··· . ~---·····-····-
t .· 
····· · · ·· -·-·---------·--·---··· --· ·- questions concerning Korea and Indo<=;>Chinao Furthermore 9 nothing 
_was said in the Communique about Mo Bidault 9 s previous condition 
that peace talks on Indo~China must be preceded by an understand-
ing from the Communist Chinese Government to cease their arms aid 
to the Ho Chi Minh Regimeo In· fact, many things were left unsaid 
-
in the interest of conciliation and agreement on essentialso 
_ ....... , . _ .. --·"':·--· .: .. ,, .- -· .. ·----- .... _____ .. Although the re sul.ts . of . the Be.r l in Confer enc. e we :re . l iJJt.i._ t~.4 .. , .... ____ --···---, ·-'~-.. ,- ~ .. -
J 
the Seni~r Delegates were· pleased with the moderate successo Their 
feelings were perhaps expressed by Mrc Eden's statement after the 
ConferenceP "At least we understand one another's position better!"19 
Yet for the French 0 the results of the Berlin Conference ~~re a l.\" 
great diplomatic feat for French diplomacy and of Mo Bidault in 
particularo Bidault had gone to Berlin with the French people's 
hope of finding a peaceful solution to the Indo-Chinese problem 
a- well as the German question~ which yas all the graver with 
', 
' 
the ·-impending ,ratification by the French Pa,rliament of the· EDC. 
_.,r-, 
Thus despite opposition ~y many in Fran_ce, including Pi~':/ M_~nd~s-. 
180 Ibid~, March I, 1951*. (J .~· 
190 Mrg Dulles and Mr. Molotov were obviously pleased with the 
results of the Berlin Conferenceo While Mro Molotov found it 
possible to thank his Western colleagues for the moderate achieve-
ment and for their cooperation at reducing international tension, 
MrQ Dulles was reportedly to be "in a jovial mood like a boy out 
of school900 He put his.hat on backwardseoo before he entered 
President · Eisenhower' s plane",, NYT, February 19, 195'1 o 
•/ 
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France, who favored direct.negotiations with Ho Chi Minh, it had 
. . . 
. . 
always been-Bidault 9 s belief that the issue of Indo-China could 
. 
. 
. -~ 
be solved by negotiations indirectly through P0ki~go Accordingly 
the Foreigb Minister struggle relentlessly at the Conf~rence to 
link the events in Indo~China with the Korean war in order to have 
the two situations discussed at the same ConfeTenceo 
... 
Meanwhile, in order to regain the confidence of the French 
f' 
people. in himself and in his government and in order to project 
even a .jreater image of the •chi~vement at Berlin 9 Bidault 
"briefed" the correspondents-of the Monde and Figaro in Berlin 
in order to convince (the) Chinese to "abandon~ Ho Chi Minh. 20 
The Vietnamese leadei was placed in the story in the r6le of 
Markos, the Greek guerilla leader who was abandoned by Stalin 
in 1948, al though in an entirel·y different contextf; ._ ~at exact-
ly Mo Bidault was able to offer Moscow and Peking for such a 
. 21 deal was never clearo Yetv the story that the Soviet Union and 
..,,. 
. - . --·· -.- ~-- - .. .,,_ - ... -- -· ~ ' .. ··-- -..... 
A 
... ·······: 
. China were ready to abandon the Ho Chi Minh regime was deliberately 
,., , . ,,,. '"'·· ,,,,,,=· -· .. 'j_~f 1 at ed. to. -(i;Jllo;~ t·r~te Bi daul t V ·~ !re~ t. achieVelllentS at .. the. B«frl iif · ···, · ·· ____ ,,,,,,=,., __ 
; 
i { ····· 
r ~ 
' i. 
I 
./ 
C Conferenceo It implied that without Russian and Chinese aid, the 
. 22 Viet-Minh forces would soon crumble~ 
200 WerthP France, p~ 6640 
2lo Bidault proved to be wise to left this unsaid while suggest-
ing the 00 Markos theoryn o He knew that that the anti-EDC group in 
France was large 9 and for them there would be no love loet !f EDC 
was traded for a peac~ in I~do~Chinao In creati~g the illusion 
of such a deali Bidault gave a hint that this was donee On the 
other hand 9 it was also suggested that Bidault might have suggest-
ed the idea of recog~ition of China by France and the latter support 
for China 9 s admission to __ the United Nations o . See Wert, France, 
po 6640. 
220 To increase the reliability of \the "Markos theory" 0 on the 
eve of the debate on Indo-China at the National ·Assemblyp the AFP 
published a "revised;; version of a speech by Chen Yun 0 one of the 
Chinese Communist leaders 9 given on March 5o The report suggested 
that the Chinese Communists were VJilling to 99 drop" Ho Chi Minh in 
order to consolidate world peace and i~ternal Chinese stabilitye 
This was later proved to be a very "free" version of the Chinese 
l.eader vs speech 9 W'J'hich ,vas published in the Ne~v China Ne',llTS Agency 
on March 5o Chen Yun had said that further interventiomi in the 
internal affairs of neighbouring countries should be postponed 
until .the Chinese government had been consolidatedo Ibido, po 665 
a~d Donald Lnacaster, The Emanci ation of French Indo-China, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961 , pp~ 290, note lo 
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. . 
· basis, the limited suc~ess of ~he Berlin ·Conference should b~ · 
accounted as Me Bidault 9 s credito The French Foreign Minister's 
position at Berlin was certainly a difficult oneQ With the Russian 
¥ 
desire to sabotage and the American determination to defend th·e 
EDC, Bidault found himself flattered and coaxed by both sides. 
On the on~ hand 9 the other two Western leaders were embarking on 
what was to be described later as the "Bidault OperatiOfilHv in 
which Bidault was deliberately "built up" ~: the other two Foreign 
~ ... 
:Mini~t~r~. a·s _"t_µe S]lOke~mlln <>r t~e .. West_"., .. as the man who would n-ot 
._ .... ,. compromise on EDC, and- who would not let the Russian leader play· ··-
the all too obvious game of spliting France from her British and 
American allieso In doing so 9 it was apparent that Dulles imaged 
French vanity would be flattered, Bidault's prestige at home 
would be enhanced, and the chance for French ratification of EDC 
would thus be vastly improved. 
.... 
. On the other hand, it was soon clear that Mro Molotov's, 
I 
~ : 
i 
' ' I 
: 
. ' 
motives at the Berlin Conference ,vas to sabotage""'=tlf~.-~-~---~--·---
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,, pointing out t•,· Me Bidaul t the· common Russian and French_ fear of .. 
~}"Jll 
" ....... _ ,-· ~·· . '·- '. ' . ,, 
German re~armament and in luring th~ French Minister into direct_ ~ 
negotiations with the Ho Chi Minh Regimep Molotov hoped to get in 
return French rejection of the EDCo Thus in pTivate talks -with 
Bidault Mro Molotov was alleged to have offered Russian good offices 
to arranie an armistice in Indo~China in exchange for the French 
promise to abandon the EDCe Although Ma Bidanlt rejected Molotov-'s 
·dea!, it was clear that ~nder the pressure imposed upon the French 
.... ·- ·-. ···- - • ~-----·-· ···-- ····· . ··- i 
Government and upon himself, he endeavoured to enlist Soviet assist~ 
230 Mro Molotov declared .at the end of the· Conference: "The Soviet 
............... Union has neve.,r made any secret. about it.s rejection o.f ihe. creati.!!_n. 
of military groups o Q o direct against other countries o o oL an abou.t_/ 
the particular danger of such ·a military grouping as the EDC, formac= 
tion of which means the rebirth of German militarismooQ" NTY, Febo 19, 
1954 8 •. 
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ance for the arrangement of peace talks with the Viet-~inh without. 
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_·_. · ': alienating the, American Secretary of, State o · 
\. 
_ It appeared at the end that Bidault won his points~ Not only 
did~e succeed in his efforts. to bring the discussions of the two 
·---·-··---··'"·-·..,i-,·-~,---,,-.,-~--~. : .. ~: :~_. ___ : ....... Asian areas to the .agen-da of the proposed Conference P but he also ., 
·• 
won some extra advantageso 11 The Communique promised to arrang0 that 
-dis~ussions on the Indo~Chinese issue and the Korean problem would 
be on equal footing and would be conducted in such~ way that dis-
cussions on the Indo-China situation would not depend upon the re-·-
.. ,, ._., .... ,,_.. .. ~ s.ult$ of the -Korean neg-ot-iation-. -- · . .j . 
Bidault's strategy at the Berlin Conference was cleare Real~ 
izing that he was being courted both by Moloto~ and Dulles, he 
decided to agree to support the idea of a Big Five~inisters' C9n-
"~---/ 
ferencep thus ens~ring his chance of winning Soviet assistance in 
I 
the p_eace talks with the Viet=Minh Regime, ,vhile his "steadfast 
and loyal" refusal to compromise on EDC with the Soviet. Delegate 
- 25 won Dulles' reluctant acceptance to convene the Geneva Conferenceo 
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Indo=China together at one Conference, he would be able to bring 
to France 0 s side= which had been weakening daily with military 
---
setback sin Indo~China ~ the American power in bargaining with the 
enemya Second, he foresaw that the Conference on Korea might bear 
no fruit and demand a separate Conference on Indo~China, and again 
he won his pointe 
The weeks which led up to the Geneva Conference were most 
-········-"··-·· -·-··a··ramatic both in the-<diplomatic events which occurred in the inter-
. . . . -':': ._ ... : ., ... " .•.. ·~ ·- . 
- ·national the-ater and the militar-y- events which took place on_ the ·------- ... 
• - ' ,•,, • •• ••••"" •••••••-•·•·•.,• •··•·••·••- .. .,,.,•••••••-.. •·--·•••-·•-••••-·----·~·-·--.-~·~~>S•,-.M---··-• 
battlefields of Viet~Namo In the military situation, it became 
clearer daily that the French had lost their_grip on the situationo 
See Lancaster, .21!. o cit g, pp e 290-91 and· Werth. France·, po 664~- · -·-----· .. 
25e Bidault is said to have "promised" Dulles the ratification of 
EDC in return for DullesJ reluctant acceptance of the Geneva Con~ 
f erence e Werth, France, p~ 6611, note 6" Al so Lancaster, .21!.e ci to j 
p G 291 e 
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attacks at -Dien Bien Phu and its eventual fall had made the lndo-
' ,o ),f ((."71~, •. , '1 ,-1{. .rv,·~•'I 
---------------------------··. --····-··--------·-- -- .. ChinS1. situ.a tion look es pee ial ly grave o \While thee Foreign Ministers 
and high officci&Js cf the t'llest<eirTll n.atio:ner" including the peripatetic 
Ur o -DlUll l® s v flew f :ir@mi' COIDle capital to another to pTepare a comm.on 
;,. ~st,ategy for the Geneva Conference arrnd to disc·use possible American 
military intervention, the situation in Indo=China continued to 
~ det~riorate and even gave the appsaTance of being the beginning of 
- . 
a Third .World War. To the ·worsening mili ta.ry situation was added , 
.~ ' ' ~ 
. 
·--·· ............... , ... _,, .... <,: ·--·-······-the· d:ijcfficul-ti-e-s t-he Laniel ..... JBidaul;t~-~·G@'v@·t~unren·t··· had ·to ·:f'ace ·in France"'' ·- ·-·~-~---~=---~"' 
- I --- . -: "' 
, ~ conc~r~ing the two basic issu®ev EDC &nd ~~d@=China 0 accompanied by 
<: 
the differenees between American &fild British positions on the set~ 
ting up of a South=eas~ Asian security organization in particular 
and on the defending of South=east Asia against further Communist 
expansion in generalo 
Added to the conf~•ion was a strong evidence of Asian national-
l .. ; 
ism expressed by the Colombo Conference and some of Mr. Nehru's 
.J 
I . 
- ~~:-:-:3:..:-:~-·.._.•·-~· ~~~-;"':'.",7i::";'Jlp".;7 • ...,.. ..•. __ •• ,y·~~- -•·~-:;;~~=- =~.;:...,-~ •- . •,;,-t:...L..."=f"" .- ·, • -~~--•• ·• _ ... ,·. ,. • : )•: ~ .. ,,.,...,~, ,.,,., .. ,,,- '.''·":'·'·:••.,..., '! ·-'1'-~ ' ••• 
.. _. ·'." ....... ,.,.:,.,, •. ,,·-:-,,·.,,._, .•.. ,., .. ;:.,.'«.:, -.. ,:r11a·11enren-·(i'S-,;~- wrrrc'ir ·:i1in:i~cra:"te«x' 't,Jt'A'at the"' uri.comml'tted' neutral nations of 
Asia maintained a strong and critical interest in the delibeTations 
at the Geneva Conferencee Thus in a speech on April 2~ 0 195~ 
Mro Nehru put forward a six~point proposal, which included a 
suggestion that the great Powers should pledge -themselves against 
intervention in Indo~Chinae Not long after both India and Ceylon 
refused to permit American planes bringing French ~einforcements 
from France to fly across their territories0 It was clear that 
there was among the uncommitted Asian nations a strong sentiment 
in favor of the Geneva Conference and a peace ietti~ment~ri Indo= 
- -·. -·-·· __ · .... :. ------·-... -·".'.:=··=,--..:-_·._.- ___ . ·._·.·, ___ . __ . 
China. 
\)ltlJ 
Thus the Far Eastern·Conference ·b.egan on April 26, 1954 at 
Geneva_ and e,nded almost tµree _mo_nths __ lat_er-.~ .. Th_e .diplo.mats 0-f---the--
.- ... ~.·--·:.·. -, ,_ .. -·- ...... ··-- ................ -
various nations conducted their negotiations against a changing 
background of events often more dramatic than.th® Conference it= 
selfo Although the skillful wording of the communiqui of the 
Berlin Conference had called for a conferenc~ of "representatives" 
of the concerned nations to meet and discuss international relations 
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········· ········· .. _ ........ ,~ -~·"""!"".·-:.:.:.-f .......... --.... .--...... .....-........................... , ..... -· · ...... ~ ............. - 4'lllllllla 
·•.O. - ..... • ............ ;a. ........ . ,.·--
----------:----=-=--~-.. """'.'.-. -"'."""' __ """"".""= .. =. '=··---="""-""""-· =_ """'""":"',..,...,,,.,,,.,,..,...,,,,,,,_.........,__,_ _ ....,__~--------_ ..... ____ .......... """1"'!"9~--------111111 _____111111 ____ 111111111 ____ 11!!!!1!1 ______ 11111!!!1_.lllll!!!I_ 111111!!!1-~-•-_____ 1111111 ___111111 ____1111111 ___ 11111!!!1 __ 1111111 ___ ,11111111 _____ 1111111 _____ 1111111 ____ 1111111 __ 11!!1!!!1!1!111~. ~--~--~-~-~---.~:--=·c 
.- '.:··~ 
1,- . ' 
0 
.._,.,.__ ___ ,.,___ 
•' . 
. .. ---i-9--~- ---- ----'-'---
. --- -
. 
,·. 
- .~ -· - . - - - -
. ·~,.; ... .... ,.,."'--,:-·· 
. --- --, . ···.·· .... '., . ,. ·"''' ._.. . . . ~ 
' <t. 
,.,._.,.,, ......... , ... - . ... - __ - -----..~ .. · .. :. ;·· . ..:.l . ____ ·····-;··----- ·-·· ~--..... .,--~--...... ---.. -~ .. --.-~.----......:..~~ 
.. ,' 
~~~--=~..:..--~-----~---···--·-.·-.·----<··-·· 
in the Far East without mentioning a distiricti~n betwe~n aggrejs~rs 
- -~ .. -·-· ... 
: . , . . and' ag·gresse·d, irivi tors and the invited,,;? t- ~was clear ... lha.t .... a.t t.he. _. ____ " ___ ,, ________ ~-~~ 
. . 
Conference there were two te~m~ of antagonists in general and two 
· antago~ists in particulare · Each of the two was uncompromising 
· · . 26 
enough to make the Con~erence almost a failure~ 
For all intents and purposes the Geneva Conference was com-
,. • I 
posed of. two separate conferences~ one on Korea and one on Indo-
, ~· 
Chinae The negotiations were separa~eo _ They had little in common 
. ' ~- . . . . ~ . . . 
-- "'•--, ... ., ... _ ........ ____ ,,_~_; ' . .- ... -· . 
~~~ ........ -~-,_. ............ ---he-y=en-~-,th~ fa·c·t: tlfift ... both· ·~ere ·Asiaii· problems, and that 1 t was 
convenient to convene both at the same time and same place so that & 
all the Great Powers could,participateo The Korean Conference took 
place from April 26, to June 25, and the Indo~China Conference from 
May 8 to July 2le 
The composition of the two Conferences were different. The 
Conterence on Korea was represented by nineteen nations, which in~ 
' . ". 
eluded the representatives of the nations which had sent troops 
.. 
. ·· . -. ,, : . . to _Rartici_l!!lte in the Korean conflict I exce_Et for the South African 
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-
Republic, which declined the invitation to attend)e The Confererice 
' 
· on Korea was also attended by the USSR which had until this juncture 
refused to admit itself to be one of the belligerents in the Korean 
conflict~ ThP, Conference on Indo~China was represented by nine 
~ 
states: the five Great _Powers, the three Associated States of Indo~ 
China, and the Ho Chi Minh GovernmentQ The problem concerning the 
composition~of the Indo~China Conference was not solved until late 
,in June 9 ·when the Communist side agreed to abandon. its demand,, to 
sit r~presentatives o.f the.Pathet Lao and the Khmer Issarack, · 
-- - ·----· .. ----- --------
. (the_ latter being the pro .... Viet--Minh Cambodian group which fought· · ·· __ .............. ·····--... --·· 
against both the.French and the Royal Cambodian Government dur-
.. ~ . . . . . · .. .,-.. 
1 'ing · the' Franco--Vietnames~ ~ conflict) i- The Co~unist side had 
, 
------ --- ----
~·. ~ 
----·-:--OriginalJy deman-ded that the Cliafe-rence eonsid·~r the situatiOll---0-f------~~-- -·-_---__ _ 
Laos a:·nd of Cambodia on a equal footing with that of Viet=-Nam, 
ioee Cambodia and Laos were to be considered as iri a state ofJ 
' '"'''''"· 
-1 
1 26e This uncompromising at~itude was expressed by Mr. Dulles as I · he arrived at Geneva for the Korean Conference: "We came to Geneva 
~ on a mission of peace made necessary by Communist aggression in r ··---·-'l ___ --- -Asia~~e \Ve hop-e "tO .find th-8.-t---t-he-&g-g.~-e-SS-~-rS--C-ame---h-ere in a m0--0:c1-__ -_-_-~_-_-_-_-_-__ -_ 
I . · 'to purge,themselves of their aggressiono'ege." NYTJay 29s .. l~54~ 
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,,civil war even as Viet-Nam, and .. thus the df·ssident elements should 
-
be represented. .-----
As soon as the Conference began its·ffrst·meeting on april 26, 
~ 
it met with its first hurdle: the qu,~tion of the chairmanship, 
especially the chairmanship of th® ConferS"ItlC@ on. lirido=>Chinao If the 
heads of the delegations wers t~ rotate the presidency of the Con~ 
ference 9 clearly things would quietly come to an impasse. Mrc Dulles 
' 
would not accept any arTangement which ~ight appear that the United 
I 
i 
-~ 
_States approved o .. f China 0 a status-as a-Grea.t Power; ·l1e·nces, an ,impasse ··· ·· 
would developo nut the situation was not so grave as first appearedo 
-.-;, 
At the Geneva Confe:rencev Miro Eden found th!B Russian Delegate 0 Mro ., 
' . 
Molotov O 0'a:m.en.able o e e /;:n.i/ this vJas a tr-an sf orma tiorm fro'rm JBer line o e 1127 
.·-,··· l 
Thus at a dill'.Aner given by Mro Eden to Mro Molotov and Mro· G!fomyko, 
the Ru.ss'lian. senior delegate suggested that Mro Eden and· himself should 
turns presidtng over the Conferences As a result 0 the chairmanship 
~-
~- -~ 
of the Korean Conference rotated between Britain 9 the USSR and Thailand, 
and that of the Indo-China Conference alternated between the USSR and 
·-1 
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Great Britain. ·1 
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The Conference began. in its Korean ph~se on April 26. · ~s could " 
have been expected 9 the Conference soon came to a deadlocko Mo~e-
c 
over 9 it seemed that no one was anxious to change the status quo· 
28 ., 
gained by the temporary truce already achieved in Koreas On June 
15,~ the Conference on Korea decided to adjburn indefinitelyo The 
·Western Powers refuse~ to continue to negotiate further~ because 
'"> 
North Kore& demanded that all UN t~oops withdraw from Kome~ as soon 
as pQssibleo. On the subject. of nation~wide electio~s 9 Nofth Korea~ 
· p--roposed that a supe:rrviSory body fo~ 'the ele:~-tion be composed of 
exclusively North and South Koraean delegateso It rejected the 
Western proposal that such an ~lection should be supervised by the 
I 
I 
• I 
0 
:_ I 
~ . . .. ~-~. .. . ... • .. - .. ,' ... ., .... "· ·-·-···· .... ,., ... , ... , .... -----·--·-···--·--·--···· 
United Nationao The discussi~ns on Korea thus· ende~, bearing l~ttle 
: _____ fi-uit 9 ·and the Korean situation remained unchangedo ·--------- ·-----------------
270 Anthony Eden, Full Circle, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960-), 
p e l jl o 
280 At the same meeting with· Molotov and Gromyko on May 5, Eden 
told the Russians· that b.e Hdid not thii!k I{orea was so urgento After 
all, there was no fighting there and matteis could be allowed to 
remain for the time being in their present state, if we could not 
agree on further steps ••• MolotQV fully agreedo" Ibido, po lJl. 
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·, . ·':: .. ' . A~ :.:~~~n as the Conf eren'ce·: on·· Indo-Chlna· began' . the adv:antage·s 
and "the·· di_sadvantages of t·he unpreci.sed wording of the Berlin · · . 
. . I . 
Communique were· appa.rento ·· <ln the one hand,; the Geneva Conference 
was supposed to be a "conferente •f represeritatives", thus there 
was no need for a Foreign Minister ·to be present as Head of the 
. 
. ~ 
Delegationo Takin.g advantage of this
1 loophole, Mr e Dulles left 
before the Conf8re~ce on Indo~China began and the United Stat~s 
was represented at the Conference by General Walter Bedell Smitb. 
···On ·the other hand, the GonmFo.niqu.~ stat·ed. that '9representatives-
of the United Sta·tes, Franc'e 9 th~ United Kingdom. 0 the Union of· 
Spytet, Socialist Republics 0 the Chinese People 9 s Republic ~nd 
'other interested ~tates 9 " were to be invited to a conference 
·_concerning the restoration of peace in Indo-China • 
./ 
. ,. 
__ The question soon developed concerning the composition of 
the Indo--China Conference: who wae to decided who the ("interested 
states were (in adaition t6 the Big Five Powers) 0 what constituted 
would not be represented at the Indo=China discussionsv if the 
representatives of~tfie Viet~Minh Regime were invitedo M9 Marc 
Jacquet, the French Minister for the~A~sociated s·tates and Mr. 
t 
Donald Beath, the American Ambassador to Saig.on, both had to come 
to Cannes, where B.ao D~i was vacationing, .. in ord'er to persuade Bao 
. , 0 
Dai to reverse his stande 3 
. . -
Meanwhile, at Geneva on April 28 Mre Mo.1otov and Mo Bida·ult· .... 
14 
·. held talks devoted to the co·mp-ositi-on of the Conference .. Mro·,Molotov ..... 
NYT, April 29, 1954. 
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p~opose~ that the countrie~ to be invited to the Conference should 
... _-il)clude: France, the UJQ.it.ed States, th~ 'soviet,, .. Union,;'Grea~ ~ri~ain, 
. ;· 
Communist China 11 the IBro Chi Minh Government 9 the Bao Dai Regime, 
""taos 0 Cambodia 9 Br~ma 0 Thailandv Indiap Indonesia 9 and Australia • 
. ~ 
•1 ... 
-......J . . . ·-· .... --··· ----··· ... ··--·.·--··-·-·-·····-····--
Me Bi~ault preferred that India and Indo~esia be excluded from the 
list but he seemed to be willing to admit Viet~Minh representation 
at the Conferenceo 31 It was arranged that Mro Molotov was to 
report the developments in the talks with the French Foreign Minister 
to the Chinese Delegation and Mo Bidault on his part reported to 
the Western powerse If their proposed composition of the conference 
was acc,,epted,,Mo Bidault ,,ould invite the non-Commu~ist Pov1ers and 
Mre Molotov the Conimunist Stateso This arrangement was made in 
order to please the American delegation, which insisted that Com-
munist China be excl•ded from the inviting powers, and should be 
one of the ,,,,invited. 32 
.... , . 
The issue of the composition of the Indo-China Conference was 
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"' 
ing the invitors and thi invited also raised some problems when it 
was decided that the Conference should be composed of delegation~ 
of nine states: the United States, the Soviet Unioni France, 
Great Britain, Communist China, the three Associate States of lndo~ 
China, and the DRVN, In deference to a demand of Bao Dai, instead 
31. Just a few weeks earlier, M~ Bidault rejected the suggestion 
that the Ho Chi Minh Regime was a legitimate government,.and hence 
he did not think that the Viet-Minh Government should be invitedo 
NYT, April 28, 1954e 
320 NYT, April 28, 1954e 
' ~ 33e In accepting the _invitation to his Government to attend the 
Geneva Conference Bao Dai set two e-o-nd-i-tions: (a) At the conference 
the·State of Viet-Nam should be treated well over the Viet_.Minh 
Regime and (b) the State_of Viet~Nam be invited by all three Western 
--~ ---~-~-~-- ~Blg-Powe"fso·c; ·The_ latter part of the demand was promptly satisfied, 
. 
·, 
/)o 
but the Western Powers could dq little about the for~er demand~ 
NY.T, May 3, 1954 o 
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of M. ~idaul t acting alone, the three Western Powe.re Joi_n:t1y 
i·ssued invitations .to the Bao Dai Regime and the Royal Government 
of Laos and Cambodia~ Mea~while 9 the Soviet Union and Communist 
China jointly invited the Ho Chi Minh Regimeo The fact that 
Chin'a had joined the· Soviet· trrifon. in inviting the DRVN surprised 
some Western delegates and the American delegation in particular, 
. 
which had worked laboriously to place China among the "invited 
powers"o It was explained l~ter by the French delegation that in 
j 
.. talks betwe~n Jean Cha.uvel S) a member of the French delegation, 
and Andrei Gromyko v the S·oviet Deputy Foreign Minister 9 it was 
agreed that the 'Western side 9 would invite the Bao Dai Government 
and the other Associated Statesp and the i•communist side 99 v1ould 
invite 1 the Ho Chi Minh Governmente 34 At a press conference later 
a Chinese spokesman said that since it had been learned that 
the Western Big Three 9 rather than France alone would invite the 
Governments of the three Associated States, China had joined the 
·soviet Union in inviting the DRVN. 35 
~ 
arrived nine powers were represented at the Confereneeo On 
the Western side, representing the United States, one of the 
principal antagonists, was General Walter B~dell Smith, who 
had replaced John Foster Dullese Representing France was 
the French Foreign Ministerp Mo George Bidault, and Britain 
C, 
.was represented by Sir Anthony Eden, the Foreign Minister, 
and head of the British delegationo 
( 
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On the Communist side• representing the· Chinese People's Republic. 
I 
was Foreign Min.ister Chou En-lai~ who at the same ·time symbolized 
the other antagonist and a victo~ who came to the Conference table 
to dictate termso The Soviet Union was represented by Mro Molotov 
.; 
and his_ delegationP while the Ho Chi Minh Government was represent~ 
· · ···-· ---·· ""'···· -- ·.ed li·y ,V-i:c·e -,Pr-e·sid"en'i,c-a,nd· Ac 0ti-ng Fo~eign Minister Pham van Dong 9 who 
was no stranger to the Frencho Prior to the Franco-Vietnamese con-
flict Mro Dopg had led a Vietnamese delegation to Fontainebleau at .. 
'JI,,, . .... -· _. -, ... ,.,,~,c., I ~ 
a Conference tonegotiate with France the terms for indepe~dence of 
Viet-Namo 
Beginning with the openin~ of the Geneva Conference on Indo-, 
Chida: the ConfereQce operated in three wayso First, there were the 
plenary sessions at which the press was admitted, prepared state-· 
ments were read, and prepared speeches.of delegates were given out 
in advanceo To be sure nothint significan~ could be accomplished 
at these plenary sessionso Delegates all seemed more interested in 
using the forum for s@unding out propaganda and vindictiveA a.ccusa-
t~~ against their opponents than in discussing substantive issues 
.. 
i 
at hand a Thus at the opening speech which was to ___ ~-!-~-~-r'~-~,-~-!,~~-,,!h!~=-;;-··~~-·"''····· ··---r··--·---·--
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' . 
French position at the Conferen~e 9 •~ Bidault used the occasion to 
indict the the Viet Minh for the inhumanity with which the Viet~Minh 
treated the issue of evacuation of the wounded at Dien Bien Phup 36 
while Mro Dong, Head of the Viet-Minh Delegation, on his part 9 did 
not let lose the opportunity to expose the atrocities the French had 
committed in Indo-China during .the past century and during the 'tvar o 37 
There were, secondly, the restricted sessions, at which the 
issues were dJscussecl privately. The Con-ference went into "restrict-
ed" sessions on May 17,·1s, and 19, but a good deal of the develop-
ments were div~lged to the press. The le~k~ges enabled the journal-
ists to have a reasonably good picture of the developmentso rt· 
might seem that al though these sessions were dubbed "restricted,'' 
- ' .•..••.. --,~- ..• -._4 
in reality .it was clear that the purpose of such phraseology was 
NYT, May 9, 1954. 
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m·erely to give the smaller ·powers the illusion that they were be·ing 
. 
. -
c-onsnl ted, Such restricted sessions later proved not to have ·accom-
plished mlllch o 
The real negotiations were done, howeve~, at private talks 'and 
ll 
dinners betwe,·en the leaders of the Big Powers, both within the fac-
'-' 
tio n and be t~1een th® • si.dceso Two dlaya after his arrival at opposing I 
Geneva 9 Mro Eden was guest 9 together with Mro Ch@u 9 at· a dinn~r 
·. 38 
party given by Mro Molotovo On May 1, thethr~® For@ign Mi~isters and 
Mr. Bedell Smith, the UoSO} Delegate who had ca@me to replac~ Mro DuJles, 
held·a private meeting among themseive~. 39 On May 4, Bidault and 
C·hauvel, members of the French Delegation came to dine· with Edeno -'iO 
, 41 
Then on May 5 9 Molotov and Gromy~o we~e Eden's dinner guestso these 
were the main private meetings p~ior to th® Conference and which 
shaped the main guidelines for the composition ~f the Conferenceo 
Once the Conference had begun, there were several private talks 
between the two principal middle-men, Eden and Molotov, and between 
them and the real antagonist• - the U. s. , Chinap France and the Viet-
Minho Just as at the Berlin Conference·, i/t was at these private 
diplomacy, and it was these negotiations which enabled to Conference. 
to arrive at some concrete con~lusions. 
Until the entry of Mo Mendis-Ffance, there seemed to be little 
hope of any real settlemente On the one hand, the American intention 
to sabotage the Conf·erence i.2was · supported by Mo Bidaul t' s indecision 
l 
J8'o NYT, May 2, 1954. 
I i 39G Eden, 9.1! 0 cit~, P• 125. 
40-·o lbido, po 1280 
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r . 42. According to Eden's account, except for General Walter Bedell 
,- .. ··-···.-· ... · ····---,..0---.. ·'--··--·--··-··---·Smith 9 the t,vo other leading members of the American Delegation, 
I ·· · Mro Dulles and Mro Walter Robertson, were not at all in favor of the 
i Geneva ~onferenceo Mrs Dulles was more intsrested in obtaining 
ll British moral an~ material support for Ame:rican in.t®rvention in 
Indo-China than in the Confer~n~e itselfo When Lord Reading, who 
was in the British Delegation 9 remarked that that meant things 
"would remain,on the boil for several years ~o come, eoe Mr~ Dulles. 
replied that this would be a very good thingo" Eden, ope cit., 
p O 127. 
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·~ 
with regard to· the Conf·erence, his refusal to ··socialize with the 
• . . -o· ~ ' . 
. .. 
members of the ·Chinese .and ·the Viet...;.Minh delegat~ons 9 and- his con-
tinued eff@J?ttS 1ml Jr(eQ].1llestilnlg A,m01rican mili ta:iry inteTvent:ft.on" in 
.,. -· q . . . . 
. Indo~Chin&p ®Yen -though aft~~ Di~n Bi®n Phu 9 it was ~le&~ that there 
was little the French could do about the deteri_orratiim.g miJli tary 
situation in lndo-Chinao To be fair to the )ormer French Foreign 
Minister, it should be realimed that by the time the Ge~ewa Conference 
began on Indo~Chi~a 0 he "h8d hardly a ~ard in his ha~d 9 perhaps 
just a two of cluh0 and a tbree ·of diamonds" 44as far &a the negotia-
tions ,vere con.perrnedo He had &grreed to go to Geneva counting on victory 
. 45· 
at Dien Bien Phu 9 which would str~ngthen his hand at the Conferenceo 
with the fall of Dien Bien Phup Bidault 0 s hand was almost completely 
empty. His last resort therefore had to beto ignore the basic change 
of power relationship which had occurred in the military fields of 
l R 
Indo-China as well as at Geneva and to count on his diplomatic skills 
bluffing wi tp. threats of A.finelc3icarm interventiono Meanwhile in order 
to be able to go on pretending that he was in a position to 'dictate 
political terms, he had to shun the Sino-North Viet-Namese groups. 
On.the other h~tid 9 the~ Confdrence met with unexpected 
difficulties arising out of the issue of the composition of the 
Indo-China Conferenceo The question as to what constituted an 
"interested state" and who was to decide which was to be an "in-
, 
-, 
terested state" remained with the Conference whenp speaking at the 
opening of the Conference, M~o Dongp Head of the Delegation of the 
DRVN demanded that the Conference "invite the representatives of the 
governments of· resistance of l(hmer and Pathet Lao to take part in 
.-
. \' 
the ·,,ork .ofthe Conference i·n ·regard to the question of the re..; 
establishment of peace in Indo=China. 1146 This new and curious 
·· -demand iva.s one .of the main o.bstacles ,vhich delay'ed· th·e- pr~~~ress --of·-
~~- -------4·3 o NYT 9 April 20, 1954. 
440 Eden 0 .2J!.o cito, P• 124. , 
450 \Verth 9 Francep po 663. · 
,60 Documents relatin 
at the Geneva Conference 
Noo I, po 110. 
I \ 
to the 
1954 
Korea and Indo-Chini· 
Cmd. 9186, Document 
L 
·-· ~ 
- -~· . .:.·-·--· -·· -•·•· ., .. c,-• . . . ·.. .· • ">i';·} 
- -- - - -- - - - - -
- -- -- - --- - - - - --- -
.... ,, 
- ~........ : -...:..-. ,--
---·---·, ------ -·- ~~ - --~·-··7-c '•· - · -- ---. .·- ... •- -- -· ·· 
J 
'. 
.-27~ 
·,~· . 
.. . . "\ 
It·· wo~ld be of intere·st to n9t;e here tha.t· up to the .a:rr.~val o.f -
.. . ' , .. -.. . ~ 
. ~ t . 
Mro Dong, there was no mention .·of such possib·le "'representat·ion by 
the Pathet Lao. or th·e· Khmer Issarak. 47 While Mr. Bedell Smith for 
, the· Uo So Ao said he could not agree lo the inyitation of "so~called 
states or go;ernments" that did not eXistt 48Mr. Molotov expressed 
suppo~t for Mr. Dong's demand,'.but· suggested.private discussion oit~·-·--~·-· 
the subjecto The main issue ·involved for this demand was v1hether 
Cambodia aµd Laos should be regarded as in a state of civil war as 
·in the case of Viet-Nam· with an organized group of dissidents' 
~hich should be taken into actountg as demanded by Mr~ Dong, or 
whether the wars in Laos and in Cambodia should be regarded as a 
.case of aggression by the DRVN. The issue ·1vas not disposed until 
\ 
the latter part of June, when both sides had made substantial 
. ' 
concessionso At the end of the Conference, Mre Dong gained part 
of his demand, the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference per-
mitted the Pathet Lao to retain the two provinces which they )ad 
he.Id . since 1953. 
Ii . 
' . \ 
. ~ 
.---·-·· •,-·-·-·· .. -·- .... ·-··· - .... 
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Before Mro Mendes-Fra~ce 's entry; ho\Vever, some measures had ,.,,~ 
·,· 
.. 
·,lo 
agreed in the principle of partition of Viet-Nam, as the British-
·.,r 
had suggested prior to -the Conferenceo Although publicly the 
Delegation of the DitVN consistently refused to entertain any dis-
cussion on the eventuality of a partition of the country, the sub-
stance of ~ o Dong's p;roposal s on A(ay 25, however, represented a 
.~ 
de facto military parti tio:n of t~e country, and one ,vhich ,vould 
j 
last for so~e timee It included provisions calling for regrouping 
of populations in large areas, that lfnes of 'demarcation run' 
along natural.borders in order that fro~tiers might be more easily 
... ~. 
. 
determined, and respect for air-space and territorial waterso There 
~:-~ .·. i,,t.Z.J;&~:e al so provisions~ calling f (!r politic al, econoi:nic and s.,.tra tegi c 
'. ~ A ' " 47 0 I·n his proposal for 'the composition o_f. th~ lndo-China Con~-----=····"-"";,u==•=~===•-c-"ccccc•~ 
~-~~~·--·,·,c,_e.o ·-,-,-,_ ··--=·-~-··-·· .. , ,,,_ f'ere_:n.cei) Mr,~' M~l'ot~'v niade no mention of the Pathet Lao and the 
« 
Khmer Issarako The first suggestion concerning represent,tion for 
1· these two groups was put forth by Mr. Dong ash¥ arrived in Genevke 
NYT, May 5, 19540 . 
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· C:~~~id~r~ti ~ns:. 49 -Al thou;h· 1;h~r-~ Was -s~;~-" haggling ~~ th~ · part of 
... 
- - . 
. 
. the Delegation of the· Stat~ _pf Viet~Nam .(Frencha:asponsored) on ·the·.· · i. ;' 
. question of ,JC'egrouping a·,g· - in p~rticular, to whether military. 
groups should be confined in small "pockets" so that it vvoul~ no'\ 
, 
- ... _pepreBent a~-last~icng··part'itto·n •. ·rt se·emed. that the DRVN proposals 
were acceptable to most delegatese It came close to the consistent 
suggestions of the British Delegationa 
\ 
As soo~ as Mend~s-France entered the diplomatic sc~ne at.the 
,Geneva Conference, social relations --be~tween dele.gat-ion:a. af opponents····.-·. 
..... . . ... . ~ - ' 
J 
~ 
as well as progress on basiq issues were v1sibly im,rovede Where 
- Me Bidault was reluctant to meet and discuss issues with the Sino~ 
·.:.· .•. 
c_.~ 
Jf,J:i'' ,, ..• ' 
,,, 
Viet~Minh groups, Mend~s-France was eage~t~ discuss and negotiate 
with them to find a common solution. Whereas Me Bidault had been 
' 
' advocating American intervention in Indo-China, it had been Mendes-
France consistent belief that peace in Indo-China sh~µld be won at 
' . 
1
.49e These proposals of -Mr_~-8-ng should initiate no surpriseo These 
proposals had been pui;, for!h by the g,,9~Jt:!:1!~~µ.t .Q.f_.the .. DRV.:~t at .... differ.an~- 1 --""'·~·-·"'"· 
J -·.· ·, ,: ... ,,.:·,,-._- ,. · •• \ •• • .... ·o; ... ___ 7. ·-·. ··- ••. ~ ~·\ • ...---1,t ... , 
·,- ·occasions· 'oef_o·r·e··; · · 1n the first place 9 after Lanie l's unbelievably 
, 
. 
arrogant conditi·ons for peace which he addressed to the DRVN on 
· March 5, in a speech (eogo_ (a} the disarming of evacuation of all Viet-
Minh troops in South Viet~Nam; (b) the concentration of all Viet-Minh 
troops within a·specified area of Central Viet~Nam; (c) the creation 
of a no~man°s land round the Tongking delta and a controlled with~ 
drawal from it of all Viet~Minh 9 etcG All of these conditions re~ 
presented more·o~ less what the French had tried to achieve since 
1946 by means of force)o At this occasion, the London Observer re-
ported fromfNew Delhi HQ Chi Minhvs counter~proposals 0 whichp it 
said 11 had be~n transmitted ··by Ho Chi Minh to India o Ho Chi Minh 
then proposea: (a) a 190-mile front just hort~.of the ·16th Parallel, 
.the surrender of ·North Viet~Nam to the Viet~Minh Regime, and evaeua-
tion nf the Viet~Minh ·forces from South Viet-Namo This was what 
was largely achieved at the Geneva Conference four months latere 
(See~ Lancaster 9 opo.cito 0 po 2940 and Werth 0 France 9 ppo 665~66)Q 
It was later reported that at the early phase of the Geneva Con~ 
ference, the Viet=-Minh delegate:.s1~\;at the military discussions 
proposed terms· somewhat similar to the terms o'f Ho Chi Minh had 
seto '\ · .. 
.. 
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t · The "inve·stm.e,nt"" of M. Mendes-France by the .. French Parliament 
- ' as Pre1nier and Foreign Mil)ister co~ld not fail to alarm the American 
State Departments Me Mendis~France's frequent demand for peace in 
-,' 
Indo-China prior to his appointment and his wager~contract in his 
investiture speech that unless he obtained a settlement within 30 
days, or by July 20, he would offer his re.signation which could 
,, 
-mean f.or the Americans a p9licy of capitulation· to Communist 
demandso foreover with the appointment of Mend~s~France 9 the 
American s'tate Department now feared that France might sabota~e 
EDC and that th.e Western position at Geneva might be sacrificed 
for the sake of French futureo Just one year earlier, at the 
Government crisis in 1953, .. Mendes-France had barely missed the 
- ~ . 
appointment for Premiership by 13 "constitutional votes" on both 
' 
sensitive i,ssues: the EDC and Indo--China~,"-, On that occasion, 
Mend~s--France _suggested a compromise on EDC and was in favor of 
,_ , ._ ...... _ -.... _____ . -~ ~-~···~d~-~--g···· up ___ t~_e_ ~'.a..:r ..... ~.;Q lPJJ<>._-China._ .so_ .. that·: France .~.could. --conce-n-t-ra te-- .c, . .c ,, •. ,"· ,.,, ,,,_:,.-.- , •• 
her resources on developing North Africao 50 
American 1suspicion of Alendes ... France was further increas·ed when 
t ' is was known that Mendes~France had arranged to visit the Swiss 
President in Berng and that it had also been so that Mro Chou En-lai 
of China would be there about ·the same timeo It was feared that a 
"deal" might have been made between the two leaders during a meeting 
at the French Embassy in B~rn on June 2·3G Although the communiqu,s 
iseue"d at the end of the meeting between the two Prime Ministers 
n~ere mildly optimistie in tone"?1tbere had be~n suggestions that 
,, I 
the Bern meeting might have been "probably more important than the 
rest of the Geneva and Berlin Conferences combined", 52 it is doubtful 
. I ._: 
whether the two leader~ accomplished anything more than to_ 
become better acquainted and in this manner to facilitate future J1, •,_..,:. 
_ ·--·--·- ·-·-·--- ··- ·.·-·.:--·: .. ···-::.-;;:;.:-.:·:..:.c:..·.:;c:_c_· •. c .. :.· .• ~:--:;:.·:...:c· -- __ -·-- _ ------------------------------ - ·----·---- ·---- ------ ---c,,:..:.;::~----.:=.-:-___;;----=-----=-=-=--------·------ - ----------- : 
500 
5lo 
See Preface by Mendes-France in Francois Mi tterandv, fil!• cit~, 
ppo 12-140 
Survey of International Affairs, 195%, po 5~~ 
520 Fo Parkitison, "From nerlin to Bangkok", The Yearbook of 
World Affairs, 1955 (Londo~: Institute of W~rld Affairs, 1955), po 66e · 
... 
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· · · 55 -~ 
.. conversaiio_ps at Gene-ra. .· 
-·It was apparent that M~ndes-France foresaw the American suspiaa · · 
cion in store for him ·1·'or., during the investiture speech, besides his 
' ~ 
wager-contract with the French National Assembly, Mendes set a 
condition that he would take office only if he received a clear 
majority over and above the Communist votes. 54 This "Communist-
wtes-don ° t=-count" method of regaining· American sympathy might have 
eased Ameri <tan misgiv:irJgs s·o·me,vhat, ye.tit did not wholly 
,..,,._,....) 
·---,·····---.. -·. ··---· ··dis·pel ~ Ameri-ca~ suspicion over the "deal" Mendes-Franc_e, was 
~: 
suspected of ma k i n g ,vith Mre Cl1ou En-lai during the Con-
ference recesso So grave was the American suspicion that Mre 
Dulles tefused to let General Bedell Smith return to Geneva 
after the recess,apparently convinced Mendes-France was prepared 
to·: settle· f.or disastrous termso 55 Dulles only agreed to let 
530 Until the end of the first phase of the Indo-China Conference, 
France was represented b-y----M .• Bidal1lto · \Vith·····the ·fall of the Lani el-
.•--., ----. -.~.,,,-. .. ~-
.• - ..•. ·-- --··-. ~-- .......... l".-~. ~- "'• •. ·-·· ... 
., •... , .. ~. '··"···' .~--·-,,.c.,.·~,_c-~ .. ~--'·- ... 1:1~ 4~~1,J, .,_G~~e:r~1:11~n~, . ~.~ ~-h_,,- -~~:odes-France anci Bi d.aul t, .. insisted ~!,hat 
,,' the CO n f ere n Ce C () n tin-ii e· '·'w r th' ']ff da uI=r 'r'elif''es'e'.h'tl'lfg--:,.-pr·a·xle'ff'i,''; ·>·-~-e-, .... 1,~~~ .. ·=··,<·•=·····""""'······ =.,.' .. .,.,.., ., ,..,..,.,,,, ·~..,-,.-,.\ . ...11!1 ••
session of the first part of the .Crionfe"rence ended on June 19, one 
', .-,··r 
· day before Mendesc,;oFrance ,vas "initested '9 o The meeting at Berne was 
thus arranged mainly as a chance for getting acquaintedQ 
,, 
5~o Mendes~France received this majority by 419 votes - a clear 
majority independent of the 99 Communist votes for himo He would 
have needed merely 314 votes to achieve a "constitutional ma,iority." 
Journal Officiel 9 n,bats 9 June 18; 1,959; NYT, June 19, 1954. 
55e Later Mro Dulles gave the following e~planatjQn for his 
decisi~n not to· send Bedell.Smith back t~ Geneva: rirst~ Mend~s-
France9 a new hand in international dealingsp was negotiating under 
~ the shadow of military defeatso He might thus very w~l~ agree with - -
Com mun.is t terms which the United States could not approveo It _ 
would be best for the United States delegate to·i1tay"away··rro·m: th-,f----···--~------·-····-·-:-·-
Conference during the ~econd part 0 thus the Uo So itself could 
quietly disassociate itself from any such "appeasing'° settlementQ 
~-----·--~. Sec_?ndsi if the Uo Se,would be--)represented at this part of the 
Conf ere-nc_e ___ ii migirt-·-lre··-cu·-axe-d--by--b-oth France and. the Commu~i-~t ... ··---. -------,~-~-=- - - -
powers into signing thi final agreementa Failure on the p~~t of the 
rrt =· =-·= .. --=·--·=·-···-=--=-=--~-=.===--~···~-__ U_~-.-~o to do so might dampen the relationship betvveen the U o Se and -· 
Franceo Qn the other handv if the Uo So acquiesced 0 it would appear 
as approving further t;o.m.munist expansiono Finally v if .. a peace 
settlement could not be achieved, France might blame the Uo s~ for 
the failure and request American intervention in the share of 
combat troops 9 a course which the U. s. was not ready to assumeo (Survey of International Affairs ,195~). pq 630 
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meet·Mendds-France for the first time, going away impress- J 
Firench 1 eader. 56 I 
to Paris to 
· ed with the 
The entry of Mend~s-Fr~nce into the intern~tional political 
scene coincided vii th tne end ,of the first ,part of the Conference t 
which began on May 80 For weeks the Conference remained at a 
deadlock concerning ho issues: the comp'osi tion of the Conference 
concerning Indo-China and the composi tim and powers of th~ Super-
1 
v_isory Commission. On the first .issue Mro Dong demanded that the 
wars in Cambodia and Laos be c~nsidered as the same ~ituation as-in 
..... 
VietrNa,m,i"-,e~aos and Cambodia 9 · according to the· ·viet=Minh delegate~ 
were in a state of civil war 9 hence 9 repres-entatives of th·e Pathet 
l 
Lao and the Free Cambodians should be invited to the Conference, 
In this posi~ion, Mro D9ng received support from Mr. Chou En-lai. 
There shriuld be no wonder at all why Mr. Dong suggested such an 
invitation, since both the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Issarak had 
been creations of · the DltVN during the war yea.r·s, and these groups 
"' 
11 
ii 
i 
.• l 
i'. 
.---~--_,,_··---~---~- -=~~~-$;...OJJ.kolled ~entrally by the DRVN and the Vietnamese Lao-Dong 
. ,~·--···,<.-··· .. ,.,,-·r···,-...... , ..... .,,,.,.~·."··~·1· ._· ._ . --~ ~ 
· (co nutrun i- st J Part;. o 5 ?. . .... , · -- · ,, __ '. · · ,. ~ ..... :.. ·~:;~·· ~.- ... ; · ... ~w , ~=; : ............ ~. · -"';~·:;> ... , .. "··· .,..7:~· .. .-~:~.'.. - -:--';"'-,· .. ·.c·:_-:-:--:"';"'.·: - ..... - .. -... --... , .• -" ·-·~ ,: .•........ ::::-,-... c .......... ",--· ........ . 
. 
' 
It is of some interest to note t~at Mr. Molotov never gave 
Mro Dong's proposals concerning Laos and Cambodia his en~h~siastic 
support 9 and there was reason to believe that Mro Molotov tended 
to agree with the Western leaders that invitation should not be 
issued t-0 .. , so-called "governments" which :.in fact did. not exist. 
Thus, in Molotov's proposals,Jor the composition of the Indo-
r China Conference he made no mention of the.representation of the 
'~ -··" c_._ __ ,_,,,,_,_,,, .............. --, ..... "• •• ','' . ·-· , • .----·--.. ,,,, _____ ....... ~6';"-"""."'"""'" ...... ·-· .. . .............. , .... ,, .......................... -............... ................ .... .. ... . ·.-·· , ....... -............. ,, .......................... .. 
:.1 5 . " See Drummond , ll a c 1 t o , pp o 121-~.2 • 
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57 e During the war between France and Viet-Nam, the DRVN set up 
two "Resistance-.Governments" within Laos and Cambodia. In 1951, 
the DRVN set up the "Cambodian National Liberation Committee" 
with Sieu Hengg a Viet-Namese - Cambodiawa~ .Presidento This Com-
mittee in turn established a "Cambodian liesistance Government" 
headed by Son Ngoc Thanh 0 a Cambodian of Vietnamese descento · The 
same period saw the founding of the "Laotian Peol1le 0 s United Front" 
and Dang Lao ·ooc Lap (Independence Party of Laos) 9 created by the 
Viet~Namese Lao~Dong (Communisi Partya The Lao party was headed 
by Prince Souphannou Vong 9 a gifted member of t~e royal family who 
was ma:rrried to a Vietnamese Communisto See Ber~a:rd Fall, tli!_ __ Yi.!'-~.-
Minh Regime 9 Ithica~ Cornell Press, 1956, po 64; See a~so~Ellen J,· ~ 
-Hammer; ... The St_r_uggle .for Indo-C·hina (Stanford: Stanford University 
Pre s s ; 1951=1) • pp ~ 13'1 , 2 6 l 9 - - -- -'. - - . --- - - - -- /' _ - - --- -:·------ - · ----------------.c .. - .. -...... -..... -...... -... --------;·-·· 
.. 
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·--- .. ········-~- .. ------- Pathet .Lao and--the Khm.er Issarak,5.~nd.wheri M.re-."Dong·_formaily p:ropos-ed-
. -~ 
~ 
their representation, Mr. Molotov merely gave his -support but ~uggest-
ed the matter to be discusse4 priv~tely. 59 
The second issue on which the deallock at the Conference rested 
r 
was the 11roblem of the compo·sition and the po,vers of the supervisory 
commission for the enforcement of the settlemento By 29 May, the, 
Conference had tentively agreed to the "single ..... line" demarcation 
,; 
.... 
... 
.·;---~ 
.. .- ., .-.-· .. -----~-----........... 
. -
···--·---....... , .... ---·------- ··-------·· .. --·.·-~-~- .. ·-~-----~""·- ·--- .. ·- .. ' ·• .. 
. . . . . . . -· - . . .. ·• - - -·-·-~----·- ------·-·---··--~ 
.,. 
which MrQ Dong had proposed on May 25, for from the French point-of~ 
view, the "pockct 99 demarcation. line system proposed by the State of·· 
- . 
Viet-Nam would leave the French only the Hanoi-Haiphong patch ,t best,. 
'(. 
Thus, they preferred the single-line demarcation which exchanged Hanoi 
and Haiphong for better control in the south1 and a dividing line 
farther north wasviewed as an advantageous liargaine 
On May 29 Mro Eden proposed that the two Commands should 
. 
get together immediately in Viet~Nam as w~ll as in Geneya in order 
. ' to study "the disposition of forces to .be made upon the cessation t~ 
of hostilitiesi beginning with. the question of regroupiµg areas in 
.. . c , .. - .. ' 
·,1i:;c, .,., .•.. c,;i;-;.,, ,~~-f.::\'>c.,··:_:,.;,.,,·,--,-,,c-r:-,,-,·-~·:: .. ,·-·· ·.·· .. •.: ".·:· ::•:·:.--·~"·c66",Y:··-·-,·:•-,.-- -,··.:·: , :·:·-:-·;,·: " .. ·· ,·, ;· ··· ·, •.,·:,·: , .... , .... ,,.··c·•--··.;·· .. ···----·~·--·,;:•··-···--·:T·.-··:;-,-,.·,-:-·-:;·::--:;-:7·;···-;-•·:·c:··----....... --•:·.···c;··;··,--,·.,--,-:---.,;-n;;:,crrn.•-;; .... :.,,.~,· •· -~ .. ,., .. 
-
1 Viet~Nam-9 ".,J .. ·· .. The careful· phraseology enabled the conferen"ce to ignore 
j\ 
fl;:-~: i 
'' ·' ? 
:; 
·,· 
the question concerning tpe status of war in-Cambodia and in Laos 
f&t the time being, an4
1
to concentrate its efforts on solving the 
"·' 
more urgent problems concerning Viet-Nam. Mr. Eden's proposals 
. d" . t 61 receive unanimous agreemen o 
With the issue c~ncerning regrouping areas in Viet~Nam thus 
- . ---- . --- ·- ··-- ··- ·-- .... 
removed, the conference turned its attention to _t~e problem of 
supervision and the enforcement of the cease~fireo On May.30 1 
Mr. Molotov proposed that there should be established a four-member 
Neutral Commission Supervisory Commis·sio·n which would be made up of 
l) 
representatives of In~ia, Poland, Pakistan, and Czechoslovakia. 
580 
59. 
<(\ I 
See footnote q7, and NYT, May 5, 195q. 
NYT ,· May 5 , 19 5 4 • 
. ~ 
; 60. Documents,.!!.!!• cit. Cmd. 9186, PP• 136-37~ 
- ---------~ -~ ~--~----
61. The wording of Mra Eden's proposals also enabled the conference 
to by-pass the issue r~ised ~y Mro Dinh of the State of Viet-Nam con-
cerning either "single-line" or "patchwork" demarcatione It was then 
understood that Mro Dong's proposals for regroup·ing areas were to 
be acceptedo 
...... ·-- ·-·· ···-~·-··· ~-~·-·· ·~-·---··-·-. . --·--·. -,- -·. --·-· ··-·--
---,..._.--, . ' ... •, '' - ' -- ., ------
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-
of· the Neutral Nation's Supervisory Commis·ssion in checking North 
Korean objervance of the Korean armistice, the Western powers reject-
ed Mr. Molotov's proposals for the Supervisory Commission. 
With the support of M. Bidaul t., .on June 8. Mr. Eden suggested 
that the task of supervision be entrusted to the Colombo Powers, 
the majority of which had-, shown willingness to help settle the 
. ·- - ·- . . . 
- - ···- -· --
·------·1--·-··-··-···--·-·-····-·------ -~ -- ---.--·~- ~--· --· ··~ .... ·-
' . 
/ 
. eris.is in Indo-Chinao \Vhen it_ ivas hi~ turn,howeve:r 9 Mro Molotov __ 
·reiterated his proposal for a four-member Commission an·d gav,_ . ~--.. --"·'·.,-.... ,,, .... ,,,._ .... 
Mr. Eden's suggestion no support. 
·-c, 
On June 10, Mr. Eden again prop6sed in a vigorous tpeech that 
the task of supervisory commission be entrusted to the Clombo Powers, 
that its powers should not be impeded by a veto 9 and he warned the 
conference that unless any progress could be made on the two basic 
~ 
issues on which the Conference was deadlocked, it would be the·:::du-t~y~~--=-~-~-_ ,;--~-··. 
--
of the Conference to declare to the world its failure~to achieve any -
, constructive results. 63 It was apparent that the British now felt 
.•~'--~.•••• I•- •• ": -,. - ....... , ... ,'- •. • C, ••.,•••••·,"':- ,,.,, ~ .. ;;. :s;,, -~•\""' ...,.--~-. -, J •--;:;• ·- -, •-:,. • ~-•,·--;•- \' • ••- ~ • •• ~, ,- •- --• ,••-.~- '••; •' - ~- "'~ I< ' ·- • --,--:;-· f -.- •• ,- -\ • ,- ,-. __ ._,r"; • '- .·:;;·;•··-;···,.-.•·-. •:,:. "> • • ,·.,., .,~,-;·--:_·:;. _-_- - • - • > - - • 
- - • •.. •. ·-.,~ .--;r_, _ _, .-. -·-. , ·f~·----:-::~·~,.:-:~-;-;:..:-r:··-::·:··-..-c:--:·-:>!::::-; 
. --·-·········--···· ···- .. ••'- . ····--,-· --------·-·· 
,, 
that the possibilities for a negotiated p_~ace at Genev·a had been 
exhausted and pernaps the American insistence on resisting the Com-
munist expansion in Southeast Asia with "united action"_ had been 
correct. 
Eden 1 however,continued to believe that some progress might 
develop out of .the deadlock while there would be some chance that 
.. 
fresh·possibilities for agreement could be thoug~t out. Yet, by 
June 15, it seemed clear that the Conference came close to a break-
. -·· - ---------,...._.ti.. ~-- . -···~· ·-·-h 
down, On the one' hand', both -the Frent1h· and ~the AmerJcan delegatio~s·~-
refused to have any contact with the Communist delegation, and on the 
other hand the Communists did not appear ready to compromi,se thus 
., . 
le_~:Y!P.g __ J¥(Jl°o_ -~-c:!~JQ.-~_J_Qµ~ t,;ryJ:g._g ____ 19 Jc~~Ittb~-- Coµf~;r~~9-~- g~i~_g_ -~y_ ~_c>n~tantly ____ ~------
. . . _ 64 . -~ 
producing new proposalso 
.62,1- NYT, May 31, 1954 and Manchester Guardian, June 1, 1954 • 
. 
6 ~~ 3• Eden~ .Q.E.o cito 9 po lqq. j 6q. In his words~ Mre Eden later described his position then as 
"becoming increasingly embarrassing." Eden was certainly being ' 
criticized in the American press for his intermediary activities 
between the Communist and the non-Communist powers. See Eden, 
.2.1!. e Cit~ 1 p • 1 q q • _________ _ 
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Meanwhile in' P~ris .the French Government suffered a new crisis. 
-.- . 
.. 
, On June 12.,· the Laniel Governmen·t was brought down by. a vote 305-293 .. -----·"··-···<t~ C 
'! 
Al t·hough it was found later that the Lani el Government had been ~ -~ 
defeated by its Indo-China policy as well as its EDC policy, the 
immediate cause for its fall was clearly its failure to form an effec-
ti:ve Indo-China policyo On June 13 0 the Prea'ident of the Republic 
I 
accepted -the resignation of~ M. Laniel and asked M. Mendes-France 
to fo.rm 'ia ne.w governme.nt~ ... Only. three days earlie:r )4e;n.4~s-France had 
a.t.ta·cked the Laniel .G.overnment. fie1;celJr in. a.,-vigorous speech ,vhich 
. . - . . -- ~ - . . ...... . 
was called the "coup de grace" for the dying government of Mo Lanie!. 
Mendes-=France charged the government with having planned American·· 
int~rvention at the risk of a general waro The plan 0 according to 
.. ~, 
him, had fortunately been thwarted by the opposition of the British 
Government and public opinion within the United States. Mendes-France 
urged the Government to form its policy regarding Indo-China on the 
~~sis of the realities of the situati~n in Indo-China itself and 
that France should $eek a straightforward peace with the Government 
" 
.. : 
.· 
. 
·. 
... 
' . 
. 
.. 
-
' 
.. 
. · 
.. 
.· 
of Ho Chi Minh, alt,houg'h,.~o,t.-on the ba~is of capitulationo \\He in-
., .. .,,_._ .. , __ , .. ,_ ..... " -. . ·' ...... , .,I.~..::~.-~ ·-- _. ··- . ~':"---1:0:---r..:-""f'--.7-r;,-"";·-,·-~·:---,·_·".""'"·~_..,:·~:-- ;·· . .-~-.-~-'<--:··· --r·-----:-;.;;--.--;-·::·-·.~·,----;~ T -·-;,;· ;·,-,-;:·:····~:-~.' .;-;-:;··:~_·::. :;·: .... ~_-·;----i .;r. ·:::::·,··. ,:;:-:-~.f'",..-:ti-;-;--·-r--T-, ,~..  -: . ----.-::-:-.-. -~'.~----~---.·c,•---·-·--_--·-""7--:-···:-.-·-···-:-----·--:-----..-·---,,----... ___ :-_:-:----··-~·-. --~- .-· - •.. - - - -- . ' ' ...,-1,,r,.:iii:::-c-~,-;:-,=f-~----=-,-.,...lll 
--='°· sited that there was sti11····time ·for ~chieving "a p~~c~ wit_h, -ho~o~r:-~nu:,·· .... ,,. .. ~, - ~ 
~ At that tim~ the Conference at Geneva concerning Indo-China came 
to a deadlock on the two issues concerning lndo-China. · The Conference 
seemed nearer to a deadlock than ever before. The British Government 
' } 
on June 15 announced that its Foreign Minister, Sir Anth~ny Eden, 
and its Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, would visit Washington 
on the weekend June 25-21. 66 On the same day Mr. Dulles remarked at 
- ' 
his press conference that sine~ the British QOW felt~that there 
-.; ,. .. 
were 
no further possibilities at the Geneva Conference he hoped that the 
British Government would be prepared to consider other alternatives. 67 
- Mea~whi 1 e on the s_ami d,ay Generftit Bedel i Smith showed . Sir· Antholl~ 
' 
- Eden a telegram from President Eisenhower advising him to d~ every-
-- ··-. . ...... ·-·· ---~- ···- . ------· ·-·--·-·······------- ·---- --·-
NYT, June 13, 1954. 
The Times (London), June 16, 195~(text). 
Eden, .Q.1!.• cit., PP• l~~-q5. 
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. "'ll> 
thing within his po~er to bring .the ~Conference to an end as quickly 
as possibl!3, on the grounds that th8 Commnni st~ merely wanted to 
take advantage of the deadlock at the Conference to ,advance. their·· 
- 68 
own military gains in the Far Easto This must be· understood as 
·implying that "to keep hostilities going (in Indo-China) would help 
. - 69 
the French and their allies$" Although Eden does not seem to· 
have sl1ared thim opinion with the. American leaders, he was prepar~d 
... 
to talk over the situation with the American Government in the 
.. ' 
it," :~ t, 
· .- .... ,' · · ,-. ,.· ....... .,<· · •• -- •· • • ··- · .. · im~"c....,p-·' e· ·n···-d·1··n·-- g····· v·· 1~ ·.s-i t · 1· n·· 1Jva·sh·1· ·n·g ton o·· · 
... --·· , ...... - -- ... . '. . ·- . . ,,. .... ·- .~; ... . ' - 0 ' '• .. ,A• ·~· ~ ••• • -•"\ • 
. It had been thought apparently by the American Government that 
---
the Washington visit of Eden and Churchill would be based on the 
failure of the Geneva Conference, and perhaps the British Govern-
ment would be willing to discuss the possibilities for united action 
with the United Stateso This situation was, however, radically altered 
when the dead~ock suddenly disappearedo Apparently, either Mro Eden's 
. 
~arlier belief that the deadlock might protluce good results.had be-
come a reality» or it had come about as an after-effect of the fall 
.·~ I 
of the Lanie! Governmento · T·he evening of June 15, the evening of 
' 
, ." "' ,__,,./ 
' 11, 
, .. -,--;-, ... ·,·.,,,.~, .. -~ .• -~,.,c~•'·'~h-'.·~ . . ~\.\•.,~ ... ,.,~,.~<1,.~-.~\-·-,b.tfh--:e-,,·s1tm·er''.'-a,ay·,r:;tJtift~'-,Mr·-;c--:-TE"tllfnr--~re-'a·d····Eterenrrowe•·r't',er·•""'?m;e•s·sca·ge',lfn.n'TDur-1·e's·•···~.:. t .. ,,,,., .. ,,.,.•/,~,<s,,"_< .. H•\!,;,,', .. ,. .... 
• .I-. 
I . 
statement, Mro Molotov asked to see Mro Eden and indicated his in-
terest and willingness to see that the Conference proceeded· to.~a )}; 
successful agreemente · On June 16 9 Mro Chou En-lai paid Sir Anthony 
a visit at which there "encouragini" talks about Laos and Cambodia. 
After discussions with~Mro Eden, Mro Chou proprised that all foreign 
~~ 
troops be withdrawn from th~se countries. He told Eden~:; that-_--he thought 
he -could persuade. the Ho Chi Minh Government to withdraw~1t~ t~oop$ 
l 
from Cambodia. and Laos 9 and that HChina ,vo:o,ld recognize their royal 
governments 0 provided that 
\. tory.11 70 li'In his talJcs,. Mr/ 
.,. Qr-~ .,, ~ 
military talks between the 
there were no American bases in the terri-
Chou also agreed th,at there should be 
~ ~ 
two sides ih each case, and that Laos and 
Cambo.dia should receive arms up to the level required for their 
680 Ibid~ i P• 144. 
69 .. Ibid o, P• 144 •. 
... 70. )· Ibid.,, P• 145. .: c; 
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· national def,ence. · 
. ( 
F 
On the same day, June 16, Mr. Molotov indicated that~ the 
position of the Communist side concerning.the composition and 
functions of the supervisory commission had become more flexible. 
He had previously, on June 14, suggested that if a four-power super-
visory commission were to be established as he proposed, India might 
be chairman with a casting vote, and that minor decisions might not 
require unanimous consent12 On June 16 he made a;further change to-
wards meeting a compromise with the Western desire: by suggesting 
;I ···-- - -,- -·--.. ·'" -·-- ·---, .. -·-----~· 
" 
that either a five-power commission (India. 9 Pakistan, Poland, Indonesia n 
·- ' 
and Czechoslovakia) or a three-member·commission (India,. Poland. and 
Indonesia or some other Clombo Power) 73be set up. 
On June 17, at the suggestion of Mr. Eden, who thought after 
the meeting with Mro Chou En-lai on June 16,that some agreement could 
be achieved, Me Bidault paid Mro Chou his first visit to discuss the 
~·new offer the Chinese had made concerning Cambodia and_Laoso Bidault 
··-. 
was said to,b-e "convinced by it .. that the Communists now wished a 
· · set-tlement in Laos l!,nd Cambod1ae .. 74 The new Communist position w~s. 
,,i • , ,,, • , 1/ • ,· .,,._,~{ ) .. ,, '1\r-tS, p.<-..._i.;,, a,~ I ,~<~, ~,:r·~....-.-;--._r-;;- ,.-{:;--;--:-• · ·•-- ---.-•,:::·--·--:.·--1- -\ •· -;:--.-.-H,-1-- '..,_ -- 'F.- • ,-- ~ ---.---·--~,- ""·-, , ·~•--:-=::--,. ~i-:;·---::--r-:-7i~---r •, - - ;-. , -,- -,, .• , · - -, - - ----,- --~-.-- ··-1·i:"--·-------;-; ·• ---:_·-;---- -r--;--·--, ,----,-·~----:1--~~---;:------~..-~ 1• 1 '•" -.~·~~~~;.....,.::;'7. "" 
that the Communist Governments would be willing to drop sponsorship 
'5 of the "resistance governments" of Cambodia and Laos and agree to 
the representation of the Ho Chi Minh Government on the Communist 
side at the military talks concerning the two countriese Mre Chou 
indicated that his government would be willing to recognize the govern-
, -
' ments of Cambodia ~nd Laosj if satisfactory arrangements would be 
made by them with the Pathet Lao and.the resistance movement. 
After Bida-ult's suc_cessful talk with Chou En-lai, Jean Cha,uve14>· 
of the French delegation was put to on the draft of a p~oposal 
concerning military talks on the situation in Laos and Cambodia. 
The draft,~if acceptea, would set in motion the negotiations on the 
.•,•'·. 
situation; Despite 'Mr. Robertson'i furious and unexpected att~ck 
7Io The Times, (London) , June 21, 1954. 
72 e· Manchester Guardian~ June 15, 1954:. 
\l< 
73e The Times, June 21, 1954:o 
,: 
74. The Times,· June 21, 1954 .... 
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on the Chinese proposals at th~ re~tricted session on June 1a,75the 
French .redraft of ~he Chines~_proposals was accept~d ~y th~ Con- · 
ference on June 19. The~Conference thus reached an ~greement that 
the representatives of the two commands in Laos and in CamQodia 
"study the questions relating to tbe,),c-essation of hostilities on the 
~ 
territories of Cambodia, and LaosD beginning with the withdrawal of 
all fo~•ign armed forces and of foreign military personnel."76 The 
talks were to be held either in Geneva or in Cambodi~. With this 
agreement achieved, the first part of the Geneva Conference dealing 
. ~;1- 'I · 1 'I 
" 
with Indo-China ended a When the Foreign Ministers depart.ed .for 
"" • • • r. 
their respective countries there were four commissions set up, 
three military and one political, concerning the three states in 
Indo-China. 
Thus by June 20, and after about one month a half of discussions 
the conference had achieved agreement on one point favorable to tlte 
} 
.. West, namely",-"tbat Laos and Cambodia must be treated differently from 
Viet-Nhmo Progress of the Conference could also be noted with the 
' . 
·.i. ~ 
.. 
... 
· beginning_ o~ armisti.<t-:~, _t,i_lka in .. _ ea.c:h .. o.f.,.-_, .. three --states-.- --Thus; -·the· · --- ·- --- .----- :~----·--- ------ ·---- ---;r-----;-------.-:-,'t:m.~---.;;.-··~,. ~;:::--.r, ... -~--::,,~ . .,.,~ ........ I,.~•,._.,,', r ••• u,, ......... ~-~.,. -
- ~~-.... ~ , 
·-· - first part of the conference ended on an pptimistic note o It ,vas 
~l\/\ V' \"(\··-i \ •,. \. \ • 'r·.7'\· 
clear, however, that what the Conference had be~n able to achieve 
was fa~ from complete, for it was possible that the chinese would 
not be able to restrain the Ho Chi Minh Regime from try1ng to gain 
a quick victory at Hanoi while the Conference was still in session 
and in this way be able to demand a high price ~t the Conference. 
It was with this in mind that Eden warned in his report to the House 
of Common~ on_, Juner' 23: 77 
75e 
76e 
77e 
Final agreement at Genevi will not depend upon us and 
our allies and associates alon~e It sho~ld be clear to 
all that the hopes of agreement would be jeopardized 
if active military Q~era ti-o-ns in Indo.-.CJh ina were to be 
intensified while negotiatiins for an armistice are 
proceeding at Genevae If this reminder is needed, I 
hope that it may be heedede 
Eden, Jllto cito, po 14:So 
The Times, June 21, 1954. 
• .. Eden. 9.Jlo cit .. , P• 1%70 
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During the Conference recess, which extended from June 20· to 
. ,· 
July 12, ·irome impo·rtant develop~ents took place. F.irst,· on the in-
, 
itiative of:Mre Eden 9 ii.wis suggested that the French lead,r arrange 
to "have an early meeting w:ith Chou En lai 0 and alsoooo 0 with the 
representative of the Viet~inh,"78 Mo Mend•s-Framce ther~upon 
a visit with ths President of Switzerland ai Bern and it was 
arranged that Mro Chou En lai would be ·present at Hern on the 
· same dayo The two Pre~iers met at the French Embassy and although 
the communiques -ivhich ,;vere issued at the end of their mee·ting in-
dicate nothing of special interest, "they were_mildly -0ptimistic. 
in tones", 79 This meeting was among the important events during 
the recess for it enabled the social ice to be broken between 
France and China and it facilitated the negotiations durin~ the. 
second phase of the Conferenceo Although the meeting had produced 
suspicion among some Westerners, especially Anrericans 9 that a 
. 
. •) 
"deal" might ha~e been made between the two Premiers it is reason-
c;;.. 
I 
ably clear that the meeting was no more than an effort on the part 
~::;-;.,;...:_.:..;.,;_~.,.s.n,,.,.·~· .... ~ .. ----~~ ........ ;,,-.:";.:-,~:: .. ~~---,,i.•>.•-·•;.•_ •• ·.,(>·~ .. - _,.,. ..... -. "'"·-· """'""•''••••~• ,• .. ,._,,. .... •,,, .. _,,,.. '>-• ., __ ,·,-.e 
-- ···--.-~,,··-- ··--- --- ,-~-• .,.·,··--·-- >h• ···-- ••••• ·-· ..... ····-
• H•- .,.~-- ·• , ·- •••• •> • ~ , • ,> •••-, > k~ "'>••· • .. -• • ..... 
'c, 
•t: --: 
of the two leaders to iet better acquainted. 
. ,, 
A second important event during this period was the Eden-
Churchill visit to Washingtorto· On June 25 the W~stern leaders of 
Britain and the U. ~o discussed EDC, and the mechanics of exchang-
ing atomic enery information~ On June 26, they discussed the si-
tuation in lndo-China and the formation of a defense organization 
. -..... _,_, ,._ · .. - ..... -·:-- .... ~. -, ..... -,_,~-- .•.. - .. ;; :, 
in South-east Asiae In the communiques which were issued afterwards, 
it was asserted that the two governments won~d "_press forward ,vi th 
plans"" to meet the situation of either agreement or non-agreement· 
at Geneva. 80 The British leaders were trying to convince the American 
Government to ~join in a guarantee of peace settlement, should an 
acceptable agreement could be r~ached~ Mro Dulles found it impossible 
to promise a guarantee, which he felt would amount to guaranteeing 
( 
, the Communist domination of North Viet-Nam by the United States. 
During their further conv~rsations, Eden and Dulles did agree on a 
Eden, .!!J!o cite, pe 1470 
Survey of International Affairs, 1954, P• 5%• 
NYT, June 27, 1954 and The Timest June 29, 1954. 
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____ jo~J!t_ communication to Mend~s_--F_ranc_e __ stating their willing_ness to 
-, - - - . - - ~ - ·- - · . -~-- ~- ' . --~ -
81 · -- ,, 
"respect" an armis··tice agreement on Indo-Ch~na whieh: ···~=--·=· .. ,..,,,:..c,,_=,.,,,,.,=;c~= .. -., .... _=--·
-· _"------'---~ 
... ---~· .. -
"1 o Preserves the integrity and independence of Laos 
Cambodia. and assures the withdrawal of Vietminh 
-forces· therefrom. 
i 
2. Preserves at least· the southern half. of Viet-Nam 
and if possible.an enclave in the delta; in this 
connec ti OD ·we would 'fie~ .. llfiWi 11-inlf t-9. see .. th~ .J,~_!°!.!, 
···-··- ·-- ---- -,. ... , ________ -,!....0_,. _____ ·-·------ --- --· 
- ;.·; .. :· .. ;·,-;:,.;:.-:::::-:;;-_~c--~::&-rt.:::-:u.----;.,--;,. ,;:.·.~:: •• ,,, .• ,~·- '.:...,_.-. s, 
1:/,, of division of responsibility drawn further south 
than a line running generally west from Dong Hoi_: 
• • ·
- .. ··-
· % ... _. •• , •• ···-- .. , :·=--
. -.- . 
•. . •t . -·· -,., ( Above 17th, ·Para:11 e 1) ·- ... ---- ------··- - .,____ -·- -
·-~ 
•a:;•,· ; ,,, ".•", t • , • '. ~; ::'....,,,...,' 
,, 
_l / 
• • 0 
0 • • 
5. D'oes not exclude the -kpossibility of the ultimate 
reunification of Viet-Nam by peaceful- mea~. ' -'~., 
• 0 • 
~upervision of the agreemento" 
Another·of the important ev~nts duri~g this period, and by no \> ·.-.; ... ; 
means the least important, was the trip home of the Chinese Foreign 
Minister Chou En-lai~ After the visit at Bern and the meeting with 
Mend~s-France at the French Embassy in Switzerland, Mro Chou En-lai 
paid a visit to India and Burma on his way homee He stayed ~n New 
Delhi and discussed Asian questions with Mre Nehru and other Indian 
(r. 
leaders.· ·,Al a -press confere~ce on June 271) Mr~ Chou declared, 
"Revolutio~ c~~~ot be exported, .... and, at the same time outside inter-
' . 
, . 
• i •• 
; ' ~2 
ference with the expressed wi.11 of the people should not be permitted.,,- _ 
.. .fl' 
At the end of their ~aiks the two Prime Ministers issued a comm~niqu~ 
• J 
wp.ich called for "the creation of free, democratic, unified and in-
~ 
~ependent states which should not be used for aggressive purposes 
81. 
82e 
Eden, .2.J!e cite, P• 149. 
NYT, June 28, 195q. 
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., I."• or be subjected to.foreign intervention. 1183 This phrase·ology was··-·--,---------
... ~ .~ . .. .. ;;-' 
. ···~·-·'··-- ~- ,-:~~, .. , ........ ~.:.:~~~ ..... -.... _ ...... .....i;..,,. ---~--~==, interpreted to mean t'hat· India had-·ag·reed ·that no American bases _____ _ 
..... : 
... 
should be established in. Indo....,China. 
--- - --·--·m----.... o .... ,."_ .. _ ..... -
le'. .. 
., 
. -: . ;.:, -·.L- il1' 
After the visit to India, the Chinese Foreign Minister visited 
Burma, where he held talk~ with Prime Minister U-Nu. Od June 30, 
the two leaders issued a joint communique reiterating the five 
principle~ of the Tibetan Agreement, which called for: 84 
--·· 11 1.e Mutual re_apeci .f Qr ~-~c.h -,~~b~I-~~Jt tErrri_toriral, ____ L, ,- ... - ·.···: -··· .. 
integrity and sovereignty. 
2, Non-aggreesion. 
r ' (. 
... ·- ----- ., - 3"• N~n-int~rference in·ea~h-6ther's.ihterbal affairs • 
4. Equ~lity and mutual benefit. 
5. Peaceful co-existence." 
The Chinese Prime Minister stopped to pay a visit to Ho Chi 
Minh·, the President of DRVN, at the frontier bet,veen China· and Viet-· 
Nam. The meeting was impo~tant, for it was appa~ently at this meet-
ing that Mro Chou En-lai convinced Ho Chi Minh of the wisdon of 
· ... :·· ,-..~ 
., M 
• 
• 
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official documents are available to prove the i'mportance of this 
·discussion, it is reasonably clear that any agreement at Geneva 
could not be possible without the consent of the Ho Chi Minh Govern-
ment in Viet-Nam. Ho Chi Minh 0 s independence from the Communist 
Chinese Government had been reported when Ho Chi Minh refused to let 
.... 
. , ' 
the Chinese int~rvene -0penly~~ith troops as the case 6f Kore&o Accord~·· 
ing to The Times of London, the Chine~e and the Viet-Minh Regime 
• ~ l 
~· 
a~reed that Chinese forces would intervene only-to prevent the Vi'e~-
Minh from being annihilated by the French Union forces, and Chinese 
assistance-should be confined to ammunition, training, supplies and 
advice. 86 Yet throughout the lndo-China war, there was no instance 
--tr 
- -Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on.lnter-
n~tional Affairs, 1954 (Lorido~: Oxford Univetsity Pre~s, 1954), 
!bide, po 315 P• JI4 
NYT, July 8, 1954, 
The Times, (London) January 28, 195·3· . 
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being annihilated~ 
. , __ / . 
"· ' 
c:- The visit of Chou En lai t1> India, Burma and. hi·s discussions 
with Ho Chi Minh_ we~e of spe~ial importance. On the one hand, they 
. ' 
indicated ~'a~ Chinese desire to break a.way from isolation by befriend-
ing the neutra.1 0 uncommitted nations,
87 On the other hand, the visits 
,,!• 
were doubtless intend~d to demonstrate to the neutralist leaders 
- . .. 
i<l • j: 
.- ,· .,,_ .. ,- ~ 
Chinese sincerity in de siring peace and·· peaceful co~exis-te;rice ·wfth 
her neighborsP 8~nd thus lessening the chance for cooperation by 
these nations with the American=British scheme for a defense organ-
" 1 
. - -- i~~tion in South-east Asia. 88 Chou En lai' s ~e~~ing wi tbu~ Chi Minh 
G-" 
can be interpreted as attempting to make the Vietnamese leaders agree 
to the concessions made and to be made at GenevaQ On the other hand, 
it can also be interpreted as merely symbolic, considering the gen-~ 
erous proposals Ho Chi 1'1\nh made either· 'him.self or- through his 
representative, Pham van Dong, at ih~ G~neva Conference. 89 
---
.. 
During the three weeks of Conference rec~ss for the Foreign ~ ·. ' • ,!. 
· - ·- - ~ ·' · -- -.;7 · ·.~ ·- ... ,,, · · .. ·: · ".: ··, _- ·~· · ·• -:.~--.. . 'c;:-;:::·.···;:--"'".""':"'::-··-·7.-····---::.~--c--··:·· '!"-----:-~··--·-~··-:-····-~;···-····y-.. ·--~·-·:--,.---,,.··-.~----;-,.;•· -".'"~--·-•·'";-.. ·--:•--··-···-··; :: '.'-- ·· -~..:····;··- ·,-.,---·-1·· .... _ .... ~.-, ---···-- ·;··;-··· .... ,.-_;····,····-··-··· ,-~---·-·· -·--------~-·-, ····--;._·--· .. ,· · ·-,------"--~.: ··-·····;-- --~,--·"7"-·-.·-·-··--.-r---··-.,:~:~.,--,,-~----···-·······-~--:--· .. --.. -~-. _.._ · . ' ~ "'.'l · y, 
Ministers the ,,vork of the Conference continued on lower leve·r·er;-·'7"·------;~.. ·-_.,.......... -,,,---.-.. ~-~--
I,.. • 
r ' 
Not much was achieved during these negotiations, although by the 
end of June· there was a prospect of agreement. on an international 
commission for the enforcement of the settlement, if a settlement 
L 
could be achievede 
On July 12, the Foreign Ministers reassembled in Geneva to 
·- . ' 
87e On May .12,,lndia, .Indonesi~ and Bur~a had already declared 
that they would not join a Southeast Asian-Defense Organization 
as contemplated by Mre John Foster Dulleso No Yo Herald Tribune, 
).fay'lq 9 195~0 
.,. ff' 
I a 
88e . The Hindu reported th-at "China's thirst for peace has made 
a deep impression" (Bindu 9 July 3, 1954)0 Th~ Hindustan Times 
said the Southea_st Asian, defense proposal of Mro Dulles, though 
ostensibly defensive in conception 9 would divide Asia as the· 
Europe ~ables .(Quoted in The Times~ June 29, 1954)e . 
, 
89e According t~ the Observer of London, not willing to see -the--
Indo-China ivaJr Ho· Ghf Tulinh hadl proposed ira March 195% certain gen-
erous proposals: creation of 100=-mile fro1rnt north of-the 16th Para..:· 
llel, surrender of North Viet--Nam to the Viet--lVlinh Regime 9 and the 
Viet~Minh forces to evacuate South Viet-Namo This·largely fore-
shadowed the terms which were later achieved at the Geneva Con-
ferencee - See Werth,· France, ppo 664e Supra P• 
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resume. their discussions a All delegations ,,ere present ex·cept for 
• 
tli~ Head of the United States delegation, GefuBedellQ§mith. Dis-
appoint~d at the earlier achievement of the Coiference on June 19, 
of which the American delegation disapproved~ and suspecting the 
new French Premier 9. _Mo Mendes=>France 9 might .,surrender·· too much 
,to Communist demands~ Secretary Dulles decided to boycott the rest 
of the Conf-erence Q Dulles' fear was that the America_n delegation 
.... -~··- •,- • !r' ~ 
. ._ 
might -b·e led into· the predicament of a choice bhtween jo,ining in . 
. -
the guarantee of an international agreement which would appear to 
• 
. . . ... . ~ ..... -. 
.;. . - . . . _.. . . , . , .. 
give in to Communist expansion and app·earing bellicose before world 
. ' 
. .... ~ 
. ·· .. 
. ' . 
• C 
. 
. : 
I 
. - ... ·- .. - - I 
. 1;· 
. . 
' 
' -public opinion should the Ue Se delegation ·refuse to associate it~ 
self with the resulting agreement. 90 
.. ·---~----, .. --·--- . ,: -·- -- -,·----····--·-. .. -----~~-- - . -----·--·---·-
'"'1-' For the new French Premier, it was a race against time to 
meet the deadline he had wagered with the National Assembly. On 
·July 7, before he s~t: qut to. go to Geneva for the remainder of 
the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, Mendes-France declared that 
. \ 
'"3 - \ he would, as his Jast act before resignation, submit to the National 
, I 
I 
':J 
', :J 
-. , .-. • ,I Ass·embly :'a ._l!)i}l. whic~ wou~d .authorize the ,G,~Y.~!9!1-.~~-,~~-.-.t9,Jli~e-D~-:t~cJl:,,·;·•·y7 ~,~-~7 ;c~=~-=·,''r~~:-, 
A· -~,~~C~:-·,,;,=r-=-.;;~-.c;·-::-,;:~c-,"·.rs··,:,·-,,,-,~,-,;-,7,·;·--c:·· ,··c :-·-,· ;··;., ,--,,·.,. ·t·-. ····,· c;··,. ,c-·, ,-;::~,c:·;·c;·,;·c·;·;.·.cc 7 ,,-;·c-cr; 0·.:· ··.,-:·.;t, , ,~ ... - . .-, :c· .--·-r1,··:c.~ -:. ,,·-·,:·: :·· ,··,,·· > , , ,,- • .. 9, 1· ; 
.· .. ·. )y · t~e National Service men .to .~ndo-Chinao Thi-s later proved to be c' · i 
,I 
a ~ise move on the iart of Mo Mendds~Franceo Although Mendes~France 
realized that sending draftees to Indo~China would be an unpopular 
action for the Government, he also realized the Chinese and Russian 
desire for peace in Indo-Chinao Doubtless the Communists were 
clever enough to realize that Mendes-France was the best French leader 
with whom they could deal·,and the thought that Mendes--Fran~e .might 
90e Dulles also feared that the French new Premier might not be able 
: to._ gain all the seve-\i points which had been proposed by him and Eden 
to;,•Mendes--France in late June!) (See Edeno .2.P.~ ci to 1) po 156) 0 - .. 
In boycotting the f!o·nference Dulles merely did what he foresaw a·t · 
the beginning of the ~onferencee During ihe first ten days of the 
Conference Dulles told newsmen that "certain ~things may be done here 
,,hich we c_annot accepto" \Vhen asked ,·,hat course' he w·ould f_ollov1 in 
that case, Dn1 Jes _repl i e,d . tha.~ · '0 simply do not. par tic ipa te o" Thus 
th1 boycottint for a few days of Jthe conference was not merely acci-
dentalci See Drummond, ~.2.J!.e cito 9 pe 120. 
91a Journal Officiel, Debats, July~S, 195'*•, PP• 326~67e 
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be replaced by anoth~r pro~American. Premier _v.,i th a possible coil-
'" ' 
~ tinuation of the ··1ndo--China war with all its consequences doubtless 
., I t, , ~ f 
tended to make the Communist leaders more amenable at· Geneva than 
( 
· the·actual battlefield conditions warranted. 
Although Mendes-France wassuitablywise in hinting at the possibility 
of the continuation of the Indo-China war wi th,\,possi ble "inter:--
.nationali-za tion" in order to get swift results at Geneva, France.' s 
(_ . 
"-voice could not be strong ,vithout American support at ~he Confer_~nceo 
On July 13, however, Mro Dulles unexpectedly paid a·•isit to Paris,, 
wh~re he held talks with Mro Eden and Mro Mend~s~France, both of 
-- ·- __ ··--------------------- " - whom had, f lowra back· fro·m Geneva to meet the Ameri.can Foreign Secretar_y_;_ 
Dulles then expressed his fears that the French Premier might be 
compelled to depart from the seven points proposed by him and Eden 
\ 
In that case ·he stated .the United States would be com- I 
pelled to disassociate herself from the resulting agreement, This 
would ~,be an embarrassing situation fof the Uo So) 9and one which Dulles 
would like to avoido The Secre·,tary 9 howeverv emphasized that even 
.... 
• ,p,;c-,-.. -c- •• ~,-~cx-~,,--:r.,..-_ ;,,. ""·' .i .. t . the .set,t lement .. adh.e:re.d .to .the .. ·· s-even- po-in-t,s -th-a-t -.both .-,BrJ tai-n · -an-d .. , ~- --·--· .. , --+·-· '·:'·-· •· " 
.Y -
L • 
..__ ___________ t_h_e Uo So agree~ upon, it wo~ld be haid for- ~he Unit~d-§tates to 
' - ~.,.' 
s, 
guarantee ite In deed, it would be difficult to persuade public 
opinion in the United States to. favor a guarantee "of the sub-
jection of millions of Vietnamese to Communist ruleo n 92 After the 
conversations with Mendds~France and Eden, however, Mr. Dulles 
changej his mind and sent Bedell Smith back to the Conference. 93 
It was clear that Mr, Merid~s~Fra~ce-had wb~ his point,arid-with 
.I • - -
"-, the pree~nce of']3e·d~ll. Smith in th_e· 1\merican Delegation; the _-French_· -: 
.. _' . ,·. 
position was somewhat streagthenedo Dulles was reportedly.going ---
away impressed with the "terrific" new French Premier. 94: America-n 
\· ' 
· plesence at the last fe.v days of ·the meetings would in some way 
assist in ~nsuring -compliance wi ~h .the cease-fire agreement should 
. · it be _a·c hie v e·d. ·• On the pther hand, American agreement ·to such a 
92. 
93. 
94. 
.... 
... ; .•. :°'-<' 'I-
Eden, .!?.I! G 
Drummond, 
Drummond, 
..2.J!o ci to, P• 12~ and Eden, .2.J?.• cit., P• 157, 
Ibid., P• 124. 
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settlement would discourage any nationalist Vietnamese atte~pt to 
resist the, settleJ!!ente Finally, although the Americans found it _,. · 
impossible to guarantee any agreement which would give the appear-
ance of gu~ranteeing the ~ubjugation of a part of Viet-Nam to 
Communist rule 0 Geno Bedell Smith found it appropiate to declare 
that if the Conference could achieve an agreement of a character 
that the,United States ,vas able "to respectn 9 the Uc S-0. Govern~ 
ment was prepared to declare unilaterally that it would refrain 
, fro·m the threat or use of force t-o disturb the agreement and it 
• 
1 would view with. "grave concern" any revival of aggression in 
-~ - · ) ... - 9 5 
violation of it. 
The last few days of the Conference saw furious activity in 
order to catch up with all the work in time to meet the deadline 
that Mendds-France had set out for himself to achieve such an 
accorde Except for one -restricted mee~ing requested by the 
Communist side, ·held on July 18 0 it was agreed that negotiations~ 
should be c oncl.uc t_e_tl .. !ll~J_nJ_y .. PY. _pr.i.va.t.e _ talks among- -the· ·del-e·gate"s··· ·'- ., ·- , .·"· ... · __ ,,. · ~ ··--
.. -..en~ .. .. ,.~..:.):.,c., '•, .,, ........ .; • .· ... •·r/· ., ..... ··-·· ... ,., , .. ,. -........ ····· 
The points· '"at s~alce a~~ this time were mainly concei:niri.g the posi-~ 
. ~ 
tio~of the dividing line of Viet-Nam, the date of the elections, 
, 
the regrouping areas in Laos and the question concerning the guarantee 
of the settlement. 
... .. 
Perhaps it was at these meetings during this period that Mao-
Tse-t1:1ng's well-known saying,"Political power grows out of the 
barrel of a gun" was given a_ demonstrationo Although there was no 
.. , 
doubt that the sm,Jl powers, ev~n though being given the illusion . 
• : .. "l 
of sharing equality·of power at the Conference in the "restricted 
s·es·sions"; wer·e not permitted t'o"' play- their· supposed r8le at the 
Conference. While Mr. Tran van Do, the new Head of the Delegation 
of the State· of Viet-Nam protested,, ~n July 17 D against French 
; .··· ... 
failure to keep him informed of the negotiations concerning the 
fate o'f his country, such pro-tests were in vain. The real bargain-
'"· 95. NYT, July 19, 1954•-
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· ing was dcine between the French de leg a ti~;-;;d the delegation of·~. _ __._D....,_R_V....,....,N-.,_,...........------,., __ ...,....._ .,.,,.. .  ~ ....,...,--___,,j 
~nother smaller pmver• When it was all over it seemed that the DRVN I 
· .,r · · 96 
got most of what it wanted to get at such. an interbational conference. 
By July 19, the path to a peace settlement in tbe lndo-China con-
ftict seemed to be clear. Three issues 9 however, remained to hamper 
the progress of the Conference: the demarcation line, the date for 
a national election in Viet-Nam to establish a unified government, 
and· the· gua.ran~ee of the sett-lement-. For the d.ema.:rcation line in 
Viet-Nam, the French Delegation called· for parti~ion at.the 18th· 
Parallel 9 while the Viet~Minh Delegation first demanded the line be 
drawn at 13th Parallel, then after long and strenuous haggling 0 the 
Viet-Minh asked for "the 16th Parallel or even lower"~? Finally, 
-~ -
it was agreed that the partition line run along the Ben B\i River, 
using it as th_e 11a tural boundary between North and South Vie~-Nam. 
·~ . 
(The river runs West-East_ at approxi"mately the 17th Parallel)• The 
,. 
partition represented the control of Viet~Nam north of the 17th 
"--" l 
! 
I 
I 
Parallel by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
.-.,.i-.-.·-- - :,,..,..,...; ........ .;. :... :;..::·;·, ... ,,;-;.:..'-;:~: ~-' "~'. ...... -~~~--- ..• ·····-···· ·- k ·-·· • 
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Nam, and Viet-Nam so_uth of .th·; i?th ·i·~-r~'iI~i ··by.; t'he 'Fr"eiic'fi:~itpo-ii~oi~;:;:·,c"~''~'"'~··,,-~:,,.~~:,.c·,c~TC-.,~+~".~'~ 
~ , .-.;;. ... --
"-., 
ed "State of Viet-Nam" • 
-·· ·,-,.--..-: .. '··· ·••.· .. , .,.,. .. - .. The que~tjoµ concerni*g· national elections in Viet-Nam was of 
' 
no less importan.ce. The Communist side, and especially the Delegatsa 
ion of the DRVN insisted throughout the C_onference that there should 
be "free general ~ ... l~_ctions to be_ organized in Viet .... Nam, Khmer 
(Cambodia) and Pathet Lao (Laos), with a view of the formation of 
a single government in e,~ch country 9 n
98 At first the DRYN Delegation 
-. insisted o~ having the elections within six months. Finallyp it was 
'\. . . r .. 
· decided that e-·lec.tion·s sho-uld be ·held ~ori' July ·20,. 1956, two years 
from the date of the Geneva settlement. Representatives of the two 
~ ~ 
sections in Viet-Nam ,vere--t.0---b.e . gin ... -di.s..c.uss.ions for the organization 
f' See footnotes 3 on P• 3 and q9 on p~ 28. 
NYT, July 19, 1954. 
Documents, gJ!• cit., Cmd 9186, PP• 116~18. 
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The third issue ~.oncerned a guarantee of the agreemen.ts. On 
· July 19, the·Communist Chinese Delegation suddenly demanded that 
all Conference Powers should join in guaranteeing ·a Final Declara-
tion of the Conferenceo Mro Dulles had earlier declared in advance, ... 
99 however, that the United States would not sign any such an agreement, 
and Mra Bedell Smith had also warned Mro Eden. that the United States 
Government could not as soc ia te itself with the final de§laration. 1P~nl}lly, 
by· ~ri- ingenuous de-igrt~d Which would have -a special head~ng for the· 
final declaration in which all the participating countries would be 
listed, the problem of the signature of the guarantee was eliminated. 
There was thus no formal guarantee of the s~ttlement~ Except 
for the United States and the State of Viet-Nam, which issued separate 
Declarations, the other conference Powers signed the Final Declar&-
,·\.. 
tim of the Conference taking note of the agreements. The United 
St~tes delegation issued a unilateral declaration promising that it 
would "refrain from the use or threat of force to ·disturb" the 
-:,1.:·.:~ ·-:.:-:"·_--_.,-.; ·.~.,:·~ .. - ·r;.,:.:·:·.·:;:-:·.-r. i~r.·--·~.:.: ... ::·"'·:·-rd ::::;r.:-;::7.-;;,,;.,-:·--. ··~· "~:;.!;: 01;:-·.--•. -'i·. ···,;;·::..· ·:{ - ... ~ .•• : ·~ ·- .• .;. .t· .. ·,;; • ... ~ ;.. .-· : .... _ .·,·:it'"'· :--r---:·;· .-- ·-i~-, ·,..; ·, :: :;· .... ~;·: · :·~·~ • :...' '." ."~··;;." - ·.·- -;,·· ·-:;::······.•;:-·;·; •· ··.·:·r: ···:v:···--·:,-r--···-~c·:··-,,·--,·,·~--.. --,.. .. -....... , 
. aggreements and "would view any "'reiiewaf-'o"f""-tlii'''''ig"g"'rifssrf~lff:1~·-f11~ '. - ... '""•'~ ,,,, .. ,.c~· .. ,., .. u.,; .. , .. 
101 
. ·tiln.o.f. th.e., ... afore$a_i_d Bgte.em-~nt,~ ~~~h. grave concc.ern"G , The Govern- ... . 
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~ent of the French-sponsored State of Viet-Nam declared that it would 
~ ···~,~""'~···~"'="""'"'··-- --:·---~"'.~ ..... ,.,.c~"~')""=n"O·i····u,,s·e······f··orce ··to·········resi s·t · the ··-··carrying · out ·· o·f t·h·e ce·ase~fire·,,--·~a.t··t·JI·o·u·g1r· .. ·w.~==~-=~-
i t would still maintai~ ,.reservations on the settlement, 1°2 
Thus after nearly three months of gruelling discussions the Conc:a1 
ference came to an end which stopped the eight~year war in Viet-Nam~ 
The first indication that the Conference had A charice to succeed 
.., 
came on the a'f'terno·on of. July 18, Mr. ·chou· En-lai proposed .to 
" .... ·- ....... .. . . ... .. .. .. . . . .. . . . 
-·. ; ___ • ,•,.1 ... ·-";··· .. ··~;··":·.:. .• ~.~,, __ ~· ' -:/",. - ' ( 
··· Mr. Eden tha:t the supervisory commission should consist of India,'·;:· 
Poland and Canada, with India holding the chairmanship, 103 This was 
-, 
\ 
a definite step towards the Western posi tio!J. after much haggling ~Ag ______________ --~-
-------·------------ ...... , .. _., _____ ··------·· "' .--- _,.. ____ . ______ --,:---"···::--··- -···--" ------·-···-· - -- -------- ---·,- ·· ... :·.·_-__ ··:··.··--~ 
99e See Drummond, .2.1!• cit, 1 ~· 124. 
100. Eden, .Q.ll• cito, P• 159e 
lOle Documents on International Affairs, 1954 ( London: Oxford Uni-
versity Press·P 1957), ppe 139-.41. 
1020 Cmde 9239, ppo 40-q2. 
103, Eden, .!!.I!.• cito, P• 159• 
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arguing. ~he compromise came ratber.un~xpectedly, only one day after· 
---- ---- -------
.,a·----- - - ~ 
I - ····-. - .•. . . 
. . .
 --.··•'··-·-··,.·· ~-······ ..... ,_ .• > -·-. ·- --..:~·.:· 
the tripartite Chou En-lai had told Mr. Eden of his suspicion of 
talks in Paris a few days earlier and argued that 
,vere "going to split Southeast Asia in t1vo 0v10~itb 
the Western Powers 
an anti-Communi.s.t 
allianceo After the offer from Chou En~lai for a compromise on the 
---{}ODlJ>-O-s-i-tion of __ th.e.-.international supervisory commisaion 0 everything 
began to move on smoothly towards a settlemento On July 20th after-
noon M~ Mendes .... France and the DRVN Del<~ga tion ,vere able to announce 
,. "' 
. --,·~- '. __ .--·-- ·.·---;·-----·_,.··-.-·:-0"":'l.:~c-J .• ·:...b"---'-'' .... ~-<.- ---~~---
that they had reached agreement on the demarcation line~ which was 
to be along the Ben Hai River close to the 17th Parallel. Mendes-
France had also persuaded the Viet=Minb that elections should be 
. ~ 
delayed until J.uly 19560 By nine o'clock that evening, armistice 
agreements for Viet-Nam and Laos were almost complete. 
The Agreements for Laos perhaps represented the least favor-
terms to the \Vest.- As a condition for the Commt1nist countri'es 
I 
abandoning their sponsorship of the Pathet Lao - Mr. Dong of the 
DRVN having earlier proposed its representation at ~he Conference -
;., •• _,._, .» ..... ·, ... ,.~ -,-~~~t~;.;\-~:~~;,r.,~~·~ ,- .;-_._,-... , ~!::: -, '!-~S ',~!.~~;t°t,e,.;,., " ... ·.=~~Jlf~=!.J!.~~~,~---~'?.~- ___ .. . _ ·-=-
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1
ly- ana-· Sam--.Nuea should be the regrouping area for the· Pathet_ Lao •. ···--······-·,·- ...... ___ _ 
. 
~ •, • l 
T~
1
.Cambodians 9 however, skillfully kept negotiations concerning 
- - - " ,, ___ -· ...... - - - . . . 
. ~- . . 
. . ' . 
th \ir country going until the last minutes, when everyone was 
Finally as Mendes-France had only half an hour of time 
eet the deadline for the wager he had set for himself, the 
dian delegates demande·d an .. alteration in the wording of· the 
' 
restrictions on their military establishments, on the grounds that 
the drafted agreement infringed upon their sovefeigntyo They _argued 
that Cambodia should h~ve the right to permit foreign bases on-its 
territory in case of aggressions Their demands were satisfied& 
' The armistice on Laos and Viet~Nam were thus actually signed at 
3 a.m. on the morning of July 21 0 and that for Canbodia at 11 a.m. 
IJ: 
-that m6inin*• -rn order to meet the time-limit that Mendis-France 
had made· in the wager-contract in his investiture speech at the 
French National Assembly one month earlier, the Final Declaration 
104. Ibid., ·p. 158• 
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and the armistice -agreements _were "dated in Geneva. at 2%.,00 hours. ·on i . ·. 
·t~e 20th of· JU1)' 195'1.H 105 . · · •. _. ~~ .. ____ _ 
At 3 .p ... m.-..· on July 21, ·-Mr. Eden took the chair at the final 
_,.,,. 
plenary session·of the Geneva Conference, After variotis declarations 
had been readv the chairman made the closing statemente The chair-
man declared that "the result was not completely satisfactory, but 
) ~" 
we had stopped ari eight-year war and reduced internati~nal tension ~ 
at·&. point of instant danger to world peace. 11106 
Reactions to .. the agreement commanded a wide range of opinionso. 
While Mr, Chou named .. it "a tremendous success," ( which from the point 
of view of China it certainly was),and Mr. Dong called the settlement 
"a great victory for the· people of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
Nam • ". (and) a great victory for all peace-loving people, 11107 Mr. 
'k, 
Tran van Do, the Foreign Minister of the French-supported State of ~ 
108 ·.I" Viet-Na~, resigned on the spoto The fact that Mendes-France had 
"won his betn made a tremendous impression in the world, not-least 
(L 
in France its elf. The news ,of the Geneva accord was rec·ei ved with 
praciically unanimous satisfactiono 109 Although there might have 
r 
.. ~ 
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- -- --·-····-·-·· ·-,---·-a:tfer the many defeats ending up at Dien Bien Phu 9 the accord brought 
a great relief to Francee Now that the lndo-China episod~ was over 
there was no longer the danker of le contingent being sent there 
and France would be able to concentrate her efforts and resources 
to improve conditions in North Africa. 
Meanwhile a New York Times reporter found apathy prevalent concern-
ing the settlement in Hanoi, the capita~ o~ North Viet-Nam and still in 
.r 
NYT, J:uly 24, 1954 • 
Eden, .2.J?.• ·cit., . P• 160. 
107e Cole, 1-).lan B., Conflict in Indo-China (Ithica: Cornell 
University Press, 1956 )., pp, 160-61. ·1 · 
108. The Tim~s(London), July 22, 1954. 
109. On July 23, two days after the signing of the Agreements, the 
French National Assembly approved the settlement by 462 votes to 13~ 
AsUend~s~France appeared in the Assembly 0 he was loudly che~red by 
tnerSocialistso Communistso GaulistsD most of the Radicals and some 
on the Rig.ht o The ItiiRP alone remained glumly silent o See v\Terth 9 The 
Strange History of Pierre Mendes-France, P• 93. Also Journal Officiel, 
Debats 0 July 24, 1954 0 ppo 35q0~~3o 
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French hands. UO In London, Forei1n Minister Eden, the soul .and heart 
- .. 
~af the Geneva accord, returned to parliamentary cheers and was justi-
fiably rew~:rrcled with a prompt ~t2tem®nt @f de®p satim1action and 
firm support f~@m t~e Colo~bo Powersolll l~ Americap howevero the 
• 
settleme~t wa~ rec®ivsd with univ®~G~l di~t~ijt® ~nd di~irust • 
. 
. American pr®ill gemLsrrally 1rega~ded the 1®ttl®m®ID1.t t& vicio~y for the 
Commup.iet ivorldD and it was long after the settlement had been 
. . - -
achieved that American official circles come to rega-rd i.t a victory· 
112 - ----for the West. · ,, 
Whatever the reaction, there was a general relief running 
throughout the ,,orld with the attainment of the settlement. Nearly. 
eight years afieT the French had betrayed ihe Vietname1® Government 
at the ~coup d 9 Baipho~g~ ~e th® beii~nieg @f their ~ttempt at 
colonial ~ec@~qu®mt 9 the Gen~va &©c@~d ~~t ~~ e~d to a small conflict 
which was about· to ignite a universal catastrophe. 
. / . 
•· .. -, , .... -, t t/ I . .' ,.. - , , .. \ .> ., {" .• 1 ,•\· ·"- \ , . I. 1/. , ... .._ • ~\ ,,,,, -~ 1•. • :.;· '·•• -~ -"·• I I ,_.,, "- -i .: U ~ 1 A ..._., .•I. •\, io <lo ' ,~ -' • ¥ '..,..,, I • ,,.o ..,.. ··· -..._-.•.,. ~r ~ · ._ \ ' ,v ')'.':,., '!•\ ·-(• '· -~ .. , f. 'N ' •' · · ~., ... ·.1.," <•~ •· '; ~-'~• .-_,_ ,.:_ • •' S ~ ', ', - ' ' ' ' •~·• ~ · )(''- ., ' 
V 
,-.;·.'""ir'·•:O" ,, .... .-.-·-••u-,•• ~ _,_,,._._,.._._ ... ,""~·•• .. •""'1-"•l·,.,. .• .,. •. ,.•,.,:, •. ,~•~•• - •-'.• '"•'\·- ~ ...... ,. ,- _.._ • .---~,.,·-" .•rQ" ..... --. •--.-- ,_ •• ' ~ • 
.. -·.··. -···-· ,._ -··· 
.. : 
. . . 
. . ·,.. ·"··. \ 
~ .. 
.. 
..• • ··--, ... _,_.,~~--,- ... -·,······--···-·-· -.·.-.• ..-'•,.,,-._., .• _ .. ___ .•..•• ..,. .... ~. ~,r- --··,•,'--~·. ·-··~··-. "" ··-·- ._;.. !'""·--- ...-: .,,.. ~, .......... , -·-.··~··· 
\ ...... 
5 ,.-•• ..,,. . ..... 
~ - --- -· ~- ---------_.:... ·- .• .. _- .-~ .... _ - -·· .. •. -·~-- __ .. ·.·...:.. .... : •. ·.. _. __ . ___ -····: ·=· • .-:·'\:. ,: ' ______ ., _______ ·, ._______ ... · - •. -·- - - •. ~,,--· ·,. - ,..,_,...._· .. •d,.-·~-- ··--·---~-----.:. _ _: ______ • ___ , ___ ···-··--·--·-.-·~· --·-···- :~ 
.. ,_ -· . -:•"""' -:-----...... --.·:·.~··:-:·.-.·.-'".·'' "····. -~- ·:"·'"···· :."' -~--.::;--,.:·· 
... .... 
-~ 
... 
. :; • .. - ··--:· -. ; .. 
./ 
·,/' 
;...,. :1. .·, ,,<;·t. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
I. 
NYT, July 24, 195~• 
Manchester Guardian, August 5, 195%. 
Life, J~nuary 16, 1956 
."r.-: . ~· 
,:,·. \. 
=~ 
.-) 
- -. ·;,---· -,~- ··:--··-···:··-· ....... . 
,:£,; 
'i'." 
.. --
\ 
. . \.-:.::·.::·.:-:.'.··:.;··:~~-· ........ -,-., 
. 
... • - .... l ' -,-~.::;:'. .-
... ···.~_ .. : .. -.-·-. -·,; 
·-.- . ...........,,.~--.. 1.· 
. . . . 
.. ~ .. -~ ., ., .... ••: :._. !.', .. '•• .. ,\1,,,0- ,. • :.. .. ... "' 
r' . 
. ' .. • -I . . .- ~ . 
<'.,; •' .•' • 
i ! 
' ; ... 
. ~ 
• · .•. ·'.(:!I .• . ... i. . ~~ ... . 
,. . . ' .- ~ '· - . . •, .. ,..,.... :· 
. 
·- ".. .. 
\ 
"· /.. - •. •. - -~_ ..... :_t:_ -·--- ..,, 
. - _L__~ --····· -
. -- ,_ :..r.i .. ·- -· ·-
.,,,. 
' 
' . 
.i- .. ~--~- -
;.,-. 
-- - - .. """'"." .. ___ -
- --- -~----·--·-·--·--·-·---· -··- ··~--··---
CHAPTER THREE: WHY WAS THE CONFERENCE CONVENED? ..... .. 
The first among the three questions concerning the Conference 
),·: 
~ why was the Conference ever convened - has been raised and im-
plicitly explainedD_but not clearly answered by our consideration 
of the events shrouding the circumstances which brought the Con-
ference into being. The question may be asked both for the Western 
. -
-Powers ~s well as the Communiet Powe-rs. · 
On the Western side let us first consider Britain's position 
on the new Chinese Government in Asia ·and in the world. Britain 
~ 
wanted to bring China back to the family of nations :,.and assume her 
place in one of the great po~erso Her agreementthen in calling the 
, Geneva Conference at which China would be recQgnized as one among 
the Big Five is not difficult to understando It is more difficult 
. to realize w h y Bi daul t 0 ., lVho had refused at first to take up 
Molotov's offers for negotiations with ·the Viet-Minh Regime and 
who so passionately believed in victory in lndo-China, 11 ~ver agreed 
" 
-·}· e·'' 
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-!"' 
tried to pers~ade Dilles to give his consent to the convening of such 
a confer~nce, that he did not fail in so doing 9 but Dulles actually 
left Berlin in an exuberant mood, 114is even harder to explaino Was 
there any "deal" between Bidaul t and Dull_·~s, considering the change 
-~ in Dulles' attitude toward any implicit recognition of Red China 
involve.din sitting in the same international conference with China? 
le 
On the Communist· side, considering the consistently cool attitude 
.: · ·o·f the Sowi.e·t Union to'ward·s th·e· Ho. Chi -'Minh" Regiml 1~nd its··· luckwa·rm 
ll3e See NYT, January 1, 1954 and also Lancaster, .2.lL• cit., PP• 
290-920 
114:. ~ Up9n "returning from the Berlin Conference, Dulles told newsmen 
at the Washington airp~rt the conditions at the Far Eastern Con~ 
ference to be held at Geneva were "100 per cent what we wantedo" NYT, 
Feb o 2 0 , 195 4 o - . . ~-f 
1150 Although usually the Soviet Union is not slow in defending 
the interests of the colonial people, especially in a colonial war, 
the Indo-China \var offered an exception •. Anxious. ~o keep i,ts _inter-
.. 
national front and the popular support for the French Communist Party, 
the USSR showed no interests in the Indo-China Wa~. See Ellen J, 
Hammer, Struggle for Indo-Chin_a, P• 201. 
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support· for the DRVN during the Franco-Vietnamese \Var, perhaps ,·i't 
. 
- r --- --·-···-··----·--·-·---·c:::t-- ·-·-·----------~-·---------. ----------~ is not difficult.to understand that she wanted the war in lndo-
China to be ended. The Chinese,for ~heir part, certainly wished 
to participate in a full-dress international conferences In 
addition she was on the side of the winning state and this meant 
that a victory over the \Vestern "imperialists" could be celebrated 
in Pekingo It i's much harder to underst14nd on local terms why 
-the Ho Chi Mi~h ~egime c~nsented · to be present at such a conferenc·e 
at a time ·when its forces were winning one battle after aI1oOther. 
Judging from the barrage of statements expressing the good-
will and peace-loving desires of all the powers, one would think 
t h a t n o further explanation was needed to elucidate the willing-
ness of powers to convene the Geneva Conference for the lndo-China· 
War.e The actual circumstances and the events were entirely diff ere-nt. 
-To the world at large and the French people 9 Bidaultp who represent-
"--ed France at the four--power conference, had a duty to do his best to achieve 
_) 
II 
I 
'I I 
I 
I 
the convening of such a conference in order to restore peace in lndo- J 
,. China. This however Hid not occur· ,to BidauJ t at first •. EJlcoura ed ._ - 1 
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. . ·. 
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. L 
by the promise of victory to be brought a.bout by the "Navarre Plan" 
in lndo-China 0
11
~n addition to encouraging news about the stronghold 
of Dien Bien Phu 0
1lld emboldened by the American promise for new 
aid in arms and equipment at the previous ]3·e;,rmuda Conference, Bidaul t 
felt able at first to reject Molotov.' s offer. Qf good offices to 
. . 
arrange for an armistice in Indo-China in e~ch~nge tor a French '.) 
abandonment of the EDCa Under parliamentary pressures 0 and apparent-
' lY wishing to make good use- o~ .t.he_.flvattering reception_ tha~ }Va~s 
accorded him by the Soviet Delegate as ·well as the American n·elegate· 
I 
Bidault later agreed to come to a five-power conference and per-
, 
suaded the American Secretary of State to do the same. , It was later 
reported that Bidualt apparently had made a "deal" with Dulles, that 
116. Both General Cogny and General Navarre predicted ultimate 
victory in their Ne~ Ye_a_r' s messageso Navarre went as far as to 
promise victory ,vi thin six monthso NYT 9 January 1, 2,. 1954. 
117. See Lancaster, ..2J!• cit., PP• 293-95• 
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reluct~~nt acc_eptance to· convene a five-power conference• This 
seems a reasonable hypotl1esis in the light of the behavior of the 
statesmen before and after the decision to attend the conference. 
Two considerations apparently induced Bidault to change his 
mind. First~ the convening ot such a Geneva Conference to deal 
with Indo-China and Korea on equal footing was what the French 
Government had wanted for a_ long time. _Until then the French 
Government had tried in vain to link the Indo-Chinese war and 
the Korean issues together in order to make good the claim that 
the Fmench ivere not fighting a "colonial war" in ~ndo-China, but 
,d) 
a front of the international "Cold War" against Communist expansion. 
Furthermore, in acquiring British and American consent to hold 
a conference at this part~cular time, a time when both these two 
~ 
Governments were trying to be on good terms with France in order 
to gain ·the passage of EDC 9 it seems reasonable to supose thtt Bidaul t 
- .., 
ho1ped he could use British and American influence to balance off 
"·----···· ·----...------···-· ···---------.- ---
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Secondly, Bidault was among those who "'ltrongly believed in 
ultimate victory in Indo-China. Convinced of French military 
strength fn Indo~China by fresh reports regarding the fortress of 
Dien Bien Phu and counting on the eff ecti veiless o·f the . "Navarre 
Plan..-, Bidault believed that at Geneva he could plan on "bargain-
ing from strengthtt. App~r~ntly it was these two reasons which con-
vinced Bidaul t that the.· Geneva Confe·rence would prove to be advan-
,.,_ 
tageous for France.·~ 
Furthermore, it could ~e speculated that a third reason which 
4 
might h~ve convinced Bidault of the advantage of· ~h~ Geneva Con-
ference had something to do with the power of China over Ho Chi 
Minhe It may have been true that Bidault believed he would have 
· an opportunity to deal with China over the heads of the Viet-Minh 
118. Werth, France, P• 664. 
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., Regime- -and ther-e might ·be a -chance -th.at· ·China would be wil.li-ng to 
"a:t>an_don'° Ho Chi Minh. This reason might account for Bidault' s. in-
..:· 
.,J ~ 
itiative in producing the "Markos theory" at the Berlin Conference, 
when he "briefed" the correspondents of the Monde and Figaro to play , 
C 
. ;;, 119· 
up the story that he· had persuaded Russia to "abandon" Ho Chi Min~. 
If the reasons for Bidault agreeing to come to the Geneva Con-
ference were complicated, the reasons for Secretary Dulles to agree 
.\ to the convening of the Geneva Conference were similarly difficult to 
.. !. • - . . .. 
· understand o -Although Dulles had agr~ed to come to the Be.rlin ·con-/ . 
ference under the condition set out by the Soviet Government that 
its -delega.te would ask for a five-power conference, including China, 
when the four met, 1fl811es was conscious of the fact that it would 
be hard to convince American congressional leaders and public opinion 
of the need to negotiate ,vi th Communist Chinao :. · Even to sit at the 
/. -
. ' 
same conference with the leaders of China •ight be interpreted as 
a fcl':rm of implicit recognition of the new regime in China • 
., . 
~ 
. 
_ Despite great reticence on his own part concerning any such 
. --- .--.. . . ..... ': ~ 
·1 
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fi~e-power conference, Dulles later reluctantly agreed to convene 
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· restoration on peace i:rr· Iitdo-China. \Vhe_ther or not there was any"' 
} . 
"dea_ <~-"_r_· between Dulles and Bidaul t as has been implied by some 
r \ \~,. , 1 121 
1au~Jr~f'·~-)lias not been provede Dul~es himself, however, considered ; .,,. -~ 
r· I 
~the conditions for the· Far Eastern Conference as "100 per cent what 
· 122 
we wantede" Furthermore D Dulles apparently had some doubts 
regarding Sino~Soviet solidarity and he believed that the Geneva 
,, 
., ) 
Conference would furnish a good opportunity to obse~ve .the b~haviour · 
of "the Chinese .. Commu.ni.sts ap.d the Moscow Communists in th~. same 
room at the same time. n 123 Such occasion would enable Dulles to judge 
the degree of the dependence, independence and interdependence between 
Moscow and Peking, thus facilit~ting his future,policy decisions. 
119. See \Ver th France, P• 664-65. 
' 
. ' / 
120. Eden, !!.] • Ci to J P• 60-61. 
p, 
121. See \Ve:rth 0 France, po 6640 Also NYT, February 21, 1954. ~ 
122. NYT, February 20, 1954. 
123-o NYT, Feb-ruary 21 1 _ 1954. 
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If Bidault was not enthusiastic about convening· a conference ,. 
and~ D~i l~-s ~ ace epted. · ti~~----~~~;~-~-i~~--~-f- -th-~- --~-~-~f ~¥;·;ri~-- ~i th -r~ l~c tari-~e·;·r= .. ,.,.,=~-2 .. ---
the case was ,<the opposite with Eden," who 6ame to the Berlin Con-
ference with some definite ideas for a conference on Indo-China. ' 
' 
. ! 
-< 
1 
..) 
Eden had thought before coming to the Berlin Conference that._the 
I 
French would need to negotiate with the Viet-Minh at the earliest 
moment possible, for it seemed to him that "the longer negotiation 
was delayed, the more difficult the situation would become for the 
12~ ~ French," with the deterioration of the French military positioh in 
. ' 
. - .. Indo-Chinae Eden believed that the French would not be able to hold 
out indefinitely in the Tong king~ delta ( delta of North Viet-Nam) and 
at the beginning of 1954 9 he b·egan to think of some forms of par-
125 126 . t:{t ionof Viet-Nam. His "chief concern was for Malaya'° and he th«?ught 
it desirable to contain the Communists as far north as possible by 
a scheme of partition. This scheme he t~ought would enable the West 
\ to hold on to part of Viet-Nam, and the territories of Laos and 
Cambodia. More important, Eden ·''hoped that matters might be so 
contrived that India, and perhaps some other Eastern nations, would 
,, 
i 
i 
i 
.... -• 
"""~ ~-•• :·""""-.,;,-;r-•. ,·=--· ~-· ~~~~-'"<:'"'. •• :"7";-·-n.-.. J,;,r,c, · 7r'T1~n':'r· · ~. -~i,-,-,n.,....,.· -~tite ""gt1·u·1:-iitri:~er ' .tm·s wti a :nF UU.i·ir ~· ~ ~-· tli ~= 8.~; ~;;~·:r~ ;;i "' r Th~~ . . . < • ~ • .• . • •• : ·• 
··-'· · - · · · ··· ··. ·· · · -~ ·-··· · . ·by the time ther~ were1-dis cus sions o·n the· ques tfon · of the ·po e,s i b:i. I_l t-y · · · ··· · · ·· _ I 
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_b • .:,~ . ' 
for restoring peace in Indo-China, Eden was ready to sponsor such 
\ an ideae 
The over-all attitude on a Conference for pe•ce in Indo-China 
was very different for the Com.mt1nist side f r o ·m the" Western side. 
.- ••· ••• • -~- -.••'< ,.., .. , ••. -.w·•··,·- --·•··-• • .-~•- .• -
From the beginning of the Berlin Conference,and even before the con-
~ening of the Berlin Conference, it was clear that both the Soviet 
' Union and Communist China desired to have such an international -
-.conferencee Thus when the Western powers proposed to the USSR to 
come to the Berlin Conference "to discuss directly the first steps 
which should lead to a· satisfactory solution of the German problem, 
namely, the organization of free elections and the establishment of 
12'1. Eden, op. cit., P• Q7. 
125; I b!._<!,, . 97. ~ \": • ' pe I 
! 126. Eden, Qll~ cit., p.97. 
127e Ibid., P• 97. 
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......... a .. f.re,e all~German, Go~ernm:~-~ fl!~~ So;iet Governmen; countered witha repry · - · ~ ·· · J 
. ; , ' I 
ih~i it wo'Uld be willing to b'e tJresent at a conference ,vhiCh would j 
-i include Communist China ·a1id discuss the problems of the ,vorld at 
large. At Western insistence, however, "the Soviet Government 
agreed to come to a four-power conference with the condition that 
the· Soviei Delegation would raise the question-of a five-power 
conference. 
~ I 
~ 
1 I, 
i 
! I ,, 
,; 
f: 
t 
I, 
I 
t: }· 
r. 
~ 
t: 
~ 
·· At .. variou.s_t-im.~.~:-. a~. ~!1,_e ___ ,Berlin Conference, M:r, Molotov suggest- t: 
t~ • ,•f- •" •, '"-'•f ;,,•··•·,,•· .,._,I"",-., .. ''•• ' • • _,;;::,, • T • '• • .' ';, ' .,.,,_, •··•;. .,;;.·~':" •• ··,•:°:- ~-:,-n:":;11'1-.r.'""•~-:~-.-T---':o\. ---~~---,,._. . .._ti ... _.::::.~,"'lr-..i•'",•• -:. .. ·----~----~~ 
• • ~ y 
-ed. to Me Bidault: .his willingness·· to· arrange armistice talks for ; 
f 
! 
the French and the .Viet ..... Minh Jtegime and as soon as the conference l 
·, 
came to a deadlock over the questions of Germany and Austria, Molotov 
proposed that the Conference discuss the possibility of an enlarged 
JCoq~erence concerning the Far·East. Although Molotov had proposed 
-·~"~4!!' . . 
th~t. the Conference's· scope would be large, in deference to Mro Dulles' 
~· ., 
request, the -conference would limit itself to only the question~ of 
Indo-China and Koreao Molotov was apparently pleased with the limit-
-~ 
ed success of the Conference at Berlino He found it-possible tD 
thank his colleagues at the end of the Berlin sessions for their 
f ,, 
\ 
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· . ·.··· .· ... ·. · .. ·u·u.n·aer~!_~dfllg" o"f~the USSlf 'POSi'tiOri ·•···· 1,ri the dfSCUS~io~~·~~~ ~~e~!!::-~--~~~U,..;._~ _ 
~=--~-~,- ~~--~~.,~~~~h-icle·, .... th-;--p .. ~,king. Radio decl·~~ed thf).t,, .. t'ii·~,-~-~~.n~~~.i~g of the Geneva 
r 
' .1-~,-~ 
. .. 
t- . a . ) 
' , 
... ,. .. 
Conference as a···:r·es·u·t·-t:····trf·,. ..... ttre·,,~ .. B·e·r·ttrr ·conference was a "great sue c es s" 
for the forces of the peace-loving countries.l30 
While perhaps it would not be difficult to understand the reasons 
... ·'·-· f o_r, the s·clviet Unio·n and Chi-na' s interes.t. in a .. Gen,eva. Coµf_e;r~nce, 
it would be hard to ex~lain the fact t~at the Viet~Minh Regime proved· 
williI:lg to. attend o,_ Indeed, with its forces gaining advantages daily · 
,.(. -' . ,,, - . (/ '-.- ,.._, ' 
.; 
. upon a demoralized French army in Indo-China 9 it would be strange· 
for the Bo Chi Minh Regime to be happy about the suggestion of a 
settlement at that partic~lar junctuee. Many people have contended 
- -- - --:: --...- - . - • 1 •• - - • 
128, 
129e 
lJOe 
Ibid,, P• 60. 
NYT, February 19, 195q. 
The Times, (London), ~ebruary 22, 195q. 
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t·hat "the ·.Viet-Minh appear· to have been dismayed by the de·cision 
--- "- - · reached iri Berlin 1• 1J!d that wi ih victol'y laying within th~ir ,grasp 
J' 
. ~ "' ' 
the Viet-Minh·did not consider such an international conference ~ 
"to be in their best interest. 11132 
The opposite,however, seems to have been the case. Several 
·times during the war, it was the Ho Chi Minh Regime which proposed 
peace talks with ·France., As late as November 1953, when the Viet-
Minh · forces co.ntrolled m<tst of. tbe .. territory- of North -Viet-Nam, 
th~_re seemed to be a. possibility for a truce on the part of the 
Viet-Minh Governmento · On August 2 9 1953 Red Star said that the 
Korean truce provided fresh stimulus for ending the war in Indo~ 
China, 13Jnd a broadcast from Peking on September 14, 1953 9 indicat-
ed the possibility for a trucee 134 Besides ihese comments from 
outsiders, there- were al.so remarks and proposjls for a truce on 
the part ·of the leaders of the DRVN Government. On November 23, 
1953, Mre Le Dinh Th~n, the DRVN Delegate to a meeting of the World 
Peace Council in Vienna, said th'at the. war -in Indo--Chin~ should be 
ended, as the Korean War had been ended,h> peaceful negotiatio~s. 135 
.. 
' 
- .• ~ .•-~~.~-·h'-",' ~.,, . ,~ 
l 
' 
-On November 29, 1953, the Stockholm newspaper Expressen published 
answers given 0 by Ho Chi Minh to five questions which its manag_iug· 
·editor Nygop had asked through the DitVN Charge d 'Affair es in Peking. 
President Ho Chi Minh stated that any negotiations for an armistice 
' 
concerning the war. in Indo-China" would essentially be "an affair 
between the governmen·ts of F.rance and the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam. 111 36 He also said that he was prepared to examine French 
/ proposals and that the essentiaF ~asis ~fan armistice was real 
,, · 1.,37 French respect for the independence of Viet-Nam. · 
. \ 
13i. Lanc~ster,, op, cit., P• 
132e !bide, 1 P• 263, 
133a NYT~ August 3, 1953e 
263. 
v· 
.. , . •'9, 
., ·. 
-~ 
~ /'. 
-~ \ 
134:, §urvey_9{ International Affairs, 1953 (London_: Oxford University 
Press)o po 297. 
'The 11imes 9 (London), December 17, 1953, 
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135 • 
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Ibid,, P• 149• 
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Several ,good r·easons m~ght be adva,nced, particularly military ones:.., 
' ' ~ . . 
that the Viet~Minh Regime·was not enthusiatic towards attendance at 
the Geneva Conference;- it can be argued that the DRVN Government was 
not unfavorable towards a peace settlement arrived at through direct 
negotiations between France and Viet-Namo This reasoning can find 
support i~ the first instance through the Swedish interview w~th 
President Ho Chi bA.inh quoted -~hove o Ho Chi Minh said then that he 
would welcome efforts of neutral nations in ar~anging armistice 
. - ,. 
talks, but added significantly enough that negotia:t:t'ons for peac.,~ 
would be essentially an affair between FrAnce and his government. When 
asked whether he would favor a conference "which would allow you 
to end the presen~hostili
1
ties,H fiiff answer contained a long state-
ment ·which ,vas concerned mainly with the American "imperialism" 
which forced France to go on with the war in Viet-Nam in order to 
make "France weaker and weaker 0 so that she could ''take over her,,, 
position in Vift-Nam" 81).d with American ·" imperialists" Hforcing France 
'-r 
\1_1 
to sign the EDC pact, which implies that German militarism will be 
reborn" and etc e He did not' however' gi v:e '!I.Jl_ ~p.s~ver .t-O,.,:th.e.c.-quea,t.i0-n,...-=--,,'._;,''. ''"'""'-:·-
~c~~7,,,_,=b~~·~;c;~irlg ;}i·~t;be~ o; nor ·~e· w~~:l~ ~~ree to a conf erenCe •139 .· · .· ..... ·· · · ·· 
'/ . 
::·. _:t. 
. . 
~- · . 
.... ,; . 
Secondly, soon after the conclusi~n of the Berlin Conference, 
the Ltirldon Observer carried ·a report from New Delhi, which it said 
had been t,-ansmitted by Ho Chi Minh to India, in which Ho Chi Minh 
proposed generous terms concerning a possible armistice. This was 
*' ' 
-~ _presented in the form. of a counter-proposal to 
1
ari arrpgant French 
proposal that Premier Laniel expounded in the French National 
- _ 140 Assembly on March?, 19.5?-t.-
On the other hand, it could be argued that although Ho Chi 
Minh would pre·fe~ direct negotiations between France and his 
governmeJ1t, to an,. international conferenc·e~ h-e did not loolf at the 
1 
peace conference at Geneva with complete disfavor. On the con-
138e 
139. 
Ibid., P• 149. 
Ibid,, P• 1'19. 
... . ,.. .....___ 
140 • See Lane aster, ..!!11 • cit•, PP• 294-95; \Ver th,- Franc~, PJl. 665-66 
footnote 87 above • 
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tra~y it seemed that the Viet-Minh Jegime was eager to attend the 
~ 
Conference. Tjf~while the French-sponsored "State of Viet-Nam" 
' "' "'It' . 
was reluctant about acceptance of the invitation to attend the 
delegates of the DRVN were already in Eastern Europe- v1ai ting for 
(' 
the invitation. Their presence iQ. Europe li~bil® waiting for their_ 
~g4 
anticipated representation at the Confer(Snce enabled M:ro Chou En lai 
,, 
to urge an,early invitation and declared that the Vietc,:;,Minh delegates ... 
would be in Geneva "within 2~ hours'' after the invitation issued. 141 
Secondly, the Viet-Minh Delegation at the Geneva Conference 
demonstrated.clearly that they sineerely wanted the conference to 
' succeede Their cooperation at the Conference indicated their 
sµpport for the negotiationse 
Mre Dong 9 the Head of the DRVN 
The best evidence after all is that 
Delegation at Geneva; presented 
~ 
:.i.i ~, --, 
essentially reasonable terms. It seems reasonable then to argue 
that the ·nRVN' not only showed its good will a,t ~he conference by 
not sabotaging the work of th~ gathering but also by attempting to 
,; 
'v 
' '\,··· . 
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Thirdly, in a.negative way the Ho Chi Minh Regime showed its 
favor toward the Geneva Conference in that a military onsl~ught 
upon the demoralized and greatly weakened French forces in the 
delta of North Viet~Nam and possibly Hanoi would probably have 
sabotaged the whole work affair, Such an onslaught did not take 
" place. The Ho Chi Minh Regime restrained itself in a military 
sense ·after the Dien Bien Phu victoryo 
The Conf'e'rence then wa,s convened, .ostensibly to briltng about 
- the reunification· of ·the Korean country, but it turned out to be 
a conference mainly on Indo-China. Despite American and South 
Vietnamese relucta~ce,, it was clear· that all~the other powers 
desired a conference and were determined to make it a success. 
141. NYT·, May· 1, 1954. 
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' . CBAP'l:ER FOUR:. AN ANALYSIS OF THE REASONS FOR· AGREEMENT ~ 
r--. 
The most important of the three fundamental questions ~oncern-
ing the settlsm,nt at Geneva•as perh~ps the question as to why Powers 
. ' 
were able to agree at all, For it.is one thing to show why the great 
powers came to Geneva and quite another to show why they agreed upon 
. ' the particular settlement which finally emerged. Indeed, it is not 
easy to arrive at an ~xpianation-for the tict-that th~ G~tie~a Settle~ 
ment ,vas the only major international agree·ment. signed since the 
Italian Peace Treaty was concluded at ihe Paris Conference in 1946. 
Every single international conference at the Foreign Minister 
level since th~ Paris Conference had ended in failureo Between the 
Paris Conference in 1946 and the Geneva Far Eastern Conference in 
1954, a span of-eight years, there were four international Conferences 
at the Foreign Ministers' level~a The Moscow Conference of March 1947 
had attempted to deal wi tli the German que,stion. American and British 
; 
J 
r: 
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. :I 
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I 
•":i:;;.: • .;.._i.·,_ , -, . ., __ ·~; _ _' _.,.: . .. ,;--_; ___ ,'_,,_ -·:-- ,_...:.,a,_..:- ,., •·: ·.- •• ,d,';..:,.;;i..;.,_.·;,,.,.--" ... -~ • --~·.,-.1,'.'"' ·; . .-,;,..;.·; ..._., • ,;,.;.~- •"-, •- · ,_ .. ,.a-;,.--..__ - - •-·• ." .. · • '• 
• '•· • , • ~.-- ··- · - -
0 
-~ , - - • ~ .,-- ·~"'"" • -f ... - , .. _, .. : .•• ,._ -- , · .... :,.· '""!- _.,,,, • •. ,. •• . ,. , ;~.- • '"' ••• •• -·- '_·•. d: ••. - •- • ...:. ~-- ,..;_ ·.;. , _:_. ,:...- ,: ,.- :·~;;.-..:...;., ,. .. ~·~; .;;;-·,·<: .. __ ~: ··.-,;;·;.;,,.--;~;;:-;. I 
efforti to r~ach agreement on the question of German economic unity· 
---·-·-·····----· .. ' --------~·.····--·- -· :. ran -i-nto Russian and ·-Fre.nch oppositio.n .• _ A.fte.r· .. _six w.e,e.k~.~-~~'-·~-u~,~l~. 
wrangling, the Moscow Conference ended in failure. 
--. ··-···-.--,,.'. · ... ·, -.· .·- ·~·:_ ___ "·-·-- ·• ::.,·",· .. -... 
. . =". .... ;... .. 
) The second Conference took plac~ iri C Lorido·1f" in ·n·ec·eniber ·1-9q7·; .... · · - .. __ , ................ -···------.... .. 
If>· 
at which the main question at issue was also German economic unity. 
I 
Each side showed its hostility for the other and _charged the opponent 
. with having violated· the Potsdam Agreements. The Soviet Union accused 
the \Vest of having raised the industrial level 01'":tl!e "Bizonia" 
~ {an Anglo-American project to raise German economic standards), while 
" 
the Anglo-Amer:icari bloc accused the USSR of having exc<?eded its 
collection of reparations from Ge~many. After three weelts· of fruit-. 
Jess arguing, ~he Coriference adjourned~without a date being set for 
a next meeting. · · \ 
The third International Cofernce took place in Paris in 19,9. 
The Conference was convened in a clear spirit of hostility, which 
had come about as an immediate result of the many international 
frictions of the· pe~iod. In an effort to prevent the Western Powers 
from setting up a \Ve stern German state, the Soviet anthori ties in 
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~,Germany imposed a tight_ .blockad~ 1;1pon -the lVe·stern sectors. of Berlin. 
' ' l. - 1 .• • 
In retaliation ,the Ameri·cans set' up a counter-blockade of Eastern 
Germany 9 and supplied, through an unprecedented air-lift 0 food and 
,, 
other essentials for the 2.5 million inhabitants of the v1estern 
zones of Bjrlin. By the time the Council of For~ign Ministers met~ 
--. 
in Maf.1949 in Paris the blockade had. be~n lifted, but the division 
of Germany had progressed further. On May 8, 1949, a Western German 
Parliamentary Council had adopted the Basic Law of the future 
-- -- - .. "Feder.al Repub.l:Lc of Ger.m.any~and the Eastern part of Germ~ny saw the 
I . ~ • -.. • 
completion by the East German People's Congress of a constitution· 
for the "German Democratic Republic." During the time these dev'elop-
ments took place in Germany, the Council of Foreign Ministers was 
.l 
in session in Parise There was hardl~ any suprise when the Paris 
·-~ -··-·~~--- . 
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Conference ended up in failure. Following this dismal result no 
other Conference at Foreign. Ministers'· level was held 'uhtil the 
Berlin Conference of 1954. • 1' 
Between the Paris Conference and the Berlin Conference there 
' 
. 11' . 
.. -.. -..... ,. ......... ~ ....... ··-·were"" se\teral· irrt·e·.rnatio·nal --·d·ev-elo·pm-en-t-s -\Y'h.i,c.b. tended .. to"' aggr4-:v:a._;t(!., __ cr.·,-c;,=e1r==«·, .... c"5J._.,,_ ~.,, 
7 ~ 
international tension between ttie Western and Eastern bloco These 
I 
.I 
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"Truman Doctrine" and the f~ilure of the Moscow Conference - both 
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in 194 7 0 The "Cold War II seemed to get ·,v·o·r-se, ... witnesj! th'e· f'o·rmatl .. cftr··--trt···-·-·-········---~ .... -........ .. 
r"' 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organi~ation in 19~9, and the Korean War 
~hich began in 1950 and did not conclude until 1953e It was during 
these years that tension became both hot and colde While a hot 
w~r was fought between the two sides in.Korea, the ANZUS Treaty 
•. 
was signed -in 1,951._· ,a-µd in 1952 occurred the· Schuman Plan which gav ... e 
' ' • '. ;~· )./ .---· -.Jf-·.'--::-~- •. 
' I 
birth to the European Coal and Steel···communi tyc(ECSC) ~ : In Ma·y,~ :'1952 the V' ~ r. - • - -• 
·····-· -~L_.g_ ~ ~~=u=~~~E:~;:s to sign a treaty establishing a European Defens_e ___ ".'_4_~----1 
\..--· I 
The year 1953 saw two important international events: first, 
the ending of the Kore·an War which began in 1950, and second, and no 
C' 
less important, the death of Marshall Joseph Stalin, which initiated. 
a new era of Soviet foreign policy. 
In January 1954,the. Berlin Conference convened in a-period of 
"'". - - . 
:ir 
"1' 
A 
... 
; .. 
-61-
- ---···-·---- ---··---------·--·-·--·~····------ --------· -·-----···-··-- ·······-·-····--·-·--··-··- ----+-.·-----. --------~--
. r 
. total international confusion-, the Korean Truce was merely a cease- :_ ··---.,., .. ;.~--~~=-=_.==c'I 
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fire• the coming to power of the· Communis'ts in C~ina had brought to 
;,,,;' 
the international scene a new power-element; there was disunitl 
between the U, s, and Brit~in on the issue of the admission of the 
new Chinese Government to the United Nations; there was serious 
friction~between the Uo So and Britain on the one hand 9 and France 
on the other 9 over the issue of EDC. 
theme of "peaceful coexistence." 
Meanwhile, from Moscow the 
The Be~li~ Conference did .not deviate from the same subjerit 
·-which had.been the main cause of international friction: the 
question of German reunificati~n and the problems of-ensuring 
European securi-tye But it was clear ~t that meeting that the 
Soviet Union was not interested in these questions and the Con-
ference went the same way as did the other conferences previously 
h~ld on the problem. The Berlin Conference would have ended up 
in complete failure save for the incidental result of the conven-
ing .of five~power confer~nce to deal with the question of reuni-, 
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. . . . . I .· Chinao It remains true, ho~ever, that the Berlin Conference 
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how the Geneva Conference managed to achieve a settlement. The 
problem.is further complicated when one considers the complete 
-, . 
...... -· ·-."·· ......... ,~ ........ --·······wtisterri di-suni ty ··- existing· at ·the time ·wI t·h re-·ga-rd to. a common· .. , ---- ········ ···-·;··~·-······ .. ··----,~----
,. 
policy to be followed in the Indo~China affairs. Besides Foreign 
Minister Eden 9 who was the only Western advocate of peace negotia-
tions, Mo ~idault was reluctant· in accepting_such a Conference 
. ' 
and 'Mre Dulles seems to have been determined to sabotage the work 
o~ the Conference. It would not be easy either to explain the 
...,.. 
fact that the Eastern powers seemed so ·anxiou~· to- gain a truce 
at Geneva with the Communist forces gaining in Indo-Chinao It 
is, indeed 9 difficult to understand\why the Communists in general 
'-..._ 
' ~ 
---
and Ho Chi Minh in particular would agree to such an "appeased" 
settlement, one in which it accepted less than what it already ;. .. 
gained in the battlefield in Indo~Chinae Was Ho Chi Minh forced 
to-accept less than he could gain by his own military fo~ces? 
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· -One :re·ady· answer t·or the qu-estion_ .. as to why the Powers were ?,~ 
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able to agree at Geneva and not at other previous conferences was_ 
\ \ 
... 
that the Gerieva Conference dealt specifically.with the Far Eastern 
questions and not with European security or the German questionA 
the dilemma which had helped bring about the failure of earlier 
international c~nferenceso Furthermore 9 the Conference was success-
~ ' 
ful only in dealing with the Indo-China problems not the Korean issue. 
Thus, the explanation does not satisfy the questions ~eked, ~which 
express deeper and more c-0mplicated problems than can be answered 
by the simple assertion that the question for settlement concerned 
Asia and not the agonizing problem of Germany. 
In order to find a solution to the question~ it is proposed 
-
that the immediate events. prior to the GenMa Conference i-n the 
lnterna~ional diplomatic and military events be exafuinedo Four 
principal developments prior to and during the Geneva Conferenee 
can be accounted for its success: the military events in Indo-
China and the fall of Dien Bien Phu; the Jall of the Laniel-
\ . 
Mo Mendes-France into the international. diplomatic _scene; and . 
,, 
the negotiations for >intervention and the establishment of the 
South•east Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). 
The Geneva Conference began on May 8, 195~, nine years after 
the date of the German surrendero On t,h&:t -~~Y, ig.EJtead. of .c.elebrat~ .. (i··-·- .• 
. '~ ... ·'. . 4i'. ... ,.· . 
ing the anniversary of the German defeat, the French people mourned 
the fall of Dien Bien Phu together with the fate of many of their 
brave sons e 
Th~ date May 8, 1954 signified more than the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu, it meant the termination of continued French fighting in Viet-
Name Many questions have been asked concerning Dien Bien Phu and 
remain to be answered. First, in view of the fact that French forces 
were greatly superior in size as well as in equipment, why did the 
French lose the war in Indo-China? Second, why did the French 
choose Dien Bien Phu~ an area completely surrounded by Gen Giap's 
, 
forces, to establish their fortress? Third, what was the relation~ 
ship between the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the policy of inter-
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v-ention? Answers to these questions, it is ~oped, •ill ~xplain the 
impact of the· fall· of Dien Bien Phu upon the decision achieved at 
the Conf~rence. 
(>J·.J, 
. . The conflict in Indo-China began on November 23, when the French 
forces broke on the forces of the DitVN, after the latter had refused 
to obey a French ultimatum to withdraw their troops from the port 
city of Haiphong in North Viet-Namo · With its superior forces,_the, 
French Union -Command violated all . the treaty p~ovi sions 1ivhich Fra.nce 
' 
' 
ha·d signed \vi th the DRVN and under which the French forces had land-
ed in North Viet=Nam with the reluctant consent of the H'<>" Chi Minh 
Regimeo Once the conflic.t had begun, the Viet-Minh Regime fought 
largely with the methods of guerilla warfare. Against the heavily 
equipped French forces, the Viet-Minh forces depended mainly upon 
local self-defense units and a so-called regular army of the DRVN, 
which was composed largely of veterans of the colonial army and former 
i, 
guerilla fighters during the revolutionary days. 
. .. 
.. ' 
" ... ,..-~-- ----·, ----~ '!B.B ~ :rnili tary impa~"se~ The French Union forces we,re unable to gaiD ___ : --~--~---- ·--~--
ii_: 
L 
( 
con.·t_rol o_f_moxethan the major cities in Viet-Nam 9 and the forces of 
Ho Chi ,tinh were unable to ~~slodge the superior forces of the French 
Unione Once· again, the way out of the dilemma seemed to lie with 
negotiatione But events after the coup at Haiphong radically chang-
_ed the situation. Ho Chi Minh'~ teims were well-known - complete 
independence and the Republic to include South Viet-Nam {the former 
French colony which F r a n ce wanted to keep) o In order to find 
a way· out,· the F1rench sought to negotiate wi t,h Bao-Dad., . the ex-
Emperor, and the then ''Supreme Poli tic al Adviser" for the Ho Chi 
Minh Government9 His checkered career had proved him to be an 
expert puppet and an able "empereur de lfoftes de nui to" It was thus 
not difficult to understand that the 19 Bao Dai Experiment" turned out 
to be a failuree The so-called "State of Viet-Nam" which the French 
Union set up in order to negotiate with was neither a State in form, 
nor a Government in fact. While the French retained real control 
0. 
~ver the occupied areas, it was not hard to see th,t the Bao Dai 
Government received little if any support from the people. Perhaps 
. ..,, 
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"' it' qu!._lified W'ell the ti tie 11 pUppet regim~" that ·the· majority Of the 
--
Viet-Name se people were inclined to call it, 
From the beginning of,··1950 on, however, the s~tuati1>n altered 
fl~~-: 
· vastly. The military situation pass~d from a stalemate to a·sitri~-
,; ""~ 
sl 
r,•· 
tion favorabl~ to the Viet~Minh forceso lVi th the Communists in China -I 
reaching th~ fro~tier 1 ~f North Viet-Nam 0 the Viet~Minh forces were 
gradually strengthened with hew equipment 9 and with their forces 
reportedly trained and a.,rmed by Communist -China, from this ti·me on 
the offens.i ve belonged to the forces of Ho Chi Minho While th~p French_ 
Union forces and its sponsored "State of Viet~Nam" were unable to 
gain popular support in the occupied areaspand while in France, 
p u b l o: 1' C 
the Far East. 
opinion was against the idea of carrying on a war in 
The Viet-Minh forces became stronger daily and managed 
'" to·retain popular support. Although defeated in a major battle at 
< 
Vinh Yen by Gen, ·ne Lattre de Tassigny~ the Viet-Mihh forces gradually 
proved much too strong for the French. 
Meanwhile ,by 1953,· w a r--weariness had reached a high degree 
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aff~ir" 1 &· :struggle ·to -regain· & . former colonial territory p had become 
a part of the international "Cold \Var 0 , a struggle fo1 power between 
1> 
the Eastern and the Western Bloce Ind6-China was then ·no longer an 
exclusive French concern, it had become a matter of concern for the 
'--
entire ''Free World~, and the French became reluctant to fight some-
, 
--·- · --~-- · ···· .. , .. · .. ::._.: ...... --. - ···-······-on·e ·. e·lse-• s· ·war.-· ···--·AJr- thtr ··nr i ti sh· ·Foreign ·Minister ··saw·· 1·t 
9
··· .the · Fre·rich·- .. ;~·-· ·----,-···;·--_··-·,,···-···--.-.-- ··· 
. - -· .. , ... 
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• ? 
' ~ 
were complaini~g-that they could not be expected~o defend the in-
. ' ~. 
terests· of the "Free World"in Indo--China singleo=>handed and at the 
same time make the contribution to European defense which was be ... ing 
. 1~2 demanded of theme To many Frenchmen 9 however, it seemed to be un-
reasonable that France should bear the military burden of the Indo-
China war. If the war then would become "internationalized" as 
some Frencl1 leaders had suggested it., and the Americans were so 
willing, then "la pr6sence frangaise" in Indo-China would not be 
1 i. 2 • E.d en , op • c i t • , p • 9 2 " 
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guaranteed, and this ha.)a· been France's prin_ci.pal purpose for fight-
ing in Indo-Chin«;. · 
\ 
~M 
... 
If the war iecome internationalized by any means - either by 
reference to the United Nations or by allowing the Americans to 
' fa ~ 
openly intervene~ French prestige would be damaged and the 
survival of the French Union would become doubtfulo Mend~s-France 
who one year later became Premier of France, said in 195;;i43 
,, 
"••• It all looks as if the war in Indo-China was 
a frightful,trap into which we had fallen, so that 
we should exhaust all our strength in it 9 so that 
we should lose our men and our equipment there, and 
b-e reduced to helplessness in Europe$ It is unforgiv-
, 
able that we should never have tried to extricate 
ourselves from that trap; and that we should go on 
· with a war in which, in any case 9 we have nothing 
to gainooo Even at its very best 9 even if we win a 
.. 
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·- Mendes-France was perhaps correct. What would France get in return 
for a victory' over the Viet-Minh Regime 9 if she could ever win i.n 
Indo-China? Nothing! \ . At most 9 as Mendes~France put it 9 the French 
would be entitled "to go home n e He added 0 "already the concesisions 
•• _ ..... , •• ·····-····-·--·~:: ••• - ....... J ..... ~ •••• we have mad.e_ . to .. lla:o Da.i. gre.a tly,,, exceed al 1 that Ho Chi Minh asked 
b 
from us in 1946. - Our concessions to Bao Dai µave set u'.p a precedent 
which the Tunisian nationalists have· beenL quick. to · t'"ake· advantage ol ~~-i.. 
Yet as the war became·a pr~fitless enterprise from the point 
of view of France and the French Union, it became important in the 
eyes of the leaders of other major l~tern Powers within their frame-
work of containing Communist expansion,in Asiao A Communist success 
in lndo~China would mark a significant change in the world balance 
143, Francois Mitterandp Aux frontieres de 1 9 Union francaise, 
(Preface by Mend~s-France), op. cit~, pp~ 12~14. 
Ibid., PP• 12-14. 
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' 
of po~er. · The Mayer Government of Fr•nce sought to use a possible 
•*' 
« 
alternative to a settlement with the Viet-Minh Regime:: it sought 
1.'" 
to continue the waT on the Jm.odel of t):le .. Korean tiar o- In doing -so, 
it played a do·ubJle game: it talked of peace 1aiegotiations in France 
.. 
to soothe French feelings, meanwhile it reported military victories 
in Washington. 145 The game was skillfull; played 0 and in th~ Mutual 
Security Act of 1953 9 the Am~nrican Govermnent ,vas ,t,i 11 ing to pro-
vi d~ a further $18~0 million.for th~ implementation of the Navarre 
- - - ' 
Plan in Indo-China for the e n suing 15 months o Hi6 American aid, it 
was expected, would cover two-thirds of all French expenditure on 
·the .war during the fiscal year 1953-540 147 
But if the ·French Government had trouble at home concerning -the 
war in lndo-Cbina, it had trouble with the puppet regimes which it 
had set up in the occupied areas as welle While the Fren.ch continued~ 
to give and to "perfect" the independence of the Associated States/~ 
tension ~ounted between these States and Franceo Tb~ Cambodian king, 
while on a visit to America, told a press conference in New York that 
·· ··· -- -· · · ·· · -· ···· ,· -- · ...-_~ :·· · -_,,,. · · · ~- rn-i·-e7s~=-"·"t1te··-,;,Fr'@'ffc'fr'·,c,ltrlfnt 'ien'~':(raJjffrotrf·~-.r,·w,mcrr'°~--~-i·n,i"~'jfeH'd·~e°llitfe'1l,.,,, .. "t,ftlrre>'0 wa"S'"""·-· -~-·· ·=, .. --~-~~--~-~, •· ~~=~'""""~·.,JI···-
" . 
·.,.,., 
..... 
.J 
·"· 
danger of a rebellion against his regime 4nd ih favor of the Viet~ 
Minho ~He added that there was a growing support among·his people 
for the view that the Viet-Minh was fighting for independence of the 
12*8 country, and they did not want to die for the Frencho · · On June 13, 
1953, King Norodom Sihanouk fled the country, a month after his Prime 
Minister had demanded France accord Cambodia complete independence 
as Britain did to Pakistano 1~9 Meanwhile, the French also had problems 
with the other two Associated States, until finally the French offered ). 
. . 
. ~ 
to hold on July 3·, 1'953 ·separate but simu~ ta.neons negotiations with 
the three Associated States for a review of --their status in the French 
Uniono 
-
145. 
1460 
147, 
1480 
Le Monde, September 30, .1953. 
Economist, October 17, 1953. 
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NYT, Anril 19, 1953 •. 
·»ocuments on Interna~ional·Affairs, 1953 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1956), P• %70. 
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policy,towards Indo-China. The arrival of General Navarre to replace 
General Raoul Salan, reflected this attitudeo Upon arriving Geno 
·Navarre: observed· that the French Union forces had been in retreat · 
for the previous two years, and, t
0
hat the Viet==-Minh forces 0 stro·nger 
than ever before O could attack ,vhen.ever it wishes ·at the ~nd of each 
q ~ . 
rainy seasono His first main pro~lem was thus to build up sufficient 
reserves to forestall the Viet-Minh's attacks and this involved a 
transformation ~f the organization, habits, and morale of the expe-
. 
ditionary forces and national armies of the Associated States. 
· Furthermore, he observed that the war in Viet-Nam was both 
_ mili ta~y and. p~
1
li tic al warfare, and recommended complete independence 
for the Associated States in order to engage them more fully in it. 
The main object of the Navarre Plan was to overcome the political and 
milJtary difficulties of the ,var in Indoc='Chinao In doing so, it 
would·. be necess_a:ry to strengthen the expeditionary f.orces in order . 
that it could take the initiative in waging the ~1fensive instead 
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be necessary to expand the training of the Vietnamese national troops 
.. 
so that eventually the French share might be reducede This could 
only be done, however, if Viet-Nam were to be given., more independehce • 
The military side of the Navarre Plan was calculated to deal 
with Viet-Minh's. guerilla warfare, with the understanding that Gen. 
•• h •••.•••• """ . 
.. 
~-... , ............. ~~---·-·""--~-.;..., ... " ... ,.~ .. ~ ..... ~~a-t·ap·' could not···ffgh·t a pitched battles The ·Plan- called for the 
establishment of French and Vietnamese "commando" battalions adapted 
I 
~o gu~rilla tactics to fight against Giap's soldier~ at their own 
gameo With the delta ringed by French defens~s; General Navarre 
tried to root out the Viet-Minh forces from the area. It was expected 
that the growing-number~ of the Viet-Nam National Army would be able 
to relieve French troops, thus enabling them to form mobile offensive 
forces to strike heavy blows against the regular forces of the Viet-
Minhe 
Early in the campaign of the winter 1953-54, the Navarre Plan 
seemed to have ~ade some progress~ Soon, however, it was the Navarre 
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Pl an whi~h ~rought the Fren~h into the most dramatic epi_sode of tbj 
.,,, ::, - .... --. 
., . 
. . 
· · · ·entire Franco--Vietnamese war, the battle which led to the.· termina ~ · 
() 
ti on point of the dream of French reconquest -· the battle of Dien 
Bien Phu. 
Under tl\.~ Navarre Plan,, Dien Bien Phu had been a.n artificially 
.) 
c r eated stronghold for the purpose of disorganizing the enemy rear.· 
Near the epd of 1953, when General Giap refrised to fight with the 
French Union forces in the delta of North Viet-Nam and turned his 
troops instead to invade laos, General Navarre responded with the 
_decision to put Freiich troops into Pien Bien Phu, whicq had been 
~ontrolled by the Viet-Minh forces ~ince October_~ 1952.- The purpose 
l, 
of occupying Dien Bien Phu ,vas- to challenge the Viet-Minh forcers-_ . 
into a baited trap 0 nthe goat tethered into the jungle to attaact 
. 150 
the tigero" . It was supposed to be a lure that would enduce General 
~ 
~ Giap to bring his regular troops to face a pi~ched battle in flat 
., . , 
l'a.nd and thereby would risk heavy .losses, if not defeat by superio;r 
French· fire-power. A ·second purpose' of the ·fortress wa·s to prevent , 
the Viet-Minh forces from penetrating Laos, with the position of 
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· -· , ·· · Dien Bien Phu on the Thai' s road junction commanding the main in--
. .\. .. , . J. 
. : ·~ 
vasion route to Laos~ 151 A third objective that Dien Bien Phu was 
{supposed to accomplish.was that it would serve as a Frenc~ head-
quarters, from. there, it was expected under the Nav_arre Plan, the 
French would be able to operate minor offensive operations against 
the Viet-Minh in their rear. 
Di'en Bien Phu was no "fortress" in the ordinary sense. 
. ~ .· ~ 
Before 
the French came to build up the region, it was merely a sma.11 Thai 
yillage about twelve miles long and.five miles in width, dominated 
by mountains which rose steeply around it. According to Robert· 
Guillain!s first~hand account in the Monde, Dien Bien Phu was~ an 
.. 
150. Survey of International Affairs, 195~, ..Q.ll• cit., P• 16 
151Q The French apparently failed in this purpose, however, In 
r -,.- .. 
, .... 
· 1954, General Giap went around Dien Bien Phu- to- invade L-ao-s.--~-B-i--s--~--~- / 
armour "Division 308" took a pleasure tour 9 left the siegeat 
Dien Bien Phup walked a distance of 300 kilometers to Luang 
Prabang in 15 days, then without attacking the Laotian capital • 
Robert Guillain, La fin des illusions,(Paris, 1955) p, 31 • 
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and it -!fas surrounded by jmgle-covered hi,,lls occupied by the enemy. 
His first impressiori was one of being trapped 0 with,an invislble en-
e~ who "kn~w all about us, and that we knew nothing about him"! 52 
.. 
In November 1953, when Dien Bien Phu was recaptured from the Viet-
Minh forces, the French immediately began to build it up as a 
stronghold, and almost immediately afterwards, General Giap began 
building,up his own forces nearby. 
For• General Navarre, who predicted_ "victory within six mo~ths;• 153 
and General Castri·es ( then Colonel), who commanded Dien Bien Phu, 
the ga-rrison was an effective strongholdo General Paul Ely 9 after 
a visit at the fort, reported that Dien Bien Phu was an "extrem~ly 
strong position~ which co~ld only be attacked, by a very powerful 
force." Even in the event of such an attack, Ely considered that 
the advantage would probably lie with the defenders. 15' In the 
meantime, "the French commanders· in Indo-China ,vere reported to have 
~ : . 
"confidently believed" that General Giap would lose if he attempted 
to fight. a pitched battle_ at Dien Bien Phu, and thus French prospects 
for •ltimate ~ictory in Indo-China would be greatly enhanced, 155 
Robert Guil~ain of the Monde, reported General de Castriet and bis 
etat -major as dreaming, "Get the Viet down into the basin! • • • 
Once he's come down, we'll catch himl~ 156 
But "the Viet"(French slang for Viet-Minh) did not come down. 
I 
., 
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. ,.,,,., 
attack the French. For nearly three months 0 from De~ember 1953 
to March 1954 9 General Giap seemed to mark time without making any 
fierce attacke -_ Be s~emed to be unhurried in his _plans ~o take over 
Dien Bi~n Phue Around the valley, on the jungle-covered hills he 
- . 
amassed the famous "Division 308" with its new and heavy weapons, 
152e Ibid., P• 52. 
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Lancaster, .Q.J!• cit., P• 291i. 
NYT, March 15, .195~.• 
Guillain, op. cite, P• 13. 
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. -together _with the 312th, · 316th and 351st Divisions and \,seve·ra.l 
independjnt r~giments. including one from the 304th Divisiono 
y Suddenly, however, in January 195~ 0 w~en the Conference at 
Berlin was elose·to opening, General Giap sent the "Div~sion "308" 
·i'' 
for a pleasure tour ~f Laose The,"Division 308" walked a distance 
~'(,!i.. 
of JOO kilometers, leaving the eiege of Dien Bien Phu behind to the 
baffled French Command, to reach Luang Prabang in 15 days withou~ 
encountering any effective Frebch re©istan~eo Then without attack-
ing the Laotian capiial 9 wthe 308'° re·''turned to its base near Dien 
Bien Phuo lVhy did General Giap do that?' Was it,,tr-ue that Giap's 
' 
' b -
' 
troops were exhausted and the ref ore had· to return to Vietc:,,Nam? or-·-----------·-
-was there any pressure from Peking and Moscow for such hurried with-
drawal? At any rate, what did the -Viet-Minh troops accomplish with./ 
its invasion of Laos in January 195~? There might be some truth in 
,-
each of the reasons stated above concerning the return of "the 30~" 
to Viet-Nam in such a hurry, but it seemed· that Geno Giap had 
accrimplished hi~.purphse. It. seemed that the invasion of Laos as 
w~ll a~ the .entire .Dien Bien Phu battle was a tortuous political 
game played else~here either at Paris 9 Berlin or Genevae The in-
vasion of Laos metely demonstrated the mobility and effectiveness 
of the Viet-Minh forcese That their "Division 308" could leave the 
I 
siege of Dien Bien Phu to pay Laos a visit and return without meet-
. 
· ing with effective French defense of Laos demonstrated both the 
-- ----------····· . ,.....ci. __ ···--·-·-·---.. -·-· t 
··1-neffectiveness of· the French Union forces in lndo-China arid the· 
t, 
strength of the Viet-Minh forceso This demonstration left its 
effects at the Conference table' in Berlin. 
Then on March 14, General" de Castries' dream came true. "The 
Viet" came downo But unfortunately, the awakening was not as pleasant 
and happy as the dream itselfo On March 12 0 General Giap began sprink-~ 
ling the French air-fiel4.s with some- rounds of 105mme mortarse The 
next days it was relatively calme On March 14, however, Giap lau~ch~d 
,. 
-•'--
... _.:.,.:.:. 
~--. 
----·-·------~---~his first massive atta·ck, in which as many as 10 thousand Viet--lfinh -----·-----------
troops participatede 1i1ter 24 hours of heavy fighting,three of the resis-
l 
1570 NYT, March 15.t, 1954. 
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' ------------- --·-;.:;:~------liie-aiiwhIIe-. the F":r~ench ColJlllland was ,vondering ,vhether in attacking 
... 
. r 
Dien Dien Phu the enemy had not made'II. mon~ental,mistai~! Two journal-
.. 
ists observing the battle from Hanoi seriously disagreed with their 
' 
.opiniono With a slight exaggeration 9 Den.is \Varner s_uggested ,,''there 
., 
is little doubt that a sustained Viet-Minh attack would have brought 
· down the garrison in the first three days. 11159 Guil lain, meanwhile, 
stated that "only God could kno,v what ,,ould have happened· if Giap 
attacked for a third night. 11160 
After the first (.wave of Viet-Minh attack upon Dien Bien PQJJ, 
it was clear that the fortress should have been written off as a 
dead loss ior the FrenCh in the early weeks of fightingo 161• But 
here as during the excursion into Laos, the Vietnamese General did 
' . 
no t seem to concentrate on fighting, -If one had wondered ·why 
·,. 
General Giap had waited so long to begin attacking Dien Bien Phu, 
. ~ 
· one coul,not help a_slc-ing why the General did not exert his best 
to overrun~e fortress at his earliest chanceo Alth~ugh there 
have been no clear explaria tions for Giap' s procrastination in his --
efforts to take 9ver the fortres~, it can be argued that Giap's 
' ' ... ., 
ov,r_a1_1 ~~,rategy in his attempt to capture Dien Bien Phu was 
influenced by motives other than military considerations. 
Two reasons can be given for Giap' s decision to prolong the 
.. 
battle of. Dien Bien Phu: first, if the siege of Dien Bien Phu 
-=~···---~--···---=~-1-~-..--,,.,,'"'=ftDtt····",the·---.·- ~inV'tt'tri·o·n 9 trf .,, bao·s· ··ba·d-------he ightenett·" -·emtJ·t·io·na-1-' "'te'nSion-- a,}1--- ·-:0°V'&P'*=-""'·"=·,=....__-'°===~=·~""'~'"'' 
--------~---
the Western world and especially in France~ then the propaganda 
_,,,.--_, 
value and the ·psychol.ogical eff·ect of the extension of the c-on-
flict and the "nibling" method on the French morale would be 
eno·rmous.· - There was then a strong movement in France demanding. 
an end to the "sale guerre" and direct ne.ytiation with the 
r 
Ho Chi Minh Government. A long battle at Dien Bien Phu after three 
158e 
1590 
160~ 
161. 
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Warn er, ll• cita, P• 163. 
-----·--------------~----• 
: __ .~ .. Gui I lain .2J! e cit a , p ~ ···1ig~·- -- ------------···-···· - ~..:.~. -. . .:--....:... ··--:.:-:--=---...:. ... _~---___,. .... _..__ _____ . 
Guillain, opo cit., po_Jl. .'i· 
........ 
I 
• I• .• 
,, 
.. 
,... . . .. 
. 
. 
--· :;i;-·-+.. ·-• ,..._ 
... ~ ' <IC ~ 
------~----·---·-,--. ---....----··--···- .... ··--------;· 
------- ·:·- "'--~---- ...:.... _ ______...._ • ....JL. _ _,,...,......:..----~.----- -~ ------- ·-----·--- - - --------- - • -
'.•.c, .i 
~. . , . : . -;.. 7-2•--- '. -. . - ~ ".-.,. ·. 
) ' ' 
. ) 
months of siege co1;1ld only ~nhance., the desire- for peace ·on thti var·t····-·-···-·"'_·~----~· 
of the peo,ple of France and the collapse of their morale• 
, 
Secondly, it is of interest to note that the fall of Dien Bien 
Phu occurred exactly one day before the opening of the discussions 
on Indo-China at Genevao If one can speculate that Giap's decision 
to invade Lacs was influenced by political motives 0 one can also argue 
that Giap had deliberately prolonged the battle i.u oirder to strength-
en the hands of the Viet-Minh Delegation at the Geneva Conferencee 
t . ' 
,-, 
Victory~ Dien Bien Phu indi~&ted clearly that the Viet~Minb Regime 
earned a seat at the Conference tabls by its own righto Furthermore, 
since the victory was won by Vietnamese troops, it would give the 
·" Viet-Minh Delegation some degree of independence from their senior 
~~llies, the Soviet Union and China. 
If the two reasons given are sound, we can thus understandr 
Giap'.s motives in prolonging the war •. After the first wave of attack 
on March 14_,15 0 in which.,, two important French resistance centers 
Gabriel le and Bea trice, ~nd a minor Thai resistance ··center had been 'l 
overrun, there was a lull of two weeks, during which the Viet-Minh 
forces entrenched and tunnelled their positionse The second wave 
of attack came at the beginning of Aprilp after two days of fighting 
the Viet=Minh forces "submerged" two more raslatance centersp the 
Dominique and the Elaineo At some points after this wave, the Viet-
f .. 
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headquarterso Then on April 3 the fighting died down againo There 
was little.fighting after the second wave exce~t for the continued 
digging of trenches by· the Viet~Minh troopso Another lull of about 
one month followedo The last wave of twenty-four hours of fighting 
I' 
at Dien Bien Phu came on May 4>o, On the mo;ning of M,ay· 7, w,t/h ;tlfl! 
Viet-Minh not many meters awayp'Geno de Castries telephoned1 his f1' 
) 
headquarters for the last timeo The area which remained in French 
hands at the time was only about 1,300 yards in diametero The 
concentration of a great number of men (15,000) in such a small 
area, the majority of whom were by now either sick or wounded, 
turned the remaining area into a great, vulnerable underground 
hospital, in which almost every shell fired from the Viet~Minh 
----·~------
was a direct hi to 
. . 
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- After ·fifty-six days of heavy and bitter fighting, the fortress 
fell o There ,vas no·· way out, except through death or def.eat~ . The 
French chose both. In establishing Dien Bien Phu Gene Navarre had 
made thr~e errors: first, ~asing his estimate of the forces of-the 
Viet-Minh on the previous fighting season, he mounted the Dien Bien 
~~~ { __ , - it> 
Phu fortress with the intention of fighting.against Vi~t-Minh guerilla 
w~rfare "in the rear of the ··'enemy" o In addi tionm he wanted to 
challenge Geno Giap into a pitched battle, believing it would be a 
.. 
mist~ke for GeneGiap to do so, and .the Viet-Minh General w0uld risk 
heavy losses if not defeat, should he attempt to attack Dien Bi~n 
Phue But the_ Vietnamese General accepted the chall'enge and proved 
that his troops could function in a pitched ba.ttle as well as in 
guerilla warfaree For the first time in the· history of the Franco-
Vietnamese war, Gene Giap used his famed· "Heavy Division", "tl1e 308·" ·, 
d th F h . t 1 . d t V . . t M . h t ' 1 ·1 
161 T. h ti 
an e r_enc were grea y surprise a 1e - 1n a.r 1 ery. ._ e 
fortress they built was not expected to be ~onfronted with 105mm. 
guns, which ch~nged the defenders' victorious attitude immediately 
after the first wave of attacko 
. ' 
The second mistake that Navarre.made was his miscalculation of 
the methods of supply for the entrenched camp. It bad been calculat-
·,. 
ed that the Viet-Minh gun-fire would be unable !o disrupt the air- \~ 
supply lines, for it was assumed that the air-strip, which was si- c:~) 
tuated some six to seven miles from the summits of the hills surround-
. ing the basin ·would be out of range of gun-fire. It was also assumed ' 
--~-"---------
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that Viet-Minh attempts to install guns and anti-aircraft artillery 
on the slopes would be pr.event_ed by French cot1;_nter-=batteries and by 
air-raidse But with the Viet-Minh separate gun positions and their 
~rtil_lery wefl-camouf laged 9 it was discovered that they ,vere difficult 
I ~, 
~ ' . 
. -~ to locate o_ As a· resul t,t ~opn after tlie &beginning of the battle, the 
I 
.., ~ 
air-strip was rendered unserviceable, and after March 26, all attempts 
to land at the air-strip by aircrafts had to be relinquished. The 
fortress continued to be reinforced and supplied by parachute; bu~ 
soon it was found that even this was no longer possible, for th~-
Viet-Minh had proceeded to install anti-aircraft batteries close· to 
the dropping zonese 
' •• •;~ "-I •• ,. -. - • .... -. - - - ·~ 
-
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Th-e - ·third miscalculation tha. t General N'avarre made· concerned 
-the assessment: of Viet-Aiinh strength and supplies. The French 
•> ' Command had bas,i~d their assessment on de.tailed re:p,9rts through their 
'·---
- . 
-.Jh_ -
-~-, 
. ,,;ltl 
.. _. e 
-intelligence channels. and estimated that the Viet-Minh forces would ' ,1v~ ' 
,~._:"'I-._. ",-. ,"' 
have enough supplies of ammunition to allow them to attack two or 
three defense centers for five or six days. 162 Duri~g the month of 
"' .... J . 
March 9 however, the volume of Chinese aid doubled,· 'ivith the arrival 
J ( 
• 1, • 
, 
of M~lotova trucks~ This facilitated the passage ~f-supplies to the 
front for the Viet-Minh. 163 Consequently, the defenders of the camp, 
who were prepared and supplied to resist an attack of limited dura-
_tion, with the expectation of being reinforced by headquar~ers in 
Hanoi by air~line, were not only cut off from further reinforcement, 
but also subjected to~ protracted siege of fifty-six days. 
' 
The effects of the fall of~Dien Bien Phu,upon the French posit-
ion at Geneva as well is the position of the French Union forces in 
Viet-Nam were enormouso First, Bidault had been among those who 
firmly believed i.n victory -in Indo-China in general and in victory 
-
at Dien Bien Phu in particular. He had expected to go to Geneva in 
a strong position. Events between the end of the Berlin Conference 
and the opening of the Geneva Conference on the issue of Indo~China, 
' ..I, i 
however, turned out differently from what he had expectedo At Geneva, , 
as Bidaul t admitted to Eden, he "had hardly a card in· his hand, only 
. 164 a two of clubs and a three of diamondso 18 Consequently,the last 
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to~ agree to social contacts with themo 
Secondly, although the loss of the French. Union Forces at, Dien 
Blen Phu, (15,000 men with about 10,000 ·pr-isoners,··as compared ·to 
Viet-Minh casualties ranging anywhere from 61 000 to 20,000,) 165was 
not significant when the total ~f 550,000 men under the French 
Command in Indo-Chinao But the loss was more serious than mere 
1620 
163,o 
16\o 
165. 
Lane aster, ..QJ!• cit•, p, 297 • __________________ -- -- ------------------~ -____ -- -- - - - -
Ibid., P• 297• See also Fall, .Q.I!.• cit., P• 31. 
Eden, .QJ!• ·cit., po 1240 
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fo·rces. Only .g, small pdrtion of the entire Fren'ch Union Command· ~as 
. 
- · compos~d of Frenchmen~rom metropolitan France 0 the rest being Viet-
namese 9 members of the Foreign ·tegion 9 and-colonial troops from 
Morocco, Algeria and Senegal. The spearhead of French actions in 
Indo-China·· was fox,med by a few battalions 9f parachutists and 
( 
l.egiqnaries, "the only ones ,vhich equ·a1 in valour the fanatic troops 
of the Viet-Minh", 16ind it was precisely these ,lite troops whi~h 
were assigned by Navarre either to occupy·Dien Bien Phu or to re-
~: inforce the besieged fortress after the first and the second waves 
of attack occureli~'.thus with the fall of Dien Bien Phu, the French Union, f.:. 
forces suffered a crip~ling blow by the removal of these forces from 
-\ 
battle. 
ii) 
j 
.. = j 
Thirdiy, the fall of Dien Bien Phu did not merely affect the 
French milit~ry position, but also French morale and will to fight. 
I On the one hand, the ~,rench .~defenders of the North Vietna~ese_ delta, 
already besieged from within
9
weakened by the loss of/their best. 
forces at Dien Bien Phu, and shaten by the.aftermath of t~e defeat, 
-~· . ~ had to face General,, Giap' s victorious army, neither exhausted nor 
decimate,d by the--·~-ight at Dien Bien Phu but elated by victory. In 
{ .. 
,(' 
such conditions they would rove to be no match fo~ the forces of the -
ii' 
Viet-Minh. In addition, the people of France, already weary with_ ~ 
the war in Indo-China, had no desire to see an extension of the con-
flic.t with possible involveme_nt_ of French national servicemen. In 
. ·.":lr:·r~~..,,,~~--,1:-;,••M~-,,,-~~•~,-·. --~·~,......,.. ......... _ .. ,..........._ .. ~.-.~..,,--~-... .,..._-.:::•---·-··-...:--:--·--·•---.._ ... =....__--.~~·-·L·-···- ···· · ·--···=-,_ .. :_ ::c· • _____ ':. ••.••• H·=-::·,----~, ··· ._ ......... , ··'- .. ·--· · ~-- ·---· ·· -- ·- ·· - ··· ···· ·- ·· · ·······--···---··· · c":·.•c····.· ·,··,.·-~·-• - ·····:,.~!.;',.::;.C.::".".;~.,:.:.:,.;.o.0:..:.:-~;..'~~....,,...,-e• ,...,...,.., d'...c,.~.......:_·• I this, the fall of Dien Bien Phu,~hadan indirect influence ,on the out-
~~. , .••...••• ---~·••¥ .... 
come of the Geneva Conference. When Bidault went to the Conference, 
·he carri,d with him the responsibility to find a solution for the 
war in Indo-China. Since Bidault failed to satisfy this desire 
on the part of the French people, the government was brought down. ~ "'- r 
166. Le Ailonde·, April 29, 1954:. In "Les Conditions de la Paix en 
Indochine" Aron in'dica.ted that there were only 71,000 French trool>s 
out of the total 550,000 men in the French Union forces, or about 
one in eight of the, total forces. Realites, March 1954. 
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·,. Indi:r,ectly the fall of Dien JBien Phu bore· an important· in-= 
fluence on the outcome of the Geneva C@nferenceo The French defeat 
hastened the fali of the Lanie I Government in France, and it was the 
new French Premier who reaped cJredi t for the achievement at Genevao 
It v1oul·d be interesting to trace the slow-motion do,vnfall ·af 
the Laniel Governmento The principal cause for the opposition 
attack on '1the government's 'policy on Indo-China seemed to be its-· 
demand for American open interventione O.u May 4, as soon as the 
·, 
A~sembly returned from the Eastern recess, there were insistent de-
' 
mands for a debate on the government's Indo-China policyo Most 
vociferous were the Communists;) the socialists G and the radicals o 
The complaint was made that the French public and the Parliament 
had first learned of their own government's action in asking for 
American intervention through an article in the London Ttmes o Asking 
for a postponement of the debate 0 the Lanie! Government ~eceived 
a majority vote of 311 - 262, with 50 abstentiono On May 79 Premier 
Laniel announced the fall of ·Dien Bien Phu, and again there were 
. hostile interpellations and pressure for an early debate on the issue 
of Indo-Chinae Instead of agreeing to a debate, Mo Lanie! suggested 
on May 11 9 as a sub\:1ti tute, the formation of a permanent commission 
for Indo-Chinese questions, which should take as its first.task a 
th>rough examination of the fall of Dien Bien Phuo The suggestion, 
however, did not placate the A~s'embly, and· Mo Francoi~ Mitte.rand, 
-
~-
1-
.. , 
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cide the question whether the war should be internationalize4 and 
whether the troops lost at Dien Bien.Phu should be ,replaced by tr<>·ops,1 
~hern in ·Germany ·or Africa, or by ·national ;servicem.eno Mo Lanie! 
secured, however, a vote of confidence by a majority of two votes 
altho"Q.gh later in the month he was forced to agree- to a debate. 
It was Mend~s-Fran~e who delivered what has been considered as 
the coup de grice ·f-o the dying Lani el Go·vernment, In a fierce attack, 
Mendes-France charged the Government with having planned American 
intervention in Indo-China at the risk of ieneral war, and suggest 
-•r,..;' 
( 
' 
,/ 
- · 'Jr ·,~-·.ii:1 ,m·a.t._o1..,.·e.!1f·.ts +or -
... 
- ,. -.:.' 
........ ,1.: ..... 
__ ---~---------------- ______________________________________________ . _______________________ . _____ . ___ .,.,,__7~z .,.,,__ ___ -,-_!__ ----·--------,------~-__________ _ 
. ·------- --,:;.-,, ··-· -----.·---~~- .. -.......... -··· ·.-. 
f. 
,,,,.: -: 
. .. . . ~ 
that the Fr_ench p.osi tion with ·reg~:.rd to Indo~China ·be '.revised on the 
basis· of realitie~ which would mean direct negotiations wi~h Ho Chi 
. .. 168 . 
Minh for an "honourable peace.II It was not too late to a~hieve a 
. P r . 
pea~e he said, and on h~norabie terms. 
After Mendes-France's violent attac-k, tlie Government was defeat-
ed on June 12 by 306 - 293, on a vote 'of confidence. The vote which 
brought down the dying regime represented a combination of critics 
"-
. t 
of the Indo=China policy and the critics of EDC. It was clear that 
the immediat·e issue was the failure of the Laniel Government's Indo~ 
China.policy:, but it seems equally c~eat that the EDC critics bad 
joined hands to .bring do,vn the governmento The combination of votes 
which elected Mendes-France irito office seems -to support this view. 
On the morning of June 18, Mendds-France received a total of 419 
votes, (apart from the 99 communist bloc votes which be did not count), 
t 
He received all the socialist votes, 72 of the radicals, 59 of the 
_ ,, . .,,. 
gaullists, 19 of the 24 Uo Do S. R., some independents, and a few 
rebel M. Re Po ; 1~3 deputies abstained, including m~st of ·the M.RoP•, 
- . 
and 47 voted against him~ Qne year earlier he had·~issed the chance 
' ' . 
to be invested Premier by 13 "constitutional votes". The Communists 
had voted against hi~, as had the Right (Independents, Yeastnts ~nd 
dissident Gaullists) and the majority of the Gaullists. An incident 
.during the voting perhaps illustrated·the reason for his failure. 
When General· de Benouville telephoned de Gaulle himself at Colombey-
, I 
, I 
les-Deux-Eglises to ask for guidance -- even_; __ tho __ g_gb_ ____ ~ll9r.1JY.~'"!!eJJlre .~~--·~-~---____ ..... _ .... :: 
-~---·----~--~-----..-·-·-------.. --.................. ·--··-----..-~'"··-··~----.. ---------·· ------"·· ------·-·----~·-·----~··--·-- ... ---.. --.._._ .... _ , . . . I 
\. ; • .~ ..,, '"t-
de Gaulle had dissociated hi•~elf from·the Gaullist deputies in the 
Parliamento According to Le Monde de Gaulle thought Mendes "unsuit-
able" , ·as .he "would not l1a,ve the guts to stand to the Americans over, 
EDCo" De Gaulle was among the most passionate opponents of the 
"supra-national" army, and he had not abandoned his_strong belief in 
the French "Empire• "It is· significant that it was the same issue (EDC), 
' 
which began-the decline of Mend~s-France's popularity ~fter his achieve-
ment at Geneva. 169 
NYT, June 13, 195q. 
"-
1 • ! . 
168. 
169. Alexander Werth, Lost Stateman, il• cit., P• 76. 
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_ lt .was c~ear,at any rate, that the entry. of Me~des-France into 
the diplomatic scene ~ad much to do with the success at Geneva • 
. 
Whe~eas Bidault was a passionate advocate of American intervention 
in Indo ..... Chi~a,, Mendes was determined to gain a peace _at Geneva and· 
to stop the war in ,Indo~Chinao Whereas Bidault wanted to bluff the 
Communists by not having any social contact with either the Chinese 
. 
' 
or the Viet=Minh and therefore to appear str~ng~ Mend~s broke the 
social ice by his interview with Chou En=-lai on June· 23, and by 
his subsequent meetings with the Viet--Minh Head of the Delegation 
~ 
at Geneva. Two,·minor statesment~by Mendes<=France also helped con--
tribute to the achievement~ his wager with the National Assembly 
~p 
. 
that he would resign if a~ settlement could not be achieved by 
July 20 9 and his promis, that as a last act before resigning,-_he 
would submit a Bil.I authorizing the dispatch of national service-
men to Indo-China. The first meant that,as far as the Communists· 
'
1 at Geneva were .concerned._Another French Premier might not be as 
<~ 
'• 
·' 
.,_ 
inclined ·to peace as Mendes--France 0 and they should thereforehelpachieve 
a settlemente The second statement clearly implied a threat that · 
the war might be prolonged ,vi th unforeseen consequences. 
THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTION AND THE GENEVA ACCORD 
} 
As -the Indo-China lVar continued, it began to lose its ·original l t . ~-. • 
title as a colonial enterprise, and by the end of the Korean War it 
~ 
had become the main battlefield between the Communists and the non-. ~ 
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· · · · Communists., With the USA de·eply committed to the defense of the 
Pacific 0 France felt s~e could depend on American support to fight 
. -, the war in Indo-Chinaelrom 1953on Americ0:n aid was massive in fin-
ancial ter-ms al though· was little sign .of direct American interven-
ti on in the ws:re The Mutual Security Act of 1953 provided four 
hundred.million,dollar,for use by France in Indo=China and in 
• September l953 a further three hundred and eighty~five millions ,;' 
were made available for the implementation of the Navarre Plan for 
"' 
. ~ ~. ' the period of the ensuing 15 months. At the end of the year 1953-,---~---~-~---~-----
there was no hint of open American intervention~ 
' Early in 1954, a*d up to the day· of the attack on Dien Bien 
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,; Phut there con.tinued to be no mention of direct American intervention. 
T·he failu~e of the defenders at Dien Bien Phu,· however 9 apparently 
"t."." 
changed the American attitudee Following General Paul Ely's visit 
in Washington on March 20, and after the first wave of attack at 
Dien Bien Phu, the situation began to look as if American in.ter-
vention might take place on a massive scale. Ely reporte·dly told 
. " 
. 
President Eisenhower, Seco Dulles 9 Admiral Radford and.other U.S. 
leaders that unless the United States intervened~ Inno~China would 
be lost. 170 On Marc~ 29, Sec~ flulles said in a ~peech to the Over-
., ,• . 
17 
seas Press Club that the imposition of the Communist system "should 
.. 
not be passively· accepted but should be met by united action. This 
might involve serious risks, but these risks are far less than those 
that.will face us a few years from now if we dare not be resolute 
now." 171 on. April 7, })resident Ei·senhow~r~ who had t,vice preisiously 
dismissed any chance of American intervention -in Indo-China, 1lirned 
,at a news confe-rence-- that Communist domination of Indo-Chin·a would 
·r .., ~ 
set· off a disastrous chain reaction throughout Asiae He backed Sec o 
Dulles for his stand on "united action" but said there had been no 
positive reactions to the United States proposal on the part of 
American ''alliese He refused to state clearly, ho,reve'"t, whether the 
United States would go it alone or would seek United Nations acticn 
in case Chinese inter~~ntion become agression. 173 
I 
' 
I 
I 
'i 
\I 
·"1 
i' 1700 NYT, March 21, 195'*• t 
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, . . , . .. ·"""·"~- .. ~-71 O _ D ~~a: t~-~~:~.~-~~-!~ _ ,~-'~ ~ .~:c~,~-~~"~~:~!.~ .. ~!'"~~~!>!~~,!~"-···~~~u.!~-~ 2"?.,~~~~"~~~~~=0~,=~~.~tl=,=~• .,.,w .. ~-·-~ .. :~,,.trom~rr-k·fr~~Lcc :1 : ... , .... ., ....... ···--,-A·~·-··"'¢~-----'"'·------ ··i12o On February 10 P E1.senliower. saicf at a press conference: No - .1 I . one would be more bitterly opposed to getting the United S.tates 
• I ,)' • • 
· involved in a hot war in tha."t region (Indoc=aChina) than I amo" NYT, 
_February 11, 195~e) Again on.March 10, Eisenhower said to ·another 
press conference: "I will say this: there is going to be no in-
volvement of America in war unless it is a ~esult of the Constitu-
tional process that is placed upon· Congress to declare i to Now let 
us have that clearo" NYTl> March 11 9 19540 173; At this state of the war 0 C~inese intervention was reported_tobe 
I . 
11 
I 
I 
!~ 
. I 
·1 
I I 
II 
composed of 0 (baside~ the provision ofwa.r materials 9-) the presence · 
<fa Chinese .General with a staff of twenty at Viet-Minh headquarters, 5 ~ 
and Chinese military _advisers ,vere pres-ent at divisional levelo Chinese ~ 
__ were also drivingMolotova trucksv estimated at 1000!) v1hich were employe-d- · -----
in bringing supplies to Dien Bien Pbue Although there was no official ~ 
confirmationp it was reported that :the 37mm. · anti-aircraft guns around :.i, 
Dien Bien Phu were m~·~n,::ed by Chinese crews{Navarre 9 Hen·ri, Agonie de l' Indochine, Paris: Pion, 1960, pe 243). 
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Dulle\s' speech, however, caused. some uneasiness in London, and' 
on April I, Anthony Eden instruct.ed Sir Roger Makins, the British 
Ambassador to ·-\Vashington 0 to inform Sece Dulles that the British 
·-~ . . 
GovernlJlent felt partition would represent the least damaging solu-..-
tion for the the Indo-China situation, and that refusal to entertain 
the possibility of a military statemate in Indo-China would increase 
the difficulty of reaching a tripartite agreement should the Allies· 
. be forced into a"£compromise with the Communists at the Geneva Co.ufere!6~. 
Replying for the American Governmentv General Bedell Smith said that 
the United States hadcarefully considered the partition solution, but 
had decided against it, on the grounds that it would only represent 
a temporary r.espite and a palliative, and would lead to Communist 
domination of South-East Asi~ eve~tuallyol75 A few dayi later Mr. 
,~iulles approached the French and the British Governments with a ne,v 
proposai, · to the effect that the countries thr.eatened by Chines·e 
intervention should issue a solemn declaration announcing their in-
~~ fention to take concerted action against such a Chinese move. Dulles 
told the British Ambassador that .the best hope_ wa.~ to compel China 
to desist from aid to the Viet~Minh by threat of military forcee Be 
said that the West possessed a military superiority in the area now 
which might not have in a few years' time. If a warning was not 
. 
heeded, they should be in a position to put their threats into 
effect. 176 Reports from Paris indicated that the idea had received 
a 1 ukewarm .reception in tl1e French ca.pi tal o wVha-t the French Govern-
.,~-~"~''""''"=~ .. ~~~,e.~;~ ... '".~=hl~,,cmen·t""'·wa-n··ted·-·-·-·at·"· -ttie·· ··t·lie··-- time · ·w·a·s·· mu·1~e···mtt·i·t'u1~,y······e'qutpme·rrt·"-"'a'nct·····~t·eclt"n1'ci'atn~s"''='""-"'''<C··'="""·~·~·-
---------- ---- ----- -- -
th th . d. t Am · · t t · l 77 ra er an 1rec er1can 1n erven 10n. 
On April~. upon his return to Paris, Paul Ely briefed M. Lanie! 
on his visit to America"and is said to have told the French Prime 
Minister that he had received "a ve·ry definite impression" that the 
. '. 
"' 
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American Gov:ernment would be p. r·ep· a.r.ed· ···to ···consider ·a ··French ··re-_ qu.est- -..... _,,_,.._.:_,, ____ , .. -·------· .. 
1 
for a massive air-strikeo The follo,ving day President Eis~.tnhower ... 
sent a message to Sir Winston Churchill urging him to _fall in with 
the American plan and suggesting that Mr. Dulles might fly to 
. . 
-London withiri a few days to discuss the -proposal. Mr. Dulles arrived 
,- I 
in London on April 11 for talks with Foreign Minister Eden, Bat by 
then apparently the United States ·stand on ···t:ne pl 1an. f_or a joint 
warning declaration had been modifiedo During their conversations 
on the next two days they discussed the possibility of establishing 
a collective defense i ~ystem within the fram0ivork of the Charter of the 
United Nations, to secure the peace, security and freedom of South-
east Asia and the western Pacific. 178 There was no specific date 
mentioned for the "examination of the possibility" of setting up a 
defense organization in South-east Asia, an om.mission ,vbich created 
some confusion and beca~e a~cause for ,further disunity and misunder-
standing among the Western Allies. 
Mre Dulles believed that he had a specific agreement from Sir 
Winston Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden for a formal meeting of the 
U. s., Britain, France and the Asian states concerned. On the other 
hand, Mre Eden, when he read the joint communiqu, in the House of 
Commons on April 13, maintained that the British G~vernment agreed 
I 
only to an examination of the possibilitiese "The outcome of that 
••. I 
,I 
k 
i' II 
I 
examination will at _least be greatly influenced by what happens at j 
.. ·-·-~--........,.,., ___ ,-.G.ene¥a-.,,.!!.! .. I2,Aee~tl-i,ng······t·&,·lh.> i~i·8'h··-pres.a··rep-eEt·s·,·····Ml'$·· ... .:Ede.p ..... b.elieve . .cL .. : ....... .,'.'"'_" ___ . ___ . '.i 
,. 
he had made it clear that he referred to await the results of the 
J 
Geneva Conference and was completely star~led to find Mr. Dulles, 
upon his return from his trip to Europe 0 took steps to settle ·the 
question ·of membership in advanc~ and his own ter~so Sir Roger 
I 
Makins, the British ~bassado:rrvreported to the British Government 
. ~ 
on April 16 that Secretary Dulles would convene a meeting on April 
20,in Washington_of the Ambassadors of the United Kingdom, Australia, 
~ew Zealand, France, the Philippines,, Thailand and the three 
178e The Times, (London), April 14, 1954• 
179. Bouse of Commons, Debates, 5th seri-es, vol. 526, · coll. 969-75•· 
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. 
ing group to study,~the collective defense of South-east Asia. On 
the ground that such a meeting.might prejudice the chance for ~uccess 
at the Geneva Conference 0 Eden instructed Sir Roger Makins to tell 
~ ~·Dulles th.at the United King.dom could not ~ttend such a meeting, 
which wao entirely C?ntrary to the s~irit of the agreemeht in~Lond~n. 180 
As a result 0 Mro Dulles agreed to convert the meeting into a general 
briefing conference on the G-e-neva negotiations, and Sir Rog~r was 
I 
• 
present at the meeting. 
Meanwhile 9 the relations between France ·and the;US were not exactly 
on happy termsq Opinion in Paris 9 as in London, did not react favor-
ably to Mro Dulles' spe.ech of March 29. Press comments were concerned 
more with ~he fear lest war should be extended and prolonged, by Ametican 
intervention 0 rather than grat~tuds that 4 American threats of inter-
-
vention might fortify the Frenc~ position at the filegoti&tion tablee 
' - . 
Official ci-rcles · in the French Government did not show their immediate 
reaction to the Ame~ican proposals at all clearlyo But it became 
, clear later that both Lani el and Bidaul t were in favour of Ameri~an 
.-~ 
-intervention alone 9 without involving any other powers in "uri~ted 
--actiono" Thus upon Ely's :report of the American readiness to enter- -
tain a French request, for America·n intervention by air-power, the 
French Governme'nt requested that a force of heavy bombers should be 
sent to attack objectives ~round Dien Bien Phuo 181 
,. 
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By the time General Nav.arre 's request for American air support 
.,--
was received, .the garrison at Dien Bien Phu was surrounded and half 
of the air-strip. was in the hands of the Viet-Minhe Navarre continued 
~--....... 
,-to believe that Americanc, air support could be used effect-ively in 
attacking enemy strong points9 It could effectively interrupt the 
flow of Viet~Minh supplies from Chinese borders to their n ,"depot·, 1' 
north~east of Dien Bien Phuo The French air force then could con-
centra.te on attackin'g enemy strong points in the Dien Bien Phu area, 
1800 
1810 
Eden, .21!! cit. , p ·• 110. 
Lancaster, .ll•- cit., P• 300. 
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-~T-he · French General,J-t-af.f. argued .... thgt., .. bo.mb-i-n-g-".fp"om ,a.n-ou.t.sid.e f oro-e-, .· 
(aside f:rom _th.e material damage ,vhich. it w'ould inflict upon the 
. . , 
enemy), ,vould hav.e a considerable effect upon the morale of the 
___ .::-,. 
. -
troops in the fortress 9and on the French and-native for~es in Indo-
, It China generall,yo They also disolosed that the American Gove.rriment 
had off~red eixty B-29 aircraft 0 which would operate from M~nila. 
' . 
Each sortie could drop approximately.450 tons of bombs and. would 
. 
operaYv'from about 20 9 000 feet. It was disclosed that a United \. 
States Air Force general and·ten officers had visited Dien Bien 
Ph t t d d ·t· d t d" th l ·~ ·t· 
182 
u o s u y con 1 ions an o 1scuss e genera si ua 10n. 
It was in connection with thiij French request for bombing the 
obj~ctives around Dien Bien Phu that Mo Bidault later declared 
Dulles had suggested that American atomic bombs be used to prevent 
further Chinese aid to the Viet-Minh forces. Bidault turned down 
the offere 183 
What the French General Staff had disclosed wa_s later discovered 
to be "Operation Vulture••, an American-French plan which had been 
. . worked .out in Saigon and Hanoi o "Op~ration Vulture" w.ould provide 
for a force of 300 carrier-based figbter-bombers 9 supported by 
60 heavy bombers from thte Philippines air-fields 9 to attack Viet-
. 
~ 
~{inh communications and their advance base at Tuan-Giao, ayepot 
, 
dispersed over a wide area of about eight square miles. 
It seemed, however, that the plans of the "war party" in the 
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Radf ord I and Vice-President Nixon), and the French General Staff 
did not agree with the pla~s of the majority of Congressional 
- leaderso Thus on April 3, Dulles and Radford had a meeting with 
a group of Congressional leaders., \Vhile there have not been any 
o·f-ficial statements on ·what ,vas discussed in that meetingp it was 
clear that the meeting heard a proposal that a joint resolution be 
... ,· .. -- . 
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passed to permit the President to use American forces in· Indo-China 
John lf e McCormack, the Demo.crati9 leader in the Bouse later reported 
jthat there was t.alk --of a mass ai:r---attack on the· besi'egers of Die.n ~ ... 
184 ~ Bien Phu 0 and a proposal "that the leaders in Congress, you and I, 
would commit ourselves in Indo-China without any assistance from any 
other country," 185u~on learning that Secretary Dulles had not 
received approval from the Allied Powers for "united action" and 
that Admiral Radford had not discussed the matter with other members 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1~ie representatives of the Congress 
advised Dulles to seek Allied approval for a "united action" scheme. 
After this meeting occurred Dulles hurried to Europe to 
meet with the leaders of France and Britaine After Dulles' return 
from the trip, there was an announcement that the ten members of the 
proposed pact would attend a meeting at Ambassadorial level ,vi th the 
purpose of forming a working commission. The result, as we have 
..__./ seen previously 9 was that the British Government refused t9'aseociate 
with such a meeting, for fear that such a "get-together" might pre-
judice the chance of success of the Geneva Conferencee 187 
\ 
Apparently the London talks with Sir Anthony Eden had one effect, 
Bulles decided to shelve for the time being the idea of. iJlllDediate 
and unilateral intervention by American forces" He came up instead", 
with a pro.,posal for the creation of a South-east Asian Treaty Organiza-
.... --· 
"' 
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r front" he wanted and that it would lead to "united actiono" ~ 
,.., 
The idea of unilateral American intervention did not end w·i th 
• v-~ . ~ . ;; 
this phase of the negotiation•, however, It continued to recur in 
the plannings between the American and the French Governments until 
close to the end of the Lani&l Government. 
184. 
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Before the "united action" policy came· to an e~d, however, the 
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intervention crisis· burst into fl~me_ again. ·A few day~ after the· 
meet_ing on April 20 in lVashington, Dulles. fle,v · back to Paris, 
ostensibly for th.~ NATO me®ting ,vith Eden 9 Bidault and others, dur-
ing the week-end just before the opening of the Geneva Conference. 
I 
On Friday 0 April 23 0 Bidault showed Dulles g telegram from General 
Henri Eugene Navarre 0 saying that only a massive air atta·ck could 
save Dien Bien- Phugwhic.J by no,v had been under siege f«J)r six weeks. 
Dulles said the United States could not intervene alonee On Saturday, 
Apri 1 24, Admiral Radford( whose views conce.rning American interver.-
t ion and whose important r8le in the Pentagon as the Chairman of. the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff could influence the shape of events) 9 arrived 
in Paris 0 supposedly for NATO e?'!e~rciseso At a meeting bet,ve~n Eden, 
on the one hand, and Dulles and Radford. on the other, the Americans 
told Eden that the-French were asking for military help at onces 
An allied air strike at the Viet-Minh positions around Dien Bien Phu 
. " 
was discussede · 
According to Eden, Dulles began by saying that he was by that 
time certain that there was nQ chance of keeping the French in the 
fight in 1ndo~China unless they knew "that we ~ould do what we can 
within the President's constitutional powers to join them in the 
fight~ 11188 The French by this time had taken the position that it 
would not be enough if the Allies w~~e, to join them in defending 
lndo-China after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. Unless the Allied 
Si) 
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. 1~ • 
itself, that would be "their last battle." Dulles ,vanted to make 
plain that there was·no possibilit~ of the United States participa-
1 
tug in the Dien Bien Phu battle for the President would not be able 
to act with such speed and because it was clear that no Allied 
participation at that stage would save the fortress. When Eden asked 
... 
the American Secretary of State what he had in mind, Admiral Radford 
replied that some mllitary effort should be organized to help the 
French without delay. He suggested that the British Government· ' - -- --· ----------- - - - - - -
... 
1880 Eden. rut,e cit., P• 114:. 
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might seiid~ in R.AoFo uni ts fr·om Malaya or· from Hong Kong into North 
,. 
..:-.- .. 
...... 
.... Vie,t-Nam. He also· inquired of Eden whether or not the Bri ti-sh. might 
'" 
~ have an aircraft-carrier in the area. 
.) 
\Yhen asked ·Whether the Americans had thought of the possibili·ty 
that Allied intervention might mean open Chinese intervention, and I • . . . 
. 
hence·a possible.world war 9 Radford said he never thought th~t the 
Chinese would intervene in Indo-China, nor had they the available 
resources for such an enterprisee If they attempted air action, the 
Western powers could easily eliminate the threat by attacking the~ 
189 , -southern Chinese air-fielfts 9 which were very vulnerableo After 
the conversations, Eden decided to return immediately to London to 
parley with his colleagues. 
According to a Life ifiterview with Dulles, two American air-
craft carriers, the Boxer and the Phillippines Sea, had e~rlJer been 
sent to cruise in Indo-China waterso Their tactical air~groups 
d ·t·h. t ·. 190 1~- . t t. h th th were arme w1. a om1c weaponse ~w~s no cer a1n we er e 
targets for these aircraft and weapons were to be the staging bases 
in China or the actual besiegers arourid Dien Bien Phu. According 
to Bidault, although no date was given, it was during these discus-
sions that Dull~s offered the use of two American,atomic bombs at 
Dien Bien Phuo Didault rejected this second offer, for fear it 
. _", ·1.• 191 might do damage to both t:Pe besieger·s as we'll as the besieged. 
According to another version, which has become well-known, 
would be prepared to go t-o Congress on the' following Aionday, April 
26, and ask for a .joint resolution authorizing such action~ Assum-
ing quic.l{ passage by Congress 9 the st·rike byL "Operation Vulture" "· 
;1 
could take place on April 280 It would be presented as united action, 
by means of a "declaration of intentio-n" which had been prepared and 
ready for the Allied .Ambassadors to sign. It was Mendes-France, in 
his speech which dealt the last blow to the Lani el Government, ,vho 
made plain the contents of these conversations along this lineo 1~~ 
.i.;-r 
was reported that Me Bidanlt said,after seeing Mr. Eden at Orly Airport, 
189e 
.1900 
1910 
192. 
Ede~n; .2.J!o cit., P• 1150 
James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War", Life, January 16, 1956a 
Drummond, ..Q.]_ 't cit., pp. 121-22. Al so Tournou:t, op. cite, 
ppe 48-490 
See portions of Mendes-France's speech as translated in 
Werth, Strange Story o••, op. cit., P• 83. 
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such a critical situation, everything possible must be tried that 
could bring them any aid."l93 .' ... 
The last version 0 according' to Eden, was not among the conversa·-
tions held in Pa1ris ,vhile he was .there, but was a later developement 
which occurred after Eden ltad left Pa-ris. According to Eden, at 
11 Ao MG on Easter Sunday, April 25, a special cabinet meeting was 
called to discuss the American proposal for "united actionvvv which 
I 
• i . 
·, J 
R~«lford,?and Dulles had- pr~posed to Edeno The proposal v1as unanimous-
' ly reject,edo That af.terpoon, while the Ca.b!net was in s~ssion, the 
French Aipbassador to the Court of Sto James, Mo Massigli, came_to 
,._ 
see Eden to inform him that the Unite~ States Government now proposed 4 
.... . /._.)' 
. /•~' 
. 
./}'·' 
that an immediate declaration.should 'be made on behalf of the 
governments of·the Uri i t,e ·a St ates, the_United Kingdo~, Franc,, j ' 
. 
the Phillippines"·arid -the Associated States~ proclaiming their common 
. • ' ',. . . ' 
I 
will to .check the expansion of communism in South-east Asia and to 
fuse· "eventual military means" for this purpose o If President Eisen-
hower was assured of British participation in such a declaration, 
he ,vould be ready to go to Congress to seek approval for American 
intervention in Indo-Chinac The Americans, according to the French 
Ambassador, had urged the French GovefJ!.!llent 
\. 
. '',.., Government to agree to such a proceed1bgo 
United States naval aircraft would go into 
to persuade the British 
If such was approved, the 
action on April 28a That 
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Government decided to reject the American proposal and Eden was 
r.equested to convey the message to·Dulles and Bi.dault on his way 
' 
" 194 · . to attend the Geneva Conferenceo It was at the Orly Airport as 
reported that Bidaul t attempted vainly for the tas•t•. ,time .~to persuade. 
Eden personally to help o~t the Fren~ho 19~ 
193 ,, --·-N¥-T, Ap·ri 1 26, 1951'. 
1940. Eden, _Qj!_Q cit,·, po 119, 
1950 See footnote 1930 
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The events of April 2,-26 occurred during the Easter.recess of 
'the Parliament both of Britain and France Q,,, In Dri tain~ the proceed-
ings of the Sunday Cabinet meetings had occasioned :much specula:~ion· 
concerning the possibility that the goveEnment might have been per-
suaded by the Americans to undertake new, commitmentso On April 27, 
Sir Winston Churchill read ''a' statement in the -~~House of Commons de~ 
claring such apecul~tion had no foundation 9 and that the British 
~ Government was not prepared to undertake any military action in 
Indo=China in advance of the results of the Geneva Conferenceo 196 
meanwhile in France r~eports of the Bidaul t• s request for American 
. __ f-~--=,-~··· air-raids at Dien Bien Phu, as reported in The Times, had been the-· ----- --
event which had been given the downfall of the Lanie! Governmenta 
\~ There appears.to have been-t ~onsiderable difference rif opinion .. 
between French Government policy and the attitude of the French 
public towards the war in Indo-China 9 insofar as pu~lic opinion can 
b~ deduced from press reportso The emotional tension of the extended 
siege of the fortress at Dien Bien Phu had hardened public opinion 
against any policy that might endanger the chance for a negotiated 
peace at Geneva which would bring an end to the war in Indo~China in 
the immediate future. Anxiety was expressed in French news media 
th~t the Lanie! Government might take advantage of public emotion 
over the fall of Dien Bien Phu to present to the country a'fait 
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accompli P and asking Ameri-can intervention, which would bri:n~,.~.~.~,~,!, ... ., .. ,,"'~"·~~""'"-=<-~=,,~"=:-<t<cC'-•. -
-o-·-- __ .._ ..... ~--,-··,,,,~--u~nf~re·se;;1>1; ~~;·;;q~~~~;;:~ ~~d·;;;h~;; ;;;~ ~~~id ~;;;·~l 97 The.French . 
Government was accused of tolerating these efforts on the part of 
' . 
. ' Mo Bidaul t, ,,ho exerted special efforts ·to secure American inter-
, 
vention in Indo-China and thus prejudiced the chances 1 for peace to 0 ~ 
which the Government ,vas commi ttedo This period saw the beginning 
-- of the slow death of the Laniel-Bidaul t government. 
I 
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House of Commons, Debates, 5th s·eries, vole 526, coll~ 1455-6e 
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The statement of the British Prime Minister to the House of 
Commons marke·a the -end of t·he intervention crisi's during the period 
,, 
of Dien Bien Phu. The negotiations for American intervention between 
.. 
. ~ . 
•• '>' 
·"' the Governments· of France and the United States continued until much 
later O hoiirever 9 even. u n. ~til the Genev1& Conference on Indo--Chin.a ,vas 
well~advancedo On two later occasions,at least there were di$cussions 
between the t,10 governments of this subject o, First,_ on May 1~, when 
the Conference on Indo~China was about.one week old, and was bogged 
down on the issue of Laos and Cambodisp it was reported in the New 
York Herald Tribune 9 that Mo Bidault pursued inq~f~ie~ cottc~rning 
the possibility of American armed intervent~onp and ther® were press 
reports of the progress of such in the event of the failure of the 
Geneva Conferenceo When ~pproached by Eden at the Conference, Bidault 
gave a vague denial,and Mro 18.edell Smith s.aid 1', knew nothing about 
the mattero The press reports& however, could not help but leading 
to disharmony within the Western camp in an already t&nse situation. 
The second occasion at which the issue of intervention was again 
in main concern was on May 31, when Eden at the Conference itself ~ 
was injormed by Sir Gladwin Jebb from Paris that the French and,. 
United States Governments hmd practically reached agre~ment on the 
condition of intervention in the case of the failure @f the Geneva 
Conferenceo Bidault told Eden the same day that Amilsrican help was 
comtemplated at three division strength and added that this was 
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course of the negotiatioIDlso Eden then told Bidault that the pQl~~.cy 
of the British Government had not changed since he last. saw the 
French Fo.reign Mini·ster- at ;the Orly airport. 
That was the la~ time that any poltcy Of intervent:lo.ri ·wa,~ .. 
,....._., 
... \I 
comtemplated.o Soon the fall of the Laniel Government occurred, with 
the entry of Mendes-France,' the bogey of American intervention 
became a past story. , 
Looking -back u-pon the developments which led to the end of the 
American po·licy of ... ~i:ntervention, one can trace the story of the 
crisis itself e American intervention had not ~been concieiv<ed until 
after the first wave of attack at Dien Bien Phu and some time after 
after the visit of General Paul Ely in Washington~ It reached a 
.J 
-- . ---··---- ._,,. ·- ----' --~-----
... 
... 
-··-· .. ,.- ·--' --·-····---· ..... 
violent flare~up, which led to disharmony between the British Govern-
)Y. ( 
ment on the one ~~nd, and the French and the United States Govern-
~ .· 
men ts on the other, when Dien Bien Phu v1as experiencing its most ,c·ri tical 
r., .. ,,_ 
period·e It began to lose momentum vii th the. statement by the British 
Prime Minister on April 270 In the main it is certain that the 
·British Government was the main obstacle whjch blocked any policy of 
intervention. 
-
The impact on the negotiations of possible· American intervention was of 
great importance for events during the period of the Geneva Conference 
as well as for the results of the Conference itselfo In the first 
place, it was the negotiations for intervention (and Bidault's strong 
support for it), which brought down the Laniel G~vernment of France, 
bringing to French politics a man mor-e willing to negotiate for a 
peace in Indo-China than either Bidault or Laniel, thus making the 
settlement at at Gen~v~ possibleo Secondly, the negotiations for 
intervention although secret were "loud" enough_~o permit the Com~ 
. 0 D 
munist Powers to detect the differences and tbe.disharmony;among the 
Western Powers 4> Nothing of course cbuld be more musical .. to the ears 
.of the representatives of the Communist Powers than mutually muttered 
recriminations among the Western capitalso But it was these rum-
blings,this confusion among·the Western Powers, which also reminded 
~ 
the Communist side that should the Conference fail to come to a 
" 
J 
peaceful settlement, their strength might again be tested in a mor~ ~~~ 
\ 
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In one way 9 one can say that the failure of the negotiations 
for intervention was the major cause for success at Genevao What 
if the bellicose America~ State Secretary, Mre John Foster Dulles 
and his submissive French,Ally Mo Bidault,had had their way? First, 
-...... 
atomic bombs would have been dropped at Dien Bien Phu or at Tuan I I 
Giao, the Viet~Minh advance base on the road leading to Chin~o· No 
one then could tell -1ivlhat the sequel for such atomic bombardment would 
.. , . . . 
be o Second, if. Bidaul t had had his way O as he pointed out in his 
letter of April 24, 1951i to Dulles,"a massive intervention by American 
..,, 
air~power~could stil~ • o o destroy a large part of the enemy forces 
o --" o "· and save the garrison at Dien Bien Phu. 198
 In that case Chinese 
1980 Tournoux,-.2.n• cit.~ po 463~(translated by aut~or) 
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armed forces woul4 probably have intervened, and in return, as 
Admiral "ladford 4ad · suggested,·'" the A_merican air-power wo.uld · have 
attacked the air bases id southern ChinaD which were vulnei•hle. 199 · 
W.qether the Rus~ians then v1ould have entered th·e picture is t&ny one's 
. . . ~-
guess 9 but it is at least argu~t.,~ble that a general war might have 
. ... 
" 
come abouto In any case, however, the chances for a settlement at the 
Geneva Conference would have been slim,indiedo 
, 
Looking back 9 therefor~ to the events which led to the accord 
T ~ 
. 
concluded at Geneva one cannot fail,to ask the question as to how 
such __ v~--'T$ettle·ment could e~e_r have been achieved.Indeed, it is not easy 
to arrive at an ex~lanation for the fact that the Geneva Agreements 
wer'e the only major internatio.nal_ se,ttlement since the Italian Peace 
" 
Treaty concluded at the Paris Conf~~ence in 19~6e The matter is 
further complicated when one considers the almost total international 
', 
confusion at the time. On the one hand, China's successful drive 
' ..:, ' 
for the great power status had left an indelible mark on the re-
treat of European ascendancy in Asia and a large gain of territory 
. . 
for t;he Communist wo:rrldo On the other band 9 the world was still 
struggling with the agonizing proble~ of Germany, while witnessing 
! ' 
a· bellicose America determined to use her strength to counter 
Communist expansion. 
The answer to the question as to why an accor~ was achieved :, 
seems to lie with four factors: the influence of modern military 
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the Co~ference; the determination of the majority of the Powers at ~ 
" the Conference to gain a settlement; and a change in the Communist 
international s.trategy 0 The :relative· importance of· ·these factors no 
doubt-varied with each of·the Powers represented at the Conference 1 
but to be sure, besides the local questions~,these i~re the main-
factors which enabled Powers to achieve a settlement at Genevao 
Among the issues which contribute·d to the success a't the Geneva 
-I 
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Conference, the negotiations for American ~ntervention may be con-
sidered m.ost important. Indeed, when Powers sat down·in Geneva to 
negotiate the iaB~es conc~r~ing I~d@~Chin~ 0 for the· first time, 
their representatives felt the deterrent.power @f the E~bombs work-
, 
ing silently behind the attitude~ of compromise inhibited by both 
·Mr.Eden and Mro HolotovD the two middlemen at the Conferenceo 
Certainly 9 the C~mference owed~ good deal of its iUcce~~ to this 
powero Eden himself felt that it would be ha1rd to believ® that 
Geneva ended with a succesij and the world &voiding a maj6r war had 
it not been for the deterre~t power of the bombo 200 The threat ot· 
the power of the new weapons was greatly enhanced when it was in the 
hand of a great Power which would not hesitate to use it at the place 
o~ its own choosingo After only a few month~ earlier; in Ja~uary, 
~~cretary Dulles had pronounce~ his doctrine of the ~New Look" 
,which held that the United States would not stop short at conventional 
weapons in a major future war •. 
The effect of the deterrent power of the B-bomb seemed to be 
least on the United States at the Conference table. For Russia 
was not then able to reach the u. So shores sffectively with her.own 
bombs, while the Chinese had no bombs at allo Next to the U. S,, 
. 
China does not seem to have apprehended the powe~ of the bomb in a 
future war as much as she might haveo Perhaps 0 first 0 China as a 
new comer to the internati@n&l scene was incapable of understanding 
"''"'~""""~"-""""'-",_.,.,,,,,,.~ ...... ~~~ ... ih~,~,flt_l.l,,_,,_,iJm.p,l .. i._ccltti_oJQt, .. ,.Jlf._ .. ~:tlh~ .. ".ll~e., .. (lf .... ni1c.le_aI' ,_,.Yl[.e,ap(tilE! ... if-'·''@..JC •... -,,S.flCJtlDd,."j , ... _.s..h.e., .. ~,.,~.,~··"'·"''"'""'"~"·"'!''-""~'-"~""T"""'c"',-.~"-'''' 
counted life cheaper than the other parties at the Conference. 
' ·SI' 
·c i.".:I~:,: ... 
-~· 
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" 
The case wa~ 0 however~ ·different with Britain and t~e Soviet 
Uniona Both of these countrits were sharply aware of the meaning 
··r , . . ... - .... 
of the spread of the Indoc:,China conflict. While for England. 9 be-
sides the fact that she did ~ot have the means to participate in 
another major war 0 her own territQry may have been the scene of a 
nuclear holocausto As for Russia,, such a major conflict lvould mean 
?' 
for her a grim choice of leaving her major ally to her own fate and 
_, 
200 ;,) Eden, fill• cit,, p • 139• 
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half'' of the ·communist world lying under nu.clear devastation, or 
_,,.._R<..--\. 
plungi~g herself into a nuclear abyss wiih ~nassessed.potentialitfee, 1 
. ~ 
Thus 9 i-t was largely the,efforts of both Great Britain and the Soviet 
... i;>}.~ 
Union t ivhich. had brought about the success of , the Conference o . While :·. ~ ~ 
.. 
Mr, Eden was constantly producing pi~~~s~f~ to.keep the Confere~ce 
going 9 Mro,,, Molotov appeared t«;, have tried J1is best· to gain c_oncessions 
from his two allies, Mr. Chou En-lai rand Mr. Dong • 
. 
Secondly, it can be satd that the Geneva accord owes.its emergence 
to a chain of fortuit-uous circumstances which occurred prior to and 
during the Conference~ which made possible any achievement .of a 
negotdat~d peace o This tring of events began with the veNavs.rre Plan" / . \, 
-1 I 
'1' I . .. -'I" 
_ .. 
and the decision ·"to establish the fortress IBlt Dien Bierm Phll'o To be Cl 
4 sure, the case of Dien Bien JP1-u has neve1r been cl ear l_y defined, It 
,,_, , bears all ·the earmarks of a case of suicide as much as a case of :/ 
\ 
homicidee It resembles the ~tory of a person t1b.o D wanting to commit_ 
0 suicide ~ut ~aving no courage,, _asks 
.de grice-e ·, But it was Dien Bie'n Phu 
his enemy to give him the coup 
which led on to other events 
·equally important, and which resulted in the Geneva accord. 
It was in connection with Dien Bien Phu that George Bidault had 
requested American intervention 9 which had led to the fall of the 
l 
Government in which he played an important r8leo This brought into 
world polttics a man who was more inclined to negotiate~ - • > \ Mendes-
I. 
. . 
.. 
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France's wager with the National Assembly that an accord would be I 
' I , ..• _ ... --·-::·,.·,''·-,·- • .-.... ·.-c.;.,...c .. ~-~ , • ·- ,[_;".· - • ._, 
1 
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-······· .. ,_.,_,,,._.,c~Y" .. achieved b'y ... 'July.20 and h';i.s····threat on July 7 that his- last act before I 
I resigning would be a Bill authorizing the national servicemen to go , 
I 
to fight ir Indo-China had also contributed to the results as we 
have seen, 
In a negative way the failure of thG negotiations for American 
int~tvention, ·a failure which was due to. British firm oppositiont 
" 
contributed to the ultimate aucce~s at the Genev~ Con!ere~ceo Had 
there been no British opposition and the negotiations for int'~r-
v~ntion ivere successful according to the J:llans of Mro Dulles, Admiral 
,Radford and Mo Bidault 0 (tvith a bombardme.~_t beginning on April 28, 
possibly ,vi th tac ti-cal ·atomic weapons) 9 there v,ould have been no 
" 
Conference on Indo-China,for the Conference did not begin until May 8. 
\ 
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. On the o·ther hand, it seemed cl:ear--tbat it wa• the very belli1cose _ 
··r\-
a t ti tude of the American Secretary and his ~rdent desire to inter-
vene in Indo-C·hina ,vhich maae the accord possible o Neither Russia 
(or China) v1_anted the war t.o be prolonged, nor 4id Ho Chi·. Afinh wish 
to see an internationali~ation of the war. · The "thunder from afar" 
of the .negotiations for intervention was heard and respect was paid 
to it. 
,,(! 
• 
One can· sa~ that the acco~d anhi~ved at Geneva was partly due 
,. ' 
to the events, which happe~ed:to OQeur at the time. That is to say, 
J. . i~ 
the achievement at ·Geneva was in fact an incidental results of the 
' 
force 6f eventso Neither· the fall of Dien Bien Phu, nor the negotiat-
' 
ions for intervention1) no.r the "failure of those negotiations 9 nor· 
the -entry of Aiendes-France··,,into international diplomatic, scene could 
have been foreseen at the Berlin Conference, where the decision to 
" convene a Far Eastern,Conference was made. 
~ ,, Thirdly,·~one ·can a·ttr:i.bu:t,e 7the· success at Geneva· to· the universal 
desire for peace, or better :the universal fear of·· another major war. 
After the entry of Mo Mendes-France, it seemed that there was hope 
. . ... ·_····· ·--~--- -·· -.~:-;-·:-:- ---------:-·_.:~. "'----,~ 
.• .. 
. .. 
... 
for a negotiated peace. The road was cleared whei Bidault's stubborn/~ 
I 
·) refusal to deal with the Sino-Viet-Minh bloc was put aside and when 
\ . ... ' 
the bogey of American intervention was no longer an issuee Despite 
~, Dulles·' persistent efforts to sabotage it, the Conference fi-nally 
.. 
came to an end. - -- -·- ·-·--· -----J.-
' 
. 
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Finally, the success of the Geneva Conference was due to some 
influence outside the scope of the Conference, and beyond the con-
trol of most of the delegates of the Conference - the Comm~nist 
international strategy at the time. ·one cannot Pail to observe the 
I 
tactical elasticity and the poJ.ite manners of the Soviet Foreign. 
~t ~. 
-4'"' .~ Minister, MreMolotovo His compromising attitude and his relaxed·mood 
in his dealings with the Western delegates were certainly the opposite 
of his behaviour ~t the Berlin°Conferenceo 201 On the whole 9 one can 
say that the success of the Ganeva Conference was due to Mre Molotov 
as much as to Mr. Eden. Why this change of attitude from· the Berlin 
Conference to the Geneva Conference on Indo-China? The answer can 
', 
perhaps be found in the Communist international strategy at the time, "'· 
2010 NYT, May 2, 1951*. 
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In the-first plA~e~we find that the Gen~va settle~ent cpncern-
. 
ing the question of restoration of.peace in lndo-China was the second ( . 
peace settle*ent since the death of Marshall Staline (The first 
~.l 
settlement being the armistice in Korea), Towards the last days of 
~ 
the Stalin era, there were flames of hot war threatening to spread 
in different parts of Asiaa The C~ld Wir was in danger of berioming 
.. 
a hotJwaoOnce Stalin died, however 11 there seemed to be a ne,, theme 
from the Kremlinv. that of 00 peaceful co--existence 00 o And it seemed ~ 
that the Kremlin was anxious to proye its sincerityo Both Mro ijolotov 
and Mr. Chou En-lai seem to have tried to convince Ho 1Chi Minh that 
he should submit his own nationalist sentiment to the international 
stP;at-egy of the° Co·mmunist world. 
One significant difference between the case of Korea and that 
,~~ 
of Indo-China ·was,that the armistice in Korea was the result of a 
military stalemate~ It was cl,ear tba t the Communist powers could 
not hope to gain more territory unles~ __ China w~s willing to interv~ne 
in a more massive scalep or unless Russia was willing to take part 
in the fighting., Neither China nor Ru$sia was prepared (and Chi,n4' 
was probably unable) to do soo On the other hand, the Viet-Minh 
Regime was on the move in lndo-China with the support of the local 
population, and especially with their confidence emboldened by the 
f('i 
victory at Dien Bien Phuo There was in short no such thing as a 
military stalemate in Indo=Chinaa The Communist side thus went to 
.. 
.: '""·"'-"~-... -....... ..,,,~. . . . . . . the . Geneva Co nf ere n c e with a strong hand 9 but it 1 o o ks as if the . 
~ •• - ~-~~~~e:'l."1:it~,et,,,¥rM..>':tt.·,;hi~NIUh"r.l..,~ .. -;.,,t,,.,~,;.,,,~ '' ·' o.'.,···:'.'·.'·c .~·.·~-.:•·· ·'! .. ,:,; .. , .. .;, .. .:-. • ·.,., ;._., .,,.~·,: ,,:·,.~,,.:•.·:,:.-: :.:.,.{,-.·, .~-: .•.. ·:, ,~_,:.,·.:.':/:;1· ... i .. ~:·.J,;:: _•; .. ::.•: ... ·,~·,;;.-_: . .s,::;.-:-,1,,;.,:,~:,:;,,,,.-, .... ,,,..-,,,-.,,:·,.-.,.,_·.,,.;-,·,_,_,;._-,-,;;-,,.,'< .-1,·,,,_,.,,; ~.-,,~J :,,ft_,:;;;,.-;\;,:.-,-:..,;.;-~·,-·.-,: t'. ·.-.-,'.'": ·.,;·,.,.,.:· ·. :, 7,r,-.·,,, ·,;:1:;,·, ,:-, ;;•.: 1:~ .• ~,.,~ ,,:,·.~·;·,1, .. 1·;·.,,1-,,11•.·,,1-1 .: ··,;, ;1'\' 1 ,. _.._,;7"/ _,,~, :-·:-;.,,..,~·. ,-.. ~:·;, ·;·o.,·:··r ,····,·.·:.'," ·.: ,, ·:".'·. ;. : . ~ _ _- , ,.:··· .-·:. ·.·.•·. •;,+,,;,,·.··,•1.1·: ,, •:-:::a~o·J'~'i.'1"-'ll'i'l'"rt"•Y\!c~'!'.>~.f~~m~-;~.d!ll:Xl'f~•-r11;t1~1,<',c..1t,e,l
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' Senior partners in the Communist bloc had convinced Ho Chi Minh 
that he should restrain himself and make concessi~ns in order to gain 
a peace which would enable the broader international strategy to-
.. 
succeed. 
j,a 
.. What was this strategy? If this analysis is sound, Communist-
~trategy ~t the time probably h~d~ twofold aim: in Asia its aim 
. 
~' 
was to use the theme "peaceful coexistence" in order to woo the 
neutralist powers to .. their. side o . In Europe O the Comm:unists hoped I 
to gain French support."" in Ol'\der to., sabotage the Bri tish=-American 
plan for EDC~ The theme "peaceful co--existence" w9:s no longer .mere 
propaganda for the Communist world. The successors of Stalin 
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apparently wantett to give the theme a new interpreta~ion, At a ~i~e·· 
when local wars threatened to ignite a world-wide nuclear holocaust, 
"peaceful co-exi~te~ceu required that local wars be brought under 
controle It was probably this aim in ~ind, that Molotov and Chou 
En-lai appealed to the Ho Chi Minh Regime for peace in lndo~China. 
~ 
In diplomacy itself·, the Sovi~t Un~on also wished to demonstrate 
its l,fillingn®~~, ..... t,o.,~y the new theme of·· °'peaceful co-existence,'.'· It 
- .,-~ . .,;.,.· 
,r:;--·v- ' 
w:JJahe-d··/-'f~o establish a neutral buffer zone between itself and the 
Western bloco I~ the days of Stalin, the neutral powers or the 
"third force 00 was spoken of with derision, but immediately before 
the Geneva ConferenceDhowevsrDboth Molotov and Chou En~lai tried 
hard to woo Ne1v Delhi a While Molotov placed India on the original 
"> list of the powers comprising the Geneva Conference, and later suc--
cessfully proposed that India be the Chairman of an International 
Supe,rvisory Conimission f.or the enforcement of the Geneva accord, 
Ohou En-lai ,during the Conference recess p~id India and Burma visits, 
at which friendly gestures and statements were madeo It seemed then 
that. the Communist powers had abandoned the slogan "who is not with 
us is ag~inst us" to some other Western diplomats. 
Soviet and Chinese calculations were shrewd. If the Viet-Minh 
forces had gained all of Indo-China t~o quickly, or if Bo Chi Minh 
had gained control of Hanoi and Saigonp as he undoubtedly would' 
have, and had continued to fight the French in Cambodia and Laos, 
.. 
... 
. ' 
,,, .. , 
.....-~ ... ~,~····"·······•,\,""'''''"'''''''" 
~/~·,·,,,=r~---,·~,.,,__,."-~ .... H-.·«·~-.. ,A,,-.,,,,,•,,th'eT'neUt".r·a 1 ·,' C ountr'i e s m 'i girt' 'be , a 1'11 rm e d O .. It . ' . 'tro·trl d , -be ·- 'Sitf e ly··. ,La s·slmre'cl''""'=~··:"'·"'""K'""~"'"A'*~'-.. -"·~"'"""'""'·"'"'' 
that.11 India itself might turn to the lVestern powers for protection 
and might support the Southeast Asian defense treaty whichthe American 
Government-had sponsoredo A settlement at Geneva for peace in 
lndo-China undoubtedly would score a succes® in Asia, and especially 
among the neutral nations. China would no longer be so isolated 
~ ~ 
and would enjoy the friendship of her neighboring countrieso More~ 
over, for the Chinese especially 8 the end of the war in Indo-China 
meant that from now on she would.be able·to concentrate on comple-
·ting the Revolution which had been· interrupted by the Korean War-and 
the lndo-China War. 
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Besides the general reason for the success of the Confl!rence 
at Geneva, there were of co~rse, local reasons for the ~uc~ess~ In 
retrospect 0 it seems that· the peace achieved for Indo-China at th~ 
Geneva, Conference was a product of lVestern di suni tyo Mutual re-
criminations were heard to the effect that th~ Americans wer~ 
unreasonably bellicose, the French defea~ist 9 a~d the British weak. 
".) "-
On top of it all 0 it ,,as plain that the peopPe of the Allied world, 
whether in war~weary FrAnce 9 in confused England 9 or in resentful 
United States 9 .wera not prepared to risk the consequences of a 
unified and strong stand in the distant land of Asia. The dogged 
efforts of an American Secretary of State to create a diplomatic 
and military barrier against the southward flow of Communist ex-
" . 
pa;-sion from the North in Asia was met well as in the United States. 
J 
/ 
' Dulles' proposals had basically meant some form of American inter-
vention with military forces •. In .the United States the Eisenhower-
·-: . 
Dulles Administration found it difficult to px:epare public opinion 
for a shift in tacticso Vice-President Nixon°s statement that "united 
action" might involve the sen.ding of American boys to Indo-China 
t h d ff .d d ·t t 202 l F L"l D 11 ' ouc e o w1 esprea L,pro: es o n ranee, meanw.11.11.]. e 0 u es /. 
proposals and Bidault's requ~st for U. s. intervention, raised fear~ 
-
that the Geneva Conference could be torpedoed by "war-mongering" 
.~ t, r? ·.,:"'l 
Americans before it could be launchedQ George Bidault's problem 
:,: 
• ,r • 
,-. .. :, 
i 
I 
' r I p.., • ,. 1 
then was how to try for a truce in Indo~China~in obedience to French , r 
'.· •••• ;. __ .. -· ••••.••• •·- ---- -- --•- -• • • •-•• -------- - -·- - •••·•-••••••- - •-- • - • •· ••·•'-- <'" •• ----·---•--•-•-' • •. -<;~-•-~• -J,A.i .. <OJ•.,''-.!,~~ • .:~. 
feeling without alienating the United States and without sacrificing 
French interests through concessions. In Great Britain "united 
action" ·was met 1vi-th uni versa! distaste. The British Government as 
' . 
-well as the British public desired·to have no part in the American 
intervention with ''united action"e The f~ilure of the negotiations 
for intervention therefore in p~rt iontributed to the success of the 
Conference in the end. 
On the other hand, the Coll1$uni,st powers had their own local 
reasons for agreeing to such a settlement, reasons which at times 
I . 
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seemed more important than th~ general·fear of,nuclear devastation 
itselfo ~ First, in the case of Russia 0 one finds that besides the 
fear that she mighi be pulled unwilling~y into another major war, 
there seems to,have been a subtle desire to keep China weak. A 
complete victory in which the control of the entire Indo~China 
passe~_ to the Bo Chi Minh Regime 9 (which won the war largely with 
Chinese material _aid) 0 would be a great victory for Chinao Con-
... 
~equently 0 ~t wa§ observed that at the Betlin Conference Mr. Molotov, 
·· al though superf,~_~ially seeming, to· claim championship"£ or the cause 
.... of_ ·.China as a great power, did not press the issue as he might have• 203 
. . ~-
While at the Conference itself, there were instances which indicated 
that Molotov wa~ted to ~teal the show from Chou En-laio For example, 
i'·the course of a dinner given by Eden for Molotov and Gromyko 1 
Molotov proposed that Eden and he take turns presiding over the Con-
feren~e, hinting the possibility that China might become the presi-
ding officier at the Con:ference,and this would meet American objections. 
1·t · seems more likely he did not -want his Eastern partner to take to pro-
minent a. part in the proceedingso It 1vas at the same dinner that 
Molotov told Eden that "in the past the S(Q)viet Union had also thought 
. . 
well of Chiang Kai-sheke They had considered in the course of time 
Mao Tse-tung would probably establish himself in power, but they had 
not expected this to happen so quicklyo" 204 
The Chinese themselves at the same time had their -0wn reasons, 
. ~ r: 
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which gave their Vietnamese ally much less than,, failing American f 
intervention, they could attain by force a First, by inducing the 
Viet-Minh Regime to agree to such a settlement, ~hina·gained the 
sympathy and friendship of the neutral~ uncommitted nations in South-
, 
east Asia and thus ende~ the diplomatic isolation 9 which she had .~ 
endured since the arrival on the scene of her new governmento This 
was certainly worth much more than another few thousand square miles 
NYT, May 2, 9, 1954• 
Eden, .2.D.• cit., P• 131. 
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$ of land. Secondly,. the Revolution in China had not been completed 
wh·en the, Korean War broke out. Now that the Korean War had been 
brought to an endD Chin~ did not wish tb encounter the United 
States in another stru~gle, one in which nuclear devastation was 
not outside the realm of possibility and which would probably involve 
Chinese territoryo An end of the war in Indo-China would permit 
China to concentrate her efforts on devel~ping_hsr industry and 
economyo Thirdly, Chines® traditional policy has been to keep her 
neighbors small and weak. A strong neighbor in the South 9 Communist 
though it might-be, would not seem desirable. It was all the more 
unlikely for China to wish to have a strong southern neighbor, when 
~ 
this neighbor would be guided by the 1 cunning Ho Chi Minh 0 who ran 
•'' 
a a govern~ent whic~ ~as composed mainly of French-~ducated and Moscow-
oriented intellectualso Such a government would be unlikely to be 
prone to depend on Chinese advice especially in the light ot tr•ditional 
Vi~tnamese suspicion and distrust of China. 
For the Ho Chi Minh Regime~there are two reasons which explain 
its acceptance of the Geneva Accord, an agreement which gave it much 
less than his forces could have achieved on the battlefieldo First, 
it seemed t~at Bo Chi Minh 0 having the example of the Korean War in 
mind and probably afraid of the internationalization of the war with· 
the possiblity of being the target of American atomic .bombs 9
20ilad to 
listen to China and the Soviet Union in agreeing to·the accordo 
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agreement, counted on a success in the national elections which were 
· \ ~ to be held within two years as the Agreement promisedo Indeed, it 
would be reasonable for the Viet-Minh Regime to expect to carry!· 
'.i:"" 
a popular mandate in aentirelyfrree election in Viet-Namo ·To''·"the 
majority of the Vietnamese at the time ~he Regime personified the 
nationa'ffst spirit of resistance against a former colonial po,ver, 
and therefore the Viet-Minh Regime would have good reason to count 
·On success at such a national election. Moreover, there was reason . 
. 
2.050 Werth,_,France, 9.J!• cit., P• 664. 
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to think that the Vie,'.l .. Minh had counted on the collapse of the Ngo · 
Dinh Diem Government in South Viet-Nam, . just as other French-supported 
Governments before ite After all, every single French-sponsored 
Government during the Franco-Vietnamese War had p-roved to be a failure. 
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.. CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
Immediately a-f·ter the signing of the A_greements, Mr. Pham Van 
l,c 
. < 
Dong, the Foret_e;~~ Minister of the. Democratic Republic of Vir,et-Nam, 
·Jf. 
declared that the settlement was "a great victory for the people 
of the Democratic Republic of v·iet-Nam ••• (and) a great victory 
for all peace-loving peopleo" 206 Mr. Chou E~-lai, meanwhile 9 stated 
that the agreement was a "tremendous snccess"o Although ~t first 
general opinion in American wa~ unfavorable towards the settlement, 
-~. 
gradually9 hoivever, the Americans themc:relves came around to c·onside·r 
'.'. 207 
the agreements a victory for the Westo Which side, or which 
great Power, was the real victorj re-quir·es a brief analysis• 
First, in terms of actual gainsJ conside_ring the balance of 
_forces in the military field in Indo~China and the bargaining power 
wh'ich stemmed from it, it was clearly a victory for the West. For 
unl,$.~ .. the Western gre.at powers were re~dy to i_nterven<e on a mae~ive 
....... . \. ; . .,,. . . ..,..,,. .. 
scale, a case which was doubtful at the time considering Britain's 
f_irm opposition and American reluctance to enter the struggle.without 
support from her Allies 0 the war in Indo-China was all but lost for 
the French in particular and the Western Powers in general. 
· The settlement at Geneva was not a complete victory for the 
West, or perhaps it would be better to say that ·the ·Wes·ter·n Powers -
were not the sole victors at the Conference table. ·The Communist 
. . 
·-
. , .. "p:owers seem to have 'carried out the.ir fundamental stra -egyo China 
succeeded in breaking out of her diplomatic isolation,and e Kremlin 
leaders succeeded in emphasizing the nev, 00 peac.eful co-e~i~tencil" line 
which they had adopted as a tacticalmaneuveTe~ The only power which 
suffered an actual loss at the time were the Indo~Chinese Statese 
The Viet-l{inh RegimtJ s calculation regarding the holding of national 
·~ ' .. 
elections was a mis-calculation. -<7 Mo elections were ever held, nor 
l 
2060 
207. 
Cole 1 ~· cit.,. P• 160. 
Life, Jandary 16, 1956. 
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, , did .:·t·he. :Government of ~remier Ngo Dinh Diem. collapse as 'the ,Com-
,, ® . . ,' I • 
munists undoubtedly liop-ed it would., So'on after th~ Geneva settle-
ment, Diem wisely removed himself from French tutelage.by~trans-
, forming the "State of Viet-Nam" i~ich he had inherited from Bao 
. ,_ Dai i:q,to a Republics, "the Republic of Viet.;.Nam," Iii doing so he 
.. ' ,,_, { . 1,..-:i ' ' 
.. 
avoide'd ·the' problem of national cslections, which were supposed to 
be heltl in July 1956~ and instead charted the steady course of 
development and stability which has characterized his govern-
ment. 
In perspective we can say that the reasons for the calling of 
· · -,._,,_, ____________ , ______ --c::,------the -Ge-neva Conf·erence··,and,,·f·op,.,,.,,~the final terms, of settlement were a 
·,. 
J •y· -~ ··;,' 
combination of factors which included complete questions of inter-
4 
national ~trategy and the balan~e of power and their' interaction 
with l~ocal issues and purely accidental Pi.rcumstances. 
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, THE GENEVA CONFERENCE DECISIONS, 21 July .1954 1 
... 
--· 
- . .  ., . 
. (a) Final Declaration on Indo-China 
., 
. 
(i) The conference takes note of the agreements ·ending hostilit-
ies in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam and organizing internat~onal con-
,-. 
trol and the'supervision of the execution of the provisions'of these 
I 
:- agreements o 
(ii) The conference expresses satisfaction at the ending of,, 
I 
. hostilities in Cambodia., Laos i> and Viet-Nam; the conference expresses 
its conviction· that the execution of the provisions set out in the 
present ieclaration ai.nd in the agreements on the cessation of 
hostili~ies will permit Cimbodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam hen~eforth to 
play their part in full independence and sovereignty, in the peace= 
ful community of nations. 
(iii) The conference takes note of the declarations made by the 
• 
....G.overnments of Cambodia, and of Laos of their intention to adopt 
measures permitting all citizens to take their place in the .national 
community, in particular by participating in the next general ele~-
. " if tion~ 9which in conformity with the constitution of each of these 
..,. ,:. "1 I ,- -...._, 
countries, shall take place in the course of the year 1955 by secret 
ballot and in condition of respect for fundamental freedoms • 
/ 
. ,. 
" 
' 
., . 
_, . 
, : .. (iv) The conference takes note of the clauses in the agreem_~nt 
. ..; 
on the cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam prtihibiting the intro-
duction i~to Viet-Nam of foreign troo~s and military personnel as 
I 
-'-·! 
i 
i 
well as of all kindsr·o·f arms and munitionso The con£~rence al~o 
; .. ·.·,. •_, ·I ,.,._,. ' ~ ' . 
......... _ ,_ ..... lr°I ....... · .. - .·-:· ····.-_- :. "!':.--::. ·.··_··; .. - .: ... :.t .• ·.- ... :.::~ :.-~ ... ... ~ ::.-. 
takes note of the declarations made by the Governments of Cambodia, 
and Laos of their resolution not to request foreign aid, ,,bet-her 
' ' . : "" 
in war.materials, in personnel; or in· instructors ex~e.pt
1
_for .the-
' ' -
. ' ~. . . ,£l purpose of the ef~ective defence of. their terr! tory and-,_ iµ,. th:e case 
of Laos 9 to the extent defined by the agreements on the ce~~~tion 
of hostilities in Laoso 
~- . ( v). The co~ference takes. note of the clauses in the agree_~nts 
on the cessation of hostili.ties i"n Viet-Nam, to tb·e effect th;at ·n~ 
--,--. .,-- ... ·---~:~·~-·--mr1-1 tary. __ -lras Et, at the disposition of a foreign State may be established 
. 
in the regrouping zones of th~ two parties, the latter having the 
obligation to ·s~e that the zones allotted to them shall not ,constitut& 
1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on Inter-
.. n.a tional Affairs, 1954, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 
ppo lj8-40e 
-. 
·.·. I 
• I 
I 
'I 
. . 
C ' 
... 
f'. f.· . 
... 
.,. 
part of any.military alliance and shall not be utilized for the 
» 
/ 
. I 
resumption of'hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy. 
.......... 
' --·".""·--··-·•,.~-· 
·---,-,-.· ·--·-------~ ..... 
•/ 
The conference also takes note of the declarations· of the Govern-· · ·: 
' 
J ments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect tHat they will not join in 
• 
any agreement with other States if this agreement includes the 
obligation to participate in*a military alliance not in confoimity 
with the principles of the charter of the United Nations, or, in 
the case of Laos, with the principles of the agreement on the 
cessation of hostilities in Laos or, so long as their sec~rity is 
n-ot t~reatened 9 the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or 
Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign Powers. 
(•i)The conference recognizes that the essential purpose of the 
~greement relating to.Viet-Nam is to settle military questions with 
a view to ending hostilities and that t4e military demarcation 
line should not in any w·ay b~" interpreted as constituting a political 
or territorial bound~ry~ the conference expresses its tonviction 
·that the execution of the provi-sions,.set -out in the present· declarat-
ion and in the agreement on the cessation of hostil-i ties creates 
the· necessary basis for the achie/jvement in the near future of a 
poli~ical settlement in Viet-Nam. 
(vii) The conference declares that, so ·far as Viet-Nam is 
concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected.on the 
basis .Pf respect ·for the principl1es ,_Qf independence, unity, and 
territorial integrity, shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy 
~ 
• .. 
_, .. _. i 
,;- the fun·damental freedoms; guaranteed by democratic .. fiisti tutions 
,·. 
-~ 
,(),; 
t 
., 
' 
. r .. ·. 
- established as· a result of free general elle~_tions- by secret ballot. 
In order to ensure that sufficient progress in the restoration 
of ·peace has been made, and that a11·.the riecessa~y conditioris 6b-. 
. . . 
. . . . 
-tained for ·free _expression of the national will, general elections 
. . 
shall be held in July,' 195'6, under the supe~vision· of an 'international , . ., .. (.,. ..... 
commission composed of representatives .. of' the: member States of the 
. i 
international supervisory commission referred to in the agreements 
• 
on the cessation of hostilitieso ConsultatiQn.s-:will be held on this 
I, 
" 
subject between the·compe~ent representative authoritjes of the two 
·" t . ~. ~ ., ' 
zohes from July, 1955, onwards • 
:.. 
•• '&. 
.}J 
,l 
~ ; I -r 
, -105-
(viii) The provisions of the •greements on the cessation rif. 
' 
' hostilities intended to.,,enstire the protection- of individuals and ,, 
of property must be most strictly applied and must, in paiticular:·, 
. 'r allow everyone in Viet Nam t~ decide freely in which zone he wishes 
to livee 
(ix) The competent representative authorities of the northern 
and southern zones of Viet Nam, as well as the authorities of Laos 
and Cambodia, must not permit any individual or collective reprisals 
. ~ 
against persons who have collaborated in any way with one. of the 
parties during the war, or against members of such a personJs family. 
(x) The conference takes note of the declaration of the French 
Government to the effect that it is ready to withdraw its troops 
from the territory of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam, at the request 
of the Governments concerned a-nd within a period which shall be 
fixed by agreement· between the parties except in the cases.~here, 
by agreement betw_een the _two parties, a certain nwn.ber of French 
. . - . -. . ~ . ..._,., . . . 
- troops ~h~ll remain at specified points and for a specified time. 
(xi) The conference takes note of the declarations of the 
French Government to the effect that for the settlement of all the 
problems connected ~ith the re-establishment .a~d consolidation of 
peace in Cambodia~ Laos, and Viet Nam the French Government will 
proceed from the principle of respect for the independence and 
' ' ,, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos, 
.. ,;;,. . 
-- ··-···--···:..;---·----~--- ·· .. -·---·- ·· -- --·- .. a·n·d Viet Nam o -·.... •· ~ .... • • •.• • -- • '-1.•- - • .. .. . ' - ~.. .. ~ ..... - ...... - . 
r 
.. 
(xii) In their relations with Cambodi~, Laos, and Viet Nam 
each member of the Geneva· conf~~renc.e undertakes' t_o. ;respec_.t .th~~,.~-... 
. 
' 
-""' ... 
so~~ignty, the independence, the unl,. ty, a~d the tl!rritOri,ii. 
infe i ty of the above mention~d s't.,~t;~, and to refrain from any 
'\ 
~r interference in their internal affairse-
(xiii) The members of~ .. the conference agree to consul·t one· 
another on any· questions·which may be referred to them by the 
internation~l supervisory commission in order to study such 
measures as may pro~e necessary to ensure that th~ agreements on 
the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam 
are !espectede 
.: ... 
'y 
I • 
: 
l 
l 
') 
l 
l 
'· 
.. ' ~; ,,._,. ·",.. 
.. 
;.. 
-
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. AI>PEND IX I I 
-~TATEMENT BY THE U. s. A. ON ITS-POSITION REG.ABDIN~ THE 
GENEVA DECLARATl()N, 21 July. 19541 
~ . 
The Gove"i·nmen_t .of ~he United ~tA.tes; being resolved to devote 
,.._ 
its ,rforts to the strengthening of pe~~~ in accordance with the prin~ · 
{ 
_, 
c iple s. and purposes of the United }\la tions D takes note of the agreements. 
concluded at Gen~va on· July 20 and 21 9 195%, between 
(A) The Franco·-Laotian command and the command of 'the People's 
""i 
army of Viet~Nam; 
-" (B) The Royal Khmer Army command and the command of the People's 
army of Viet~Nam; } 
( C) TheFranco-Vietnamese command and the command of the People's 
_ army of Viet~Nam; 
And-of paragraphs 1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration pr~sented to __ 
the Geneva conference on July 21,. 1954~declares with reg&rd to~~"• . 
aforesaid agreements and paragraphs that: 
lo It will refrain from the threat or the use of force to di•-
,· turb them, in accordance with Article 2 (4) of the Charter 9f ,~he 
" 
United Nations dealin~ with the obligation of members to refrain 
'" ·-1n''t'he·i·r international relations f;oiit tiie'"th~e-at/~o~ use of f6rcer 
and 
2o It would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of 
the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threat~ 
ening international peace ~nd security~ 
In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning 
,, 
free election~ in Viet-Nam 0 my Government •ishes to make clear its· 
positi~n 9 which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington 
on June 29, 1954, as follows:·· 
-In the case of ,nations now divi.ded against their will, we ·shall 
continue to seek to achieve ~nity ihr~ugh f~ee elections, super~ 
vised by the United Nations, to that .... they are conducted .. __ · 
\-
ensure 
:, ' '.~ ·,. ~ ~ 
, ~. fairly. 
~-
... ~ 
r +~ With ~espect t~ the statement made by the representative of the (. 
.. 
State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional 
'.'•·, .. ·i..: 
position that peoples are entitled to· determine their own future and 
that it will not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. 
/ : 
Nothing in its declaration just made is intended to or does indicate 
any departue from this traditional position. 
__ ..... ________ . _ l Q __ !loyal Ins_tJ :tu:t~ __ Qf .... Interna_tional 
n-ational Affairs, 1954, (London: 
pp o }q'Q ..... 41 e 
Af.fairs, Docum.ents on -Inter-
Oxford_ University Pr·ess, 1957), _ 
.. '."'" 
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e, 
--·------·----'··-·---·--·-----····-·---·"-.. - _:· _______ ::,__ ·-We -share - the hope that the agreements will perm~ t· Cambod~a, ·Lao-s -·-----
' 
~ and Viet-Nam to play their part in full independence and sovereignty 
in the peaceful community of nations and will enable the peoples· of 
that area to determine their own future. ~ 
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APPENDIX III .. 
COMMUNIQut ISSUED AFTER THE UNITED STATES-FnENCH T4LKS ON 
. . . . . 1 -···-----~-- ·: 
INDO-CHINA·, 27-29 Sept·ember 1954 -· , 
~ 
Representatives of the two Governments have had very ~frank and 
useful talks which have shown the community of their views, and are 
in full agreement on the objectives to be attained • 
. 
The conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty 
' 
· in Manila on Septmeber 8, 1954 9 .has provided a firmet.basis than 
heretofore to assist the free nations of Asia. in developing and 
" I 
,, ' 
maintaining their independence and security. The representatives 
" 
of France and the United States wish to reaffirm the support of 
J 
4 their Governments for the principles o~ self-government, independence, 
justice and liberty proclaimed by the Pacific Charter in Manila on 
September .8Jt 1954. 
The representatives of France and'the United States reaffirm 
the intention of their governments to support the complete independence 
.(r\, / 
of C mbodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam, Both France and the United _States 
R 
will continue to assist Cambodia, Laosp and Viet~Nam in their efforts 
to safe-guard their freedom and independence and to advance.the wel-
fare of their peoples. In this spirit France and the United States 
are assisting the Government of Viet-Nam in the, resettlement of the 
Vietnamese who have of their own free will moved to free Viet-Nam 
and who already number some 3009000~ 
In order to contribute to the security of the area pending the 
further development of national foFces for t~is purpose, the represen-
tatives of France indicate that France is prepared to retain forces 
-- -, ...... _ • ,I, .,. • 
of it~ Expeditionary Corps, in agreement with'the government concerned, 
"'withinthe limi-t-s permitted under. the Geneva agreements and to an extent 
_..... ' 
, to· be, determinedo The. l:Jni ted States- ·will consider the question of 
financial assistance for the Expedmtionary Corps in these circumst-
ances in addition to support of the forces of each of the three 
Associated States. These questions· vitally affect~ each of the three 
,J 
Associated States and are being fully discussed with them. 
The channel for French arid United States economicuaid, budge-
tary support, and other assista·nce to each of the Associated States 
will be direct to that statee The United States representatives will 
begin discussio~s soon with the respective governments of the Associated 
Royal lnsti tute of International Affairs, Documents on Inter-
na t-ional Affairs·, 1254, (London: Oxford~University Press, 1957), 
ppo 1~1-42. 
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States regarding di,,rect a·id-. · The methods for efficient co-ordination 
. 
of F~anch and United States aid prograis to each of the three Associated 
States are under consideration an'd will be developed in discussions·· 
with each of these statese 
I 
After the bilateral talks, the chief of diplomatic missions in 
t Washington of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-lam were invited to a fin~l 
T-
,;·. 
... 
meeting· on these matters. The re.presentatives of all five countries· 
are in complete agreement on the objectives of peace and freedom to 
be achieved in Indo-China. 
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HO. CHI ~MINH' S EIGHT~POJNT PEACE PROPOSAL· 
November 29D 1953 1 
: "Stockholm Afternoon Expressen(Liberal) today carried a 'World 
' 
·copyrighted' story based on a reported exc~ange of telegrams ·bet,veen 
its managing editor Nycop and Ho Chi-Minlh 9 relayed ··through the Viet-
Minh Charged' Affaires at Pekinge The following is the full text 
of Nycop 0 s que~tions (sent November 5) and Ho Chi-Minh's answers re-
ceived and published in Expressen November 29: 
.,..- / 
. ,~ 
"Question LA recent debate in the French National Assembly has 
shown a desire among a large number of French politicians to arrive 
at a settlement of the conflict in Indo-China through direct negotia-
. :! 
... 
\. tions with your government, Can it be expected that this -desire, ~ ------------,----·---·----- . 
. . - - .. - . -
which is now to an increasing degree shared by all French people, 
~ 
.. 
,vill find resp~nse among you and your government? 
"Ans,ver: ~J1e w~ · has been forced upon us by the French Govern-
~ - ·.. " \ ' ".-:. / mente The Vietnamese people who were forced to resort to arms dur-
ing· the past 7 to 8 years have fought heroically to defend th~i~ · 
.. naiional ihd~pendence and their right to live in peace, If the 
,,t1) French Colonials continue their war of conquest the Vietnamese 
peopJe. are determined to carry out their patriotic war to a victo-
rious ende But if the French Government has learned from these war 
, years and wishes to bring about an armistice and solve the Viet,.-Nam 
problem through negotiations, the people and Government of the 
,~emocratic Republic of Viet-Nam will be prepared to discuss the 
·French proposalo ~ 
"Question 2: Are the·re ·at present any propects for an armistice 
-
or truce? On what terms? 
.:,. 
"Answer: The -French Government ·must suspend hostilities e An 
armistice will then be·come a reality. TlJ.e.Q basis for such an ar·inistice 
I,.. 
·"' 
• 
is that the French Government really respect the independence of the 
~ I Viet-Name 
"Q~estion 3: Would you possibly accept a state which remains 
' 
.... internationally, neutral a·s the mediator for a meeting with rep-resent-
atives of the opposing side? 
·, 
.-·· I 
"Quest'ion 4: Would Swe.den meet with the requirements of such 
a task? 
-
1 e Allen B. Cole, Conflict ln Ind-o~China ·& International Re ercussion 
·(Ithica.: Cornell University Press, 1956 , PP• 148-49. ·~ 
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,_ ..... - ___ .... ,:.~------- .. - ·- .. ---~·-, -- -- - 1'Answer-- to -3 and- '1-:- _ If -some-neutral countri ett wish to see an- --- ----------------------------------- -------
- erid to the w~r in Viet-Nam and seek to b~irig ~bout negoti~tions, 
they are welcome_o But negotiations for ·an armistice are essentially · P-
\.,.. 
an affair betwe'en th~ gover·nments of France and the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam. "' 
""' 
"Question 5: In that case would you agree to a conference which 
would allow you to end the present hostilities? "' 
"Answer: The ,var has caused many hardships for our people. It , 
has also brought about much suffering for the French people. This 
' --
.. :.•1_'· 
'-y-·-- • wby the people of France struggle against the . Viet-Nam. I 18 war 1n 
--,--- -- -------------·~-----.. -, ... -. ----
have always entertai,ned a great sympathy an.d admiration for the ___ ~ ~-----~- -~~-------
'-:< ,. •. _ .. 
,·"':\. 
., 
-. ;. 
~ Q IJ • . • 
French people and the peace partisans in France. Today i~- is not 
only the independence of Viet-Nam that is exposed to serious attacks. 
I""'"''" Even the independence of France is being seriously threatened,o -. On 
'" 
the one hand 9 American impe~ialism is making the French Colonialists 
to carry on and entend the war of conquest in Viet-Nam for the pur-
,q,, 
pose of reQdering Fra~ce weake~ and weaker -and of taking over her 
position .in Viet-Nam. On the other hand, the American Imperialists_ 
·-
are forcing France to sign the EDC pact, which implies that German 
militarism will be reborn. The struggle of the French people for 
ind~pendencep democracy· and peace and for an end to the war in Viet-
. -
'Nam constitute one of the major factors in the efforts to solve the 
... ' 
,.. ./ 
Vietnamese problem." 
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'. 
The Geneva·conf~renee· is concluded with the signing of the agree-
ment which put an end to the hristilities in Indo-China. 
I. 
.,,::;.· 
• :.,P' 
>:. 
This is a great victory fo~ the people of the Democratic Republic 
'' 
of Viet-Nam and the people of other Indo-Chinese countri~s, for the 
people of France and all the people' of Asia, a great victory for all 
peace-loving people • 
. . ,. 
It is a great victory for .peace .• •• 
The singing of peac~ in Indo-China on the basis of the recogni--
. 
tionof the nationai rights of the Indo-Chinese peoples is a victory 
for all oppressed peoples who raise high the banner of struggle for ... ________ _ 
. . . . . . ·--·-·-·- .•' .. - .... ,·. · ........... -._. __ :.:.-: , .. ·--···· ·.; .. ·-- .-~ . .,.: . .,,;, ..... .-..... ~.~-. -:. .. :.: .;; .... ,;~--- ': ~ -~ -··· ..;, .... ~~" .-· ·-
nation a 1 · independence and democra!ic libertie\. 
On behalf of the people and the Governmen't of the Democratic 
Republic of V,iet-Nam, the ·de.legation of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam expresses its thanks to all the powers participating 
' 
' ... -
l 
in this ,-conf erencec, and all .. t4e peace~lovin.g peoples and governments·;·~-----
far ·or near ~ho have contributed to the achievement of peace for 
which our people have struggled with heroism for 8 yearse 
A big step has ·been taken. More steps remain to be taken. We 
have to'· build up a- .. stable and lasting peace in Indo-China by. settling 
the political questions, of ,vhich the most .important is the achieve--
• 
ment of the national unification of our people by means of elections, 
that is to say, by ~peaceful and demo-crat~c means. 
,'.,.f 
At the ~ame time, we have to build up out country, which has 
.t -
been rav~ged by piol~nge~ war, continue and intensify the ca~rying 
. out of democratic liberties, including freedom of opinion and belief, 
develop .the co_untry O s economy and cul t.ure in order to raise .t\\~ 
standard of the material and spiritual life of our peopleo 
·, 
,To accomplish the·se ta.sks, · w!tich already. pre_s_ent-themselv.e.s.~,-.;·----~ ... -----~--·-----
··-C,····---· . .-.-,·· ·,~;~,,-~ll~eed' the sympathy, supp~rt, and a"sQistance of our friend~ • 
.._ ' 7-> 
I, 
-
". . ' 
We shall need the co-~peration of peoplei-~f Southeast Asia and all 
· the rest 9f Ast-a--o:n ··-tire basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and . 
territorial integrity, non~aggression and non~interference in each 
other's internal af~airs, equality and mutual benefit, _peacE!ful co-
/ ' ' .. • ·-· .' "'l''' -
Allen B~ Cole, Conflict in lndo-Ch~,a & International Re ercussions, 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1956, ppo 160~61. 
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exi.stence, aQd we shall need· good relations with all countries of .. 
the world. 
With France in particular, a country famous for its glorious. 
tradition of liberty, the Democratfri· Republic of Viet-Nam ~rdently 
desires to form ties of confidence and friendship, which are indis-
~ensable to the restoration of peace in Indo-China and the settle-
ment of all related l(Uest~Ons, We stand for the establishment of 
economic and cultural relations with France en the basis of equalit'y 
and mutual benefitG 
We heed peace to achieve th~ unification of our country and to 
enable us to work for our national reconstruction. We shall faith-
""''=-~·"'-e'~";~'~'=-=··-·'· · . ..;..~~-->-· ------- fully and strictly carry out all the. terms of agreements which we 
. /. 
',.:· 
. ··- ·~. •. . 
----- .. -,, . --·-··-·-. -· . -·· ... 
have signed, We hope that_the other parties concerned will do the 
. i. ,_, 
same. We all need to maintain and consolidate the peace which has 
just been achievedo 
Our thoughts go out to the people of 
1
our country, who have shown 
,·, 
such great patriotism and courage during the ~ar and will exhibit 
~ 
the same patrioti-m and courage in the time of peace that has just 
beguno The conference has fixed a date for our unification, This~ 
unity we shall make and win as we have won peace9 
No force in the wQrld, internal or external, will turn us aside 
from our road to unity by p~ace and demo~racy. ·This will be the 
crowning achievement of our national independence. 
People of Viet-Nam! 'S..,(l:/ Compatriots of the South, victory is ours! 
_The independence and unity of our land is in our handsG T~e people 
who· love peace and justice throughout the world are of the same mind 
a.s we9_ Rem·ember President Ho Chi Minh'.s. words: The struggle i·s hard, 
but it . ,ve who will . final victorye 1S WlD 
Long live peace! 
' Long live the U.llity of oui'1 Motherland! 
Sour,.c~e: Peking, New Chitia News Agency, July 23, 1954. , 
* The Minister's name was Pham Van Dongo 
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STATEMENf BY SECRETARY DULLES AT A NEWS CONFERENCE 
APPENDIX . VI 
'{-. 
·. l 
July 23, 1954. 
· The Gen~va negotiations reflected the military developments in 
Indo-China. After nearly 8 years of war the forces of the French 
Union had lost control of nearly one-half of ·Viet-Nam, their hold 
on the balance .,,a~ precarious, and the French people =did not desi-.. re, 
. ' 
to prolong the waro 
These basic facts inevitably dominated the Indo-China phase of 
'.' .r.;, 
the Geneva Conference and led to settlement which, as President 
Eisenhower said, contain many features which we do not like. 
Since this was so, and since .the United States itself w-as 
;/.t 
neither a belligerent in Indo-China nor e»bject to compulsions which 
applied to othe,rs 0 we did not become a parly to the Conference results, 
We merely noted them and said thatP in accordance with the United 
Nations Charter, ,ve would not seek by force to overthrow the settl•-
mento We went on to affirm our dedication to the principle of self-
~ ~' t-.: . . t ;. ? 
determination of peo~es ·an·ti our h<>pe that the agreements would per-
mit Ca~bodia, Laos an:d Viet-Nam to be really sovereign and independent 
(J 
nationso 
'4 
The important thing from now on is not to mourn the past but 
-~ ' 
to seize the future oiportunity to prevent the loss in northern 
Viet-Nam·from leading to the extension of communism throughout 
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. In this~ effort all Qf the· 
free nations concerned should profit h¥ the lessons of the past. 
One lesson is that resistance to communism needs popular support, 
and this in turn means that the people should feel that they are 
defending their own national institutions. One of the good aspe~ts 
of the Geneva Conference is·that it.advances the truly independent 
status of C~mbodia, Laos, and southern Viet~Nam. Prim~ Minister 
Mend~ s-Fra~nce said yesterq.ay that ins true ti ons had, been gi ve-n to the 
French rep1:"esentati ves in Viet7 Nam to complete by July 30· precise 
projects for the transfers of authority.which will give reality to 
If(~' 
the independence which.France has promisedo This independence is 
' ,( 
already a fact in Laos and Cambodia, and was demonstrated at Geneva, 
notabl~ by the· Government of Cambodiao The Evolutio~ from colonialism 
·to·national independence is thus about to be completed in Indo~China, 
and the free governments of this area should from now on be able to 
le ~ Allen Bci Cole, Conflict in Indo<=>China & International Re ercussions, 
... <"~-,.·-··~-··-·-- .. -·-·-··-· -·· ....... - __ ( I thi-ca: Corne 11. Unive:r si ty _ Press, 1956 , pp• · 176-1 77. 
. .. 
i. _·· 
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·enlist the loyalty of their people to maint$in their in~~pendence 
as against Communist colonialism. 
A second lesson which shuuld be learned is that arrangements: 
Jor collective d~fence need tefbe made in advance of aggression, 
' . ' 
not after it is_under way •. The United States for over.a year_ 
advocated united action in the area~ but this proved not to be 
practical under the conditions which e±istedo We believe 9 however, 
that now it will be practical to bring about collective arrangements 
I 
to p~omote the security of the free p~oples of Southeast Asiao 
• _,,,';'!' 
Prompt steps will be taken in this direction. In this connection 
; 
we should bear in mind that the problem is not merely one of deter-
ring open armed aggression but of preventing Communist subversion 
which, taking advantage of economic dislocations and social injustice, 
might weaken and finally overthrow the non-Communist governmentse 
If the free nations which have a stake in this area will now work 
together to avail of present oppo·rtuni ties in the light of past 
-·e·xperience, then th .. e loss of the present maj" lead to a gain for the 
futuree 
Source: State Department Bulletin, XXXI, No. 788(Aug. 2, 1954), 163-l6q 
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APPENDIX VII 
.. .-
. PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL DECLINES APPROVAL OF 
MILITARY ACTION lN INDO-CHINA BEFORE 
KNOWING THE RESULTS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
'" April- 27-29, 19541 . 
-The Prime.Minister: While in Paris there •ere naturally con-
-~ .... --versations be~een the Foreign Ministers especially about the·· grav~ 
locil situation~in French 0 Indo-China. N~ d~cisi~ris were taken i~ 
advance of the Conference at Geneva • • • 
The episode of the siege of the French fortress of Die, Bien Phu,. 
the fate of which now hangs in the balance, creates a violent tension 
in many minds at a-time when calm judgment is most neededo . {he tim-
ing of the climax of this assault with the opening of the Geieva Con~ 
ference is not without significance but it must not be ~llowed to 
prejudice the sense of world proportion whi6h should inspire the 
Conference aild be a guide to those who~ are watching its- ·progress. 
Her Majesty's Government are notprepare~ to give any undertakings 
about United Kingdom military action in advance of the results of 
Ge~~vao We have not entered into any new military or poli~ical 
' ·;·· .. · . 
· commitmentse My right honorable friend(Eden)has, of course, made 
~ \ 
it clear to his colleagues at Geneva that settlements are reached 
there Her Majesty's Government will be ready to play their full 
~art in supporting them in order to 11romote a stable peace in the 
Far Easte 
Source: Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., vol.626 
(April 27, 1954), PP• ll.i55-lli56. 
., 
, .. \ .. 
le Allen B. Cole,. Conflict in Indo-China & International Re ercussions, 
(Ithica: Cornell University Press~ 19,6, PP• 183. 
.. 
( 
, 
[:, 
v· 
... 
· ' ,,,, -· • ,:. ,,_,,,:;- '.l;--ri•"\',>,:.,·,,il;. ·.._, , ~,,,·,-•t.'}':,._,-· ,.~.,~>'""vi!!\;,';;: 1:;i-->JJ,i~:;..-"",.'·•·,-,,...--,.;,.,.~~v ,~ -.·, •·-- '· ,-.. ·• '"'' - •·. " , · "'· ......... ,-,. -••"'1' .-, ,-•i .·•·.,, ... ,.-. ._,,.. • •. , •,,,_ , .'•~, ,_. , , ., . •. ,~, •· .... , .-..;, .. , ·-··•·:"- ,,,.~ .,.,., .. , , ••• .,-.,.. ··--· - --
' 1 
.. ·~ 
. , ~ 
'·~· 
f
. ··--· ····· -· . ' ·-········· .. ,.. ·.·. ... . . . .. . . •·•··· -···· .... 
APPENDIX · Vl:·I·I 
. · \'. 
.. 
·· F.OREI GN SECRETARY EDE.N'S REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF· .. · COMMONS · 
,, I 
.-, 
ON THE ~PRO'GRESS OF TALKS AT GENEVA· 
. l 
Ju:Qe 23 9 l 95~ 
Al though our"' Asian partners in the Commonweal th were not repr~e-
sented at the Conference, we.were able to keep in constant contact 
l 
~ ' 
with them at every stage of our work, This also was quite invaluable 
•. --· ~-- •· - -
. . • - i:- . 
to us because 9 ~n my vJew, there will never be any real s~~urity in 
South-East Asia without the good will of the free Asian countries, 
' If peace is once restored in Indo-China 0 then I believe that these 
•-" .. 
countries will be able to take their part in supervising and guarantee-
ing the settlement. 
' 
settlement to last. 
If so, there will be a good chance for that 
\ 
If ale~ we succeed in negotiating some form ·01 
permanent South-East Asia defense organization, it will not be fully 
effective without the understanding and support of the Colombo 
Powerse .. e • 
I hope that we shall be able to agree to an international 
guarantee of any settlement that may emerge at Geneva. I also hope 
-,:,_ 
that it will be possible to agree on some system of South-East defence 
to guard against aggressiono In other words, we could have a reciproca~ 
arrangement in which both sides take part, such as Locarno. We could 
\ 
also have a defensive alliance, such as NATO is in Europe, and, let 
me add, such as the existing Chinese-Soviet Treaty provides for the 
F_ar ,,East so far as the Communist Powers are concernede 
That is the kind of plan _that should developo These two systems,. 
I admit, are quite different, but need be i? no way incons·istente 
My belief is that by refraining from any precipitate move towards 
the formation of a NATO system in South-East Asia,' we have helped 
to create the necessary condi tiohs in which both systems c0an possibly 
be brought into being. 
Source: Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th Ser,, Vol. 529, cols. 
432-qJJe r 
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. ·• 
MAO TSE-TUNG· CONGRATULATES BO CHI MINH 
• 
ON THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS 
PEKING.,, July 23 » ,195_41 
' 
"' 
. _,., 
President .pf the Government of the Democratic Repub,lic .. of Viet-Nam. 
) ~ ... ,, 
Comrade ·ao Chi Minh: 
On the ~casion of the reaching of agreement on the. armistice 
question. and political questibn regarding 1Indo-China, on behalf of 
' " 
/ ~ ~'I, ;\ 
the Chinese people and ~he Government of the People's Republic of 
China, I send to the fraternal Vietnamese people 9 the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and you my heartfelt and 
warmest congratulationso 
At the Geneva Conference t!ie delegation of. the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam -"r~pre$e~ting the aspirations f~r peace of 
the people of Viet-Nam, who have ·been carrying out their, heroic"_ 
' 
struggle for national independence and freedom and have achieved 
brilliant victories - madie great efforts for the restoration of, p~ace 
in Indo-China and finally attained agreement. This victory is help-
ful to the'··promotion of col'i~ctive peace and security in Asia and 
J 
the further relaxation of international tensiono 
All the people of China will strivev together with the people 
~-
\. 
of Viet-Nam, fo~ ensuring t~e thorough implementation of the agree-
ments and for the pr~~ervation and consolidation of peace and security 
in Asia and the whole world. 
Mao Tse-tung 
t Peking, July 23, 1954 
<lf/1" 
~ ;-. ; 
Source: Peking China News Agency, July 23, ·195'1 • 
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Allen B. Cole, .£.onflict in lndo-China & International Re ercussions, 
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, •• • Of greatest importance wi~l be, the Gene.va Conference decisions 
prohibiting establishment of foreign military bases on the soil of 
I . '• , ..•• ' 
Vietnam, Laos anft Cambodia and al~o the commitment by these states 
not to enter into military allianceSt••• 
The Geneva Conference decision on holding·free elections in 
--~) 
Vietnam in July, 1956, creates conditions for the national unifica-
.it 
tion of Vietnam in conformity with the national interests and~aspira-
tions of the entire Vietnamese peopleo This decision, adopted as 
a result of persistent efforts by the democratic states 9 signities 
th, defeat of those aggressive forces which were striving for the 
dismemberment of Vietnam in order to make Southern Vietnam a spring-
board of the proposed new aggressive bloc in South Asia •••• 
-._____,, 
Despite the presence o~ certain reservations ·in the agreements 
signed at_ Gerteva, one should not underestimate the overall importance 
' ~ 
. ' "'\& "•JJ; . 
of these agreements, "o e~ecause at the Geneva Conference a number. . . 
of difficulties were overcome which had arisen in consequence of the 
position of the US representatives, who tried to prevent successful 
, 
completion of the work of this conference,.~. The Geneva agreements 
I 
constitute an important victory for the forces of peace and a serious 
-·~ 
- ',?':1-1 -;1,t 
defeat f~r the forces of waro At the same time the Geneva agreements 
·~-
signify international recogni~ion of the national liberatiort struggle 
and <rf the great heroism shown by· the people of Indochina i~n this 
; struggle o 
' 
Conclusion of the Geneva Conference with the ~e~~hing -~t agr~e-
. . ... 
ments among the interested countries is fresh· proof of the f~uitful-
, . 
ness of international negotiations if there ,is ·good· will on all -~ide·s, 
., 
"' proof o·f the possibility of settling in this way important inter-
r;g,~~io~~l issues which are as yet unres·olvede ••• 
Source: Excerpts from the official Soviet statement, Pravda and 
Izvestia, July 23, 195~. 
1. Allen Be Cole, Conflict in Indo-China & International re ercus~ions, 
(Ithica: Cornell University Priss, 1956 , P• 191, 
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HUYnlf~Ki~ 'Khanh, eon of Rev. & Mrs, Huynh Kim Luyen, was born 
. 
on April 20, 1936 in Quang~Nam, Viet~Nam. His early education was 
~ ' interrupted by the events of the Fr~~co-Vietnamese War, ihen his 
.... 
family evacuated· in November 1946 to the zone held by the Resd.st-
ance Government after the French attack of Haiphong, North Viet-
Nam. lVi th. his family h.e returned to the French ...... occnpied area in 
1948, where he completed his elementary ®ducation in 1950 9 and 
his secondary educatiort in 1954, both in Haipb~ng, North Viet-
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language course "English b~ Radio"o In 195~, when his family 
. . . 
evacuated to Dal at, South Viet-=·N~ml) upon. the signing of the 
Genev·a Agreements 9 he taught English before becoming an inter-
~'"" .,, . ( 
preter for Church World Service, a relief agency of the World 
~ 
Council of Churches, set up ~o help settle the r~fugees from 
North Viet-Nam~ 
With the aid of ~r. Robert P. Kelle!man, then Chairman of 
·. Vt • ·~1 
·church World Service in Viet-Nam, he came to the United States 
-:. d 
in s-eptember 1955 and· entered Wyoming Seminary, a College Pre-~ 
paratory School in Kingston, Pennsylvaniae He entered the Johns 
Hopkins University in 1956 where he majored in Political Science. 
tf! 
Having received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Johns Hopkins 
in June 1960., he entered Lehigh University to do graduate work in 
the Department- Qf International Relations. 
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